<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 12:52 AM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix"><span class="">On 12/9/2016 10:05 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
<br>
</span><span class=""><blockquote type="cite">
<div class="gmail_quote">The fact of it being better to
equal-rank the set that is important to you instead of
choosing among them is true with other rank methods too.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">In particular, it's true of Condorcet
& Bucklin. It would be true of IRV too, if IRV allowed
equal-ranking.<br>
<br>
</div>
I don't have proof that it's, in principle, a property of _all_
ranking-methods, but I don't know of an exception.</blockquote></span></div></div></blockquote><div><br><br></div><div>Hi Chris--<br><br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix"><span class="">
<br></span>
Mike,<br>
<br>
If IRV allows equal-ranking, it should definitely be the
"fractional" version (so that in every round each ballot gives a
single vote or fractions of a vote<br>
that sum to 1).<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The only reason why, some years ago, I suggested ER-IRV(whole) was because I thought it met FBC. When Kevin pointed out that it doesn't, I no longer have advocated that method. <br><br></div><div>Ordinary IRV, Benham & Woodall are fine, as-is.<br><br>I've discussed the fact that they have a problem, but that the problem has mitigations. IRV's worst problem has been the dishonest promotion of it, with false guarantees substituted for the disclosures and warning that it needs. <br><br>IRV would be fine, if, before enacting it, people understood & accepted its problem, and weren't going to favorite-bury, or repeal it as soon as it eliminates a CWv. <br><br></div><div>So, if, in some jurisdiction, IRV is the method that's popular as a proposal, my message to its advocates would just be to promote it honestly, and to not advocate or enact it unless they understand and accept how it works, what it can do, its unique character & tradeoff.<br><br></div><div>Well, this is progressive partisanship, but one reason why i wouldn't want IRV now is that it appears that, here, under current conditions, IRV's problem, even if mitigated in general, would work against progressives if it happened.<br></div><div>But I suspect that, with honest media, and well-informed voters, IRV's problem's mitigations would make its problem a lot less important.<br></div><div><br>Benham & Woodall elect a CWv when there is one, and that's an improvement. They're quite vulnerable to burial or truncation, but the worst that those can accomplish is to give IRV results. IRV at worst, Condorcet at best.<br><br></div><div>But the trouble is that IRV has always been dishonestly promoted without the necessary disclosure, which was why it was angrily repealed in Burlington, by people rightfully angry about having been deceived by promoters.<br>. <br></div><div>Also: Though, with public ballot-imaging, _any_ voting-system is secure against count-fraud, we don't currently have that (maybe never will) , and any effort to catch or prevent count-fraud is doubtful, then it's important to not make successful count-fraud any easier than it has to be. <br></div><div><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">That means not using a voting system that isn't precinct-summable. That's the other big reason to not enact IRV or its derivatives, under current conditions.<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">You wrote:<br><br>You wrote "I don't have proof that it's, in principle, a property
of _all_ ranking-methods, but I don't know of an exception."<br>
<br>
It's true of Winning Votes and Bucklin and any of the proposed
methods that meet FBC, but I don't see how it is of
ER-IRV(fractional).<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">[endquote]<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">Maybe. I hadn't considered fractional IRV or Margins Condorcet when making that statement. Admittedly I was only looking at a few kinds of methods, and so my statement was too much of a sweeping-statement.<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">
You wrote:<br><br>
Or MinMax Margins or ER-Benham(fractional) or even
Smith//Approval (implicit). <br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">[endquote]<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">Smith//Approval? <br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">What if there's member, X, of your strong top-set that is only in the voted Smith-set because, if you equal-top-rank, it ties or beats a certain member, Y, of the Smith set who is in your strong top-set. <br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">But now you rank your strong top-set sincerely, and now Y beats X. Now X is beaten by everyone in the voted Smith-set. X had been the winner, because of its high approval-total, but now some other voted Smith-set winner, Z, with next highest approval, wins, and Z is in your strong bottom-set.<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">So are you sure that equal-top-ranking all of your strong top-set isn't the best strategy in Smith//Approval?<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">But I don't advocate Smith//Approval, because I feel that, if you're going to use a ranking-method, it should meet FBC & at least have a convenient way to avoid chicken-dilemma. <br><br>(IRV is an exception, regarding FBC--Under the right conditions it could be acceptable, but of course it should be selfishly opposed by people who'd be on the wrong end of its problem).<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>
In the latter case obviously the voter should truncate hir
bottom-set, but couldn't it be the case that if the voter strictly
ranks hir top set then one <br>
of them will be the CW while the most approved candidate is in hir
bottom set but if the voter equal top-ranks hir top set there will
be a top-cycle <br>
that includes the most approved candidate?<br><br></div><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">[endquote]<br><br></div>True. Like all un-improved Condorcet methods, Smith//Approval fails FBC, and equal top ranking your strong top-set could elect a member of your strong bottom-set.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_quote">But isn't it true that the voter ordinarily wouldn't know which strong-set member s/he should strategically rank over the others? ...which strong top-set member shouldn't be moved to top?<br><br></div><div class="gmail_quote"><br></div><div class="gmail_quote">But that wouldn't usually be unpredictable, and so wouldn't it still be best toequal-top-rank.one's whole strong top-set?<br><br></div><div class="gmail_quote">Michael Ossipoff<br></div><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="m_4115445276440746259moz-cite-prefix">
