<div dir="ltr">Chris's suggestion is a good one, though in some ways the original idea has come full circle.<div><br></div><div>His suggestion is now reduced to a form of Condorcet completion.</div><div><br></div><div>The primary difference from Smith//Approval is that unless the Smith Set is explicitly required, the winner could potentially come from outside the Smith Set.</div><div><br></div><div>In the example below,</div><div><br></div><div>40 C</div><div>32 A >> B</div><div>28 B >> A</div><div><br></div><div>A is the CW and the completion rule is not necessary. But I can imagine that there might be situations where a determined CD betrayal by B voters could force the approval two-seat parliament runoff and prevent A from being one of the contenders.</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br clear="all"><div><div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"> Frango ut patefaciam -- I break so that I may reveal<br></div></div>
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 11, 2016 at 11:18 PM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-7431796777548558363moz-cite-prefix">The "deweight to zero" option would be
best for avoiding an extra easy Push-over incentive. <br>
<br>
With voters being allowed to rank both above and below an approval
threshold, this a one-ballot per voter and one trip<br>
to the polling station version of an earlier suggestion of mine
for a 2 trips to the polling station method using simple Approval<br>
ballots.<br>
<br>
But then we have a method that can badly fail Condorcet and fails
FBC.<br>
<br>
I suppose if we don't mind a kludge fix it to meet Condorcet:<br>
<br>
*Voters submit rankings with an approval threshold (Default is all
candidates ranked above equal-bottom are interpreted as approved).<br>
Elect the CW if there is one.<br>
Otherwise elect the pairwise winner between (among members of the
Smith set?) the most approved candidate A and the candidate <br>
most approved on ballots that don't approve A.*<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<div><div class="h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/12/2016 10:51 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
</div></div></div><div><div class="h5">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Very good! And it works for a variety of Proportional
Representation methods, whether you deweight the ballots to
1/2, 1/3, or even totally deweight to zero, so that no ballot
that approved the first finalist has any weight at all in
deciding who the second finalist is. That may be the simplest
method. <br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 11, 2016 at 10:13 AM,
Monkey Puzzle <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:araucaria.araucana@gmail.com" target="_blank">araucaria.araucana@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">In this chicken dilemma defection situation,
the As and Bs could add preferences below the approval
cutoff:<span>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>40 C</div>
<div>32 A>>B</div>
<div>28 B>>A</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>Both groups defect from each other, but assign their
rival a higher preference above other disapproved
candidates.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>C and the larger first choice of A or B are the two
parliament seats, and the disapproved preference helps
that candidate win.</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><span><br clear="all">
<div>
<div class="m_-7431796777548558363m_5010640678908645253gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"> Frango ut
patefaciam -- I break so that I may reveal<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</span>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<div class="m_-7431796777548558363h5">On Fri, Nov 11, 2016 at 12:21 AM,
Kristofer Munsterhjelm <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
</div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div class="m_-7431796777548558363h5"><span>On 11/11/2016 01:48 AM, Forest
Simmons wrote:<br>
> Some of the replies are taking the subject
line too literally. We're<br>
> not talking about top two runoff, but two
member PR runoff. we find out<br>
> who the two member parliament would be then
pit those two against each<br>
> other.<br>
><br>
> So<br>
><br>
> 40 C<br>
> 32 A>B<br>
> 28 B>A<br>
><br>
> Suppose that we use PAV with implicit
approval<br>
><br>
> The A is the first member in the two member
parliament.<br>
><br>
> The two factions that supported A get their
weights cut in half, so C is<br>
> the second member.<br>
><br>
> The runoff is between A and C, not between
A and B, as some people are<br>
> assuming.<br>
><br>
> If the B faction defects, then the two
members of the pariliament would<br>
> be B and C, and the pairwise winner would
be B, so the method does not<br>
> satisfy CD.<br>
<br>
</span>On a more intuitive level, that isn't too
surprising. Suppose you have a<br>
Bush-Nader-Gore situation. The runoff doesn't help
the voters who want<br>
to know whether to vote {Nader, Gore} or {Nader},
since if they vote<br>
only Nader, Bush and Gore may go to the runoff
(i.e. Nader loses). On<br>
the other hand, if they do vote {Nader, Gore}, and
Gore is picked for<br>
the first winner, then their ballots will be
deweighted and Nader<br>
probably won't come in second anyway.<br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="m_-7431796777548558363m_5010640678908645253HOEnZb">
<div class="m_-7431796777548558363m_5010640678908645253h5">----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for
list info<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="m_-7431796777548558363mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="m_-7431796777548558363moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
<br>
<fieldset class="m_-7431796777548558363mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div></div></div>
<br>----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>