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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11/23/2016 8:22 AM, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p class="MsoNormal">If the 44 buriers were more conservative in
their burial by
not approving C …</p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""><br>
</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">43:
A</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">03:
A>B</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">44:
B>>C<span> </span>(sincere is B or B>A)</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">10:
C</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">… then A would win without regard to the
convention of the
default approval cutoff.</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
Forest,<br>
<br>
By my calculation B wins if the default approval cutoff is just
above equal bottom. With the symmetric completion<br>
at the bottom all three candidates have majority-strength defeats
(A>B 51-49, B>C 68.5-31.5, C>A 54-46) and the<br>
Approval scores are B47 > A46 > C10.<br>
<br>
So as in Smith//Approval B wins. This is a good example of why
Kevin Venzke wasn't in favour of allowing voters <br>
to rank among unapproved candidates (at least under
Smith//Approval). <br>
<br>
It's also a good advertisement for Approval Sorted Margins, which
easily elects A.<br>
<br>
And it leads me to think that in MDDA(SC) the default approval
should only be for the top-voted candidates.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/23/2016 8:22 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAP29onehW-5sHcA=4pug9x15A4S8=6jwMQmVt-0RRUa31WR4pg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">Chris,</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""> </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">Here’s
an example that you asked me to look at from last month.</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""> </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">You
wrote ….</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""> </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">43:
A</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">03:
A>B</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">44:
B>C<span> </span>(sincere is B or B>A)</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">10:
C</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""> </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">C>A<span>
</span>54-46,<span>
</span>A>B<span> </span>46-44,<span> </span>B>C
47-10.</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""> </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">Here
A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the
three </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">factions
of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing
B.</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""> </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">Benham
and<span> </span>LV(erw)SME<span> </span>easily elect<span>
</span>A.<span> </span>Smith//Approval (equivalent </span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">here
to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect
C.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">[end quote]</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Let’s look at this example from the point
of view
MDDA(symmetric completion):</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">With symmetric completion every candidate
is 50% plus
defeated, so nobody is disqualified, and the approval winner
is elected.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If the default is to approve only top, then
A is elected.<span> </span>If the default is to approve all
ranked
candidates, then C is elected.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Neither case rewards the buriers.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If the 44 buriers were more conservative in
their burial by
not approving C …</p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new""><br>
</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">43:
A</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">03:
A>B</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">44:
B>>C<span> </span>(sincere is B or B>A)</span></p>
<p style="margin-bottom:0.0001pt;line-height:normal"
class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"courier new"">10:
C</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">… then A would win without regard to the
convention of the
default approval cutoff.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So far so good!</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Forest</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">P.S.<br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Monkey Puzzle,</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I'll write a definition and brief
explanation of MDDA(symmetric completion) and its relation to
MDDTR, ICA, and ICT tomorrow. It looks like I won't have
enough time today.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">But briefly it is a cross between ICA and
ICT, where the voters can decide where the approval cutoff is
on their ballot. If they put it just under Top, then their
ballot is counted as in ICT. If they put it just above
Bottom, then their ballot is counted as in ICA.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">MDDTR(pt/2) and ICT are the same.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Gotta go!</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Forest<br>
</p>
</div>
<br>
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</blockquote>
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