<br>
Chris Benham<span class=""><br>
<br>
<br>
On 12/9/2016 10:05 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</span></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="h5">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">When I used the example of MDDA &
MDDAsc, to illustrate that it's better to equal-top-rank
your strong top-set, rather than choosing among them by
ranking them in order of preference--That wasn't intended as
criticism of MDDA & MDDAsc<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">The fact of it being better to
equal-rank the set that is important to you instead of
choosing among them is true with other rank methods too.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">In particular, it's true of Condorcet
& Bucklin. It would be true of IRV too, if IRV allowed
equal-ranking.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">I don't have proof that it's, in
principle, a property of _all_ ranking-methods, but I don't
know of an exception.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">One fairly obvious thing that can be
said for MDDA & MDDAsc is that your protection for your
strong top-set, even when ranking them (and no one else) in
order of preference, and approving them all (as is the
default), is as good as your protection of them in Approval,
when you approve only lthem.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">A majority doing so in approval will
elect one of them.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">A majority doing so in MDDA or MDDAsc
will give a majority-disqualification to everyone else. And
if preferrers of one of your strong bottom-set try burial or
truncation, and if they thereby manage to make everyone
majority-disqualified, then someone in your strong set will
win the Approval count.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">That suggests that MDDA & MDDAsc
let you choose among your strong top-set, and still protect
them from your strong bottom-set just as well as Approval
would have let you. That's an improvement over Approval.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">Of course an additional improvement
is that MDDA & MDDAsc give you an easy, convenient,
& reliable way to avoid chicken-dilemma (by denying
approval to the candidate of the distrusted faction.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">It's just that MDDA & MDDAsc
allow you to further enhance the protection of your strong
top-set, by top-ranking them all. If a majority do that,then
it would be quite impossible for buriers or truncators to
majority-disqualify them. Of course if any significant
number of voters similar to you top-rank those candidates,
that makes it much more difficult, or impossible, for
buriers or triuncators to majority-disqualify them.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">If you use the chicken-dilemma
defense of denying approval to the candidate of the
distrusted faction, and that candidate is someone whom you
top-rank, then you're still protecting hir from burial &
truncation, for the reason described above.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">If the candidate to whom you deny
approval is someone you rank below top, then that is no
longer true. If the method is MDDA, that candidate still has
the full truncation-proofness protection that any ranked
candidate has. If the method is MDDAsc, that is no longer
guaranteed. But, if Mono-Add-Plump is necessary for public
acceptance, then the cutting-loose of that middle-ranked
candidate of the distrusted faction is a regrettable but
justifiable action resulting from reasons that that faction
has given you for defection-deterrence.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">Likewise, though MDDA protects your
middle-ranked candidates from truncation by eachother's
factions, that protection isn't essential, because reliably
choosing _among_ your strong top-set isn't the important
thing. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">In MDDAsc, you're still fully
protecting your top-ranked candidates against everyone else,
and you're still fully protecting all of your rannked &
approved candidates against your unranked, unapproved
candidates. That's what's important.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">MDDA & MDDAsc are the rank
methods that best deliver the benefits that are available
from ranking-methods.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">Now, to resum my reply:<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I like to remind people that, very often, "Good
enough is better than best." That is, a voting
system (or a candidate) that is "good enough" may
very likely better than one that is "best". <br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Exactly. Eecting one that is good enough is much more
important than reducing the probability of doing so, by
trying to choose among the ones that are good enough. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>[Replying farther down] :<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
<span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
1. In this country, for
the 99%, a progressive
government would be
incomparably better than
a Republocrat government
(like we've had for a
long time, and still
have). <br>
<br>
If you don't believe it,
look at some progressive
party platforms (Greens,
etc.), and compare them
to the things that
people are saying that
they want, or that they
want changed.<br>
<br>
</div>
So, for the 99%, _any_
progressive would support
better policies than_any_
republocrat.<br>
<br>
</div>
That means that, for the
99%, there's a strong
top-set and a strong
bottom-set.<br>
<br>
</div>
...And, when there is,
Approval voting is really
simple: <br>
<br>
</div>
Approve (only) all of your
strong top-set.<br>
<br>
</div>
2. Suppose we're talking about a
better world, in a better future,
in which the 99% don't have a
bottom-set. Or suppose we're
talking about some other country,
or some entirely different
non-political <a href="http://voting-situation.in" target="_blank">voting-situation.in</a>
which you don't have strong top
& bottom sets.<br>
<br>
</div>
There are various ways that you
could vote.<br>
<br>
</div>
a) If you wanted to, and if any
reliable predictive information is
available, then you could use it for
tactical voting. (We're talking about
voting in Approval).<br>
<br>
</div>
b) If not, you could, if you wanted to,
try to estimate where, in the candidate
lineuup, your merit-expectation is, and
approve down to there, as an
expectation-maximizing strategy.
