<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>Of the methods that combine Approval with pairwise-count, maybe PAV is the one that is most favorable to Approval, while still letting people vote rankings that count and letting pairwise-count have a role.<br><br></div><div>Does that make it the best of that class?<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br></font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div>Michael Ossipoff<br></font></span></div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 1:54 PM, Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div>But wouldn't Smith//Approval, with approval cutoffs in the rankings, share MDDTR's burial-vullnerability?<br><br></div>...with, additionally, vulnerability to truncation, which MDDTR _doesn't_ have?<br><br></div>And Smith//Approval trades MDDTR's FBC for Smith, which I consider an unfavorable trade.<br><br></div>I now again consider Benham & Woodall to be the best proposals for an electorate that wants &/or needs rankings...because of the IRV mitigations that i mentioned in my previous posting, and because of the context of the always high price of CD, as exemplified by MDDTR.<br><br></div>It could be debatable whether IRV's CWs elimination problem is worse than MDDTR's burial vulnerability problem, but, because of IRV's mitigations, I tend to feel that IRV is better, _for people who want or need routine ranking_.<br></div>Myself, I personally prefer MDDTR, with middle-ranking usually avoided, but I'm talking about what's best for the electorate as a whole.<br><br></div>In polls with balloting by both Approval & Score, I've observed overcompromisers doing better with Score than with Approval. They (and rival parties) would probably do even better with rankings.<br><br></div>Suggested merit-order for electorates that want &/or need rankings:<br><br></div>1.Benham<br></div>2. woodall<br></div>3. IRV<br></div>4. MDDTR<br></div>5. Methods combining Approval with pairwise-count<br></div>6. ER Bucklin/MJ<br></div>7. Score<br></div>8. Approval<br><br></div>I still personally prefer Approval, or maybe MDDTR, when used as Approval with 2nd-ranking as a defection-deterrent. But this suggested merit-order is for electorates who want &/or need rankings.<br><br></div>On pure merit, Woodall seems a bit better than Benham, because it's more particular which Smith-set member it elects. But Benham is much briefer to define, not needing to define or mention the Smith-set, and that makes a big difference in proposability, which outweighs the small merit-difference.<br><br></div>I don't know the merit-order among the methods that combine Approval with pairwise-count.<br><br>Maybe the ones that start with Approval are better than the ones that start with pairwise-count. <br><br></div>Among those, Brams' PAV is vulnerable to truncation, where MAMPO isn't.<br><br></div>But maybe that's a good thing, if the majority CWs among the majority-approved candidates isn't in your strong top-set.<br><br></div>A proposal that the Greens upgrade from IRV to Benham seems reasonably proposable.<br><br></div>Though Benham & Woodall are vulnerable to burial & truncation, the worst that can result from those strategies is the same as what IRV would have done anyway.<span class="m_-930797630882006229HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br></font></span><div><div><span class="m_-930797630882006229HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Michael Ossipoff</font></span><div><div class="m_-930797630882006229h5"><br><div><div><div><br><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><br><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 9:05 AM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172m_-9006749870759545372moz-cite-prefix"><span>On 11/17/2016 9:00 AM, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>
<div>Here's a simple method that is essentially
Smith//Approval without having to mention the Smith set:<br>
<br>
</div>
List the candidates in order of approval, highest to lowest,
top to bottom. While any candidate pairwise beats an adjacent
candidate higher in the list, switch places of the two lowest
out of order adjacent members.<br>
<br>
</div>
When there remains no out of order adjacent pair, elect the
candidate at the top of the list.</blockquote>
<br></span>
Forest,<br>
<br>
I like Smith//Approval and your usually equivalent Max Covered
Approval method. <br>
<br>
But in this version, the stipulation that we "switch places of
the two <i>lowest</i> out of order adjacent members" could look a
bit arbitrary and less smooth<br>
than Margins-Sorted Approval.<br>
<br>
BTW, it seems to me that both this and Smith//Approval can
handle the Chicken Dilemma situation quite well if we use ranked
ballots with approval cut-offs.<br>
<br>
(Or ratings ballots with many slots that register approval and as
many (or maybe as few as only 2) that register unapproval.)<br>
<br>
<a class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172m_-9006749870759545372moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins" target="_blank">http://wiki.electorama.com/wik<wbr>i/Approval_Sorted_Margins</a><br>
<br>
<a class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172m_-9006749870759545372moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Cutoff" target="_blank">http://wiki.electorama.com/wik<wbr>i/Approval_Cutoff</a><br>
<br>
And here's another smooth Condorcet method that should do as well:<br>
<br>
*Voters score the candidates on some scale that allows large and
varied gaps between the candidates: say 0-100.<br>
Elect the CW if there is one.<br>
<br>
Otherwise compress the 1-point gaps (if any) on all ballots into
zero-point gaps (so that those ballots abandon their original
pairwise preference for any <br>
X originally scored only one point more than any Y).<br>
<br>
Based on the thus modified ballot information, elect the CW if
there is one.<br>
<br>
Otherwise compress the 2-point gaps (if any) on all ballots into
zero-point gaps (so that those ballots abandon their original
pairwise preference for any <br>
X originally scored two points more than any Y).<br>
<br>
Based on the thus modified ballot information, elect the CW if
there is one.<br>
<br>
And so on, as gradually as possible compressing larger and larger
gaps until we have a pairwise beats-all winner.*<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<div><div class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/17/2016 9:00 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
</div></div></div><div><div class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172h5">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>Here's a simple method that is essentially
Smith//Approval without having to mention the Smith set:<br>
<br>
</div>
List the candidates in order of approval, highest to
lowest, top to bottom. While any candidate pairwise beats
an adjacent candidate higher in the list, switch places of
the two lowest out of order adjacent members.<br>
<br>
</div>
When there remains no out of order adjacent pair, elect the
candidate at the top of the list.<br>
<br>
</div>
Note that the winner will automatically be a member of the top
cycle, and if it is a cycle of three, it will be the most
approved member of the cycle.<br>
<br>
</div>
Also notice that it yields an unambiguous social order, and that
there can be no second place complaint.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 5:19 PM,
Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>When I started my
current EM
participation, I was
saying that 3-Slot
ICT was my favorite
method.<br>
<br>
</div>
That doesn't conflict
with saying that I
consider Approval the
best, because I regard
3-Slot ICT, or
unlimited-rankings ICT
(when used
approval-like) as an
Approval version
without
chicken-dilemma.<br>
<br>
</div>
Later I realized that
MDDTR is better than
ICT, because it gives
better protection to
middle candidates.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>I measure that
protection by how well
they'd be protected if
they were CWs. ...what
it would take to protect
their win, and how well
it's protected.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
I define "middle
candidates" as candidates
you rank or rate below top
and above bottom.<br>
<br>
</div>
ICT gives no protection to
middle candidates, against
burial, or even against
innocent, non-strategic
truncation--the two things
that threaten a CWs in
pairwise-c0unt methods.<br>
<br>
</div>
MDDTR gives full
truncation-proofness to middle
candidates, but (contrary to
what I earlier believed), its
protection of middle
candidates against burial can
only be called "shabby".<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
By the way, I no longer think that
ICT or MDDTR needs to be 3-slot.
3-Slot would be fine with me,
because I believe that ICT or
MDDTR should be used as Approval,
and that middle rating or ranking
should only be used when seriously
needed to deter chicken-dilemma
defection. When middle is used in
an unlimited-ranking MDDTR or ICT,
it should probably consist of
2nd-place ranking, if you want to
give the demoted candidates the
best protection. ...but maybe
you'd rather rank them with
respect to eachother, at different
middle levels, as I probably
sometimes would.<br>
<br>
</div>
But, as I've been saying, activists
& organizations seem to like
rankings, and some
people--overcompromisers & rival
parties--might very well need
rankings to soften their voting
errors.<br>
<br>
</div>
And it seems to me that there's no
particular reason not to rank, in
order of preference, your middle
candidates, if some of them are better
than others, or if the voters of some
of them are less trustworthy than
others.<br>
<br>
</div>
So, that's if you want CD, in addition
to FBC, and good protection for middle
candidates<br>
<br>
</div>
Even if you're using the method as
Approval, you still want your demoted
candidate(s) to be well protected. Just
because you don't trust hir voters doesn't
mean you want to throw her to the hounds
and thereby lower Pt, the probability of
electing from your strong top-set.<br>
<br>
</div>
Anyway, so far, this is all referring to CD
methods.<br>
<br>
</div>
Of those, I like MDDTR best. As a rank method,
it (as i said) gives only shabby
burial-protection to a middle candidate. But
evidently (please tell me it isn't so) you
can't have FBC, CD, and good protection of
middle candidates.<br>
<br>
</div>
I consider CD more important to how well
protected middle candidates are. Yes, FBC + CD
give poor protection to middle candidates, and
that lessens the value of their CD. But non-CD
methods don't have CD at all, and that's worse.<br>
<br>
</div>
So I prefer MDDTR to methods that give better
protection to middle candidates, but don't have
CD.<br>
<br>
</div>
So, where I used to say that my favorite method is
3-Slot ICT, now I say that my favorite method is
MDDTR. Preferably with unlimited rankings. (Though
one could use only the 1st, 2nd, & bottom
positions if one chose to). ...regardable as a
chicken-dilemma-free version of Approval.<br>
<br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>------<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Non-CD methods with better "middle-strategy" than
CD methods:<br>
<br>
</div>
But, in an election, I'm just one voter, and so, how
well-suited the method is to me is less important, and
won't affect the outcome as much, in comparison to how
well-suited the method is to lots of progressives. <br>
<br>
</div>
So, what if most progressives would rather have a method
that's really good as a rank method, a method that has
good "middle strategy" (strategy for protecting a middle
candidate's win if s/he's CWs). <br>
<br>
</div>
That would be important if you knew that all or nearly
all, or even most of them were going to use the method
purely as a rank method.<br>
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Bucklin is the traditional FBC rankings-method.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>I distinguish 2 kinds of middle strategy merit:<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>1. How well the method protects top-ranked
candidates against middle-ranked candidates. I call
that "Middle1"<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>2. How well the lmethod protects a middle-ranked
candidate against any candidate you rank lower than
hir. I call that "Middle2".<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>So, how to get the best middle strategy, with the
main goal still being keeping a good probability,
Pt, of electing from your strong top-set?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MDDTR's middle1 seems better than that of
Bucklin. In MDDTR, you're voting to contribute to a
majority for your top against your middle. In
Bucklin, you can protect top against middle by
skipping some rating-levels above the middle
candidates. In that way, you can give the top
candidates time to receive the coalescing
lower-choice votes that they'll get from the
preferrers of other candidates, before giving
anything to the middle candidates.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>That's a bit more work than just ranking in order
of preference. It requires you to judge where, and
how far down in rankings, your top candidates are
going to receive lower-choice votes from.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>So I suggest that MDDTR does better at Middle1
than Bucklin does.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>But Bucklin does better at Middle2.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>In Bucklin, the CWs's win is protected by the
people who pretty-much agree with you, the people of
your wing, merely not ranking down too far. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MDDTR needs that too, but it isn't enough to give
MDDTR more than shabby protection.<br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>...And Bucklin's Middle1,
though not as convenient or
easy as that of MDDTR, isn't
as questionable as MDDTR's
Middle2. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>So, overall, I'd say that
Bucklin's Middle Strategy is
better than that of MDDTR. So,
for people who want to use the
method purely as a
rank-method, Bucklin is better
than MDDTR.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Bucklin also has the
advantage of use-precedent.