Depending on what is known or felt about
the relation between the distributions
of voters & candidates, you could
approve down to the mean, the mid-range,
or the median, of the candidates'
merits. <br>
<br>
</div>
Of course the median & midrange would
be easiest: The midrange is the point
halfway between the worst & the best.
But easiest of all is the median. You'd
approve the best half of the candidates.
That could be regarded as a rough estimate
for the other two central-tendency
measures, when they're difficult to
estimate.<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>"Approve about half" is a good enough, easy to
remember guideline. It would seem to maximize
your impact as well. </div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, you're voting between the maximum number of
candidate-pairs.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>[Replying farther down] :<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div> <br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div> <br>
<br>
Whether "about half" is good enough does depend
where the frontrunners are in each voter's
ordering of candidates, but given that the
frontrunners are likely to be close to the median
across all voters anyway, then they will likely be
positioned near the median of most voters'
ordering. <br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>c) But you needn't bother with a) or b).
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Even without strong top &
bottom-sets, you can still take a guess
about which set you'd like to elect instead
of the other candidates. <br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Maybe, though you don't have strong top
& bottom sets, you have _ordinary_ top
& bottom sets, meaning that the merit
difference between the sets is greater (even
if not incomparably greater) than the merit
differences within those 2 sets.<br>
</div>
<div>If so, you likely will feel like
approving (only) all of your (ordinary)
top-set.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Or maybe even that isn't so, and you
don't have any kind of top & bottom
sets. Maybe the merit gradation is uniform,
without any gaps or natural dividing-lines.
What then? <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Well, then you don't know where to make
your approval cutoff. You don't have an
obvious way to choose which set you want to
approve over the other. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>No problem! If you don't know which set
approve, then it doesn't matter!<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Just approve as you feel like. Maybe just
guess. Maybe flip a coin, or draw a number
from a bag. Or have the candidates' names in
a bag, and draw one to choose which one to
approve down to. If you don't know which set
you want to approve, then it doesn't matter
which set you approve.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Any such set that you choose by guessing
will include the best, and won't include the
worst, and will be within the range that you
feel that the approval cutoff should be in.
That's good enough! Don't worry about it.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Another thing: If, by guessing or drawing
from a bag, you make a choice of what set to
approve, but, when you start to actually do
so, you don't feel good about it, then don't
do it.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Maybe you'll say to yourself, "This is
_disgusting_ !" Then of course don't do
it. Don't approve down that far. Go by your
feelings.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>People who assume, as a starting premise,
that it's necessary to get the best
candidate possible are making things
unnecessarily difficult for themselves. Even
the more elaborate methods, the
ranking-methods, do do that as reliabliably
automcatically as their advocates sometimes
seem to believe.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>By approving (only) your strong top-set,
or your ordinary top-set, or (absent either
of those) a set that is a good guess, within
the range where you feel that the approval
cutoff should be--By approving that set,
you're maximizing the probability of
electing from that set. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>And that's good enough. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>My message to those who complain that
Approval doesn't automatically elect the
best candidate that you can get is: You
worry too much.<span class="m_4115445276440746259m_-4678168771722237146HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
</font></span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>I'm not so worried about electing the best. I
would worry about electing a much worse candidate
in a surprising upset. </div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Then, in Approval, approve all of your strong top-set.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div>Elections really ought to be much more boring,
but not enough to put us to sleep.<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>With honest elections and honest media, elections
wouldn't be boring, because you'd be choosing among
various versions of the very best. The choice among them,
the discussion regarding their different approaches to the
best policies and directions, would be anything but
boring.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>What's boring is when the media keep claiming your
choice is between two criminallyi-corrupt, bought
candidates, and when people believe it.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Michael Ossipoff<br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div> <br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><span class="m_4115445276440746259m_-4678168771722237146HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
</font></span></div>
<span class="m_4115445276440746259m_-4678168771722237146HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<div>Michael Ossipoff <br>
</div>
</font></span></div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I'm still planning to reply to a couple of your
earlier messages with a couple more comments. <br>
</div>
</div>
<span class="m_4115445276440746259HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br clear="all">
<br>
-- <br>
<div class="m_4115445276440746259m_-4678168771722237146gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">Daniel
LaLiberte<br>
<a href="mailto:daniel.laliberte@gmail.com" target="_blank">daniel.laliberte@gmail.com</a><br>
</div>
</font></span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
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