MDDT has the advantage of
precinct-summability,but I
don't consider that essential.
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>For voters using the method
purely as a rank method, I'd
prefer Bucklin to MDDTR.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Chicken dilemma won't
happen all the time, probably
won't happen often. But
middle-protection will always
matter to people using it as a
rank method.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>But it seems to me that,
once we give up CD (for voters
who need good middle
strategly, because of their
rank voting), then it might be
possible to do better than
Bucklin.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>It seems to me that methods
that use both Approval and
pairwise-count can do better
than Bucklin, at middle
protection.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>A lot of methods of that
kind have been proposed, and
I've ignored all of them
because they don't meet CD.
But, as mentioned above, for
some electorates, middle
strategy could be more
important.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>It seems to me that MDDA
(also evidently named MPOA)
and Smith//Approval are two
methods that might be better
than Bucklin at middle
protection..<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Using Approval as the
cycle-solution is a very
powerful idea (if you're
willing to give up CD, for an
electorate's needs). But most
of you already knew that,
before I paid attention to it
(...because I was only looking
at CD methods)..<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MDDA's &
Smith//Approval's burial
vulnerability doesn't matter
much, when the Approval winner
wins the cycle. In fact,
Smith//Approval's
truncation-vulnerability could
even be regarded as an
advantage, for when your
strong top-set doesn't include
the CWs.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MDDA & Smith//Approval
look better to me than
Bucklin.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Simpler Middle1. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Precinct-Summability is an
added bonus.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MDDA seems to have a
briefer definition than either
Bucklin or Smith//Approval,
and brief definition can be
decisive.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>I know of Bucklin being
rejected when MDDTR was
accepted. MDDA would almost
surely have been accepted too.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>I don't think
Smith//Approval would go over
well, with its need to define
the Smith set, which greatly
lengthens the definition.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>For an electorate that need
good Middle1 & Middle2
more than CD, MDDA seems the
winner so far.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Smith//Approvsl of course
meets Smith. ...which of
course means that it fails
FBC. But does it need FBC?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>It could be argued (but I
don't know if it's true) that
Smith//Approval doesn't need
FBC, because, though you don't
have an efffective Approval
vote at the top, you still can
vote Approval, with the
approval-cutoff, or by only
ranking your strong top-set. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>So, though Compromise could
become pair-beaten by Favorite
because you raise Favorite to
top with Compromise, resulting
in a cycle instead of a CWv
win for Favorite, the cycle
will be judged by approvals,
and you're approved only your
strong top-set.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
Of course, just because
Favorite was almost the CWv
doesn't necessarily mean that
s/he'll win the Approval
count. But are you any worse
off than you'd have been with
MDDA?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Forest (but maybe others
too) has proposed a number of
methods that combine
pairwise-count and Approval.
Do any of those beat MDDA
& Smith//Approval by the
standards of protecting one's
strong top-set, and Middle1
& Middle2?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>in particular, do any of
them do better than MDDA by
those standards? Do any do as
well as MDDA by those
standards and have as brief a
defintion, or nearly as brief
a definition?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>In other words, are there
methods that achieve those
things better than MDDA &
Smith//Approval, or achieve
them better than MDDA and have
as brief a definition?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>In fact, is there a method
that meets FBC (or doesn't
need it), meets CD, and does
as well by Middle1 &
Middle2 as MDDA,
Smith//Approval or Bucklin?<span class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172m_-9006749870759545372HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>
</font></span></div>
<span class="m_-930797630882006229m_-5128077215961204172m_-9006749870759545372HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<div>Michael Ossipoff<br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
</font></span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<p color="#000000" align="left"><br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p><br>
</p>
</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>