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<blockquote type="cite">1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject
each candidate. Default is Accept.</blockquote>
<br>
This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
candidates and like checking boxes, whereas<br>
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in
their favourite and content to keep voting the<br>
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do
so under Approval).<br>
<br>
They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their<br>
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to
also give "Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair<br>
and dumb.<br>
<br>
It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason
to resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate<br>
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".<br>
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or
with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would
eliminate all candidates.</blockquote>
<br>
I don't like arbitrary thresholds. Obviously this causes failure
of Irrelevant Ballots Independence. But also there is the problem<br>
that the final exact number of valid ballots can be disputed
and/or take quite a while to establish. <br>
<br>
Postal votes can take a while to come in, or may be mislaid and
later found. The validity of certain ballots can be disputed and<br>
the subject of legal proceedings. Some people might have
initially been denied the right to vote, but then succeed in
having that<br>
over-turned and are then allowed to vote.<br>
<br>
It is much better if the algorithm just (more-or-less directly)
compares the candidates with each other rather than measure them
against<br>
arbitrary percentage-of-the-votes thresholds.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all
non-eliminated candidates.<br>
4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already
been tallied).<br>
5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is
the final leader.</blockquote>
<br>
As Kevin pointed out and you now concede, this fails FBC. Kevin
Venzke's post included:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1478564409045_20563"><span><font
size="3"><br>
</font></span></div>
<div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1478564409045_20563" dir="ltr"><font
id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1478564409045_21849" size="3">I
believe under your method, the only time a voter doesn't
eventually upgrade his "accepts" into "prefers" is if he
prefers every tally leader that ever comes up. I guess most
of the time, accepts and prefers end up counting the same.
But the concern would be that there are ballots out there
that prefer all the tally leaders (including my compromise
choice, but excluding my favorite) and accept some
candidates worse than my compromise. In that case I could
regret voting for my favorite because of how it affects the
influence contributed by other voters.</font></div>
</blockquote>
<br>
It sounds to me from this that the method would also fail
Mono-raise.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"> I think it even meets the voted
majority Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3
candidates and where all ballots use the full range</span></font></blockquote>
<br>
49: A>C>>B<br>
03: C>A>>B<br>
48: B>C>>A<br>
<br>
100 ballots. C>A 51-49, C>B 52-48, A>B 52-48.<br>
<br>
C is the "majority CW", but this method eliminates C and B.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/8/2016 12:57 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAO82iZwo8sdv-gQCaVb2u4+1s8wvQikVR5MJOfWsd0QTyRo1gQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">Here's a new system. It's like PAR,
but meets FBC, and deals with center squeeze correctly in
the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm considering
using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the
current PAR to something like "<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg">Old
Par</a>". Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily
called <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting">PARFBC</a>.</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"> </span></font></div>
<ol style="margin:0.3em 0px 0px
3.2em;padding:0px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">
<li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Voters can Prefer, Accept, or
Reject each candidate. Default is Accept.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Candidates with a majority of
Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless
that would eliminate all candidates.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Tally "prefer" ratings for all
non-eliminated candidates.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Find the leader in this tally,
and add in "accept" ratings on ballots that don't prefer the
leader (if they haven't already been tallied).</li>
<li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Repeat step 4 until the leader
doesn't change. The winner is the final leader.</li>
</ol>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">...</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">This is pretty much a holy grail
system from my perspective. It meets FBC (I think; I don't
have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals with
a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It
deals with center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it
even meets the voted majority Condorcet criterion, in an
election with 3 candidates and where all ballots use the
full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such
an election without breaking any compliances).</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">It has a sequential counting
process like IRV, and so it fails summability; but in most
cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will happen
only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted
Condorcet cycle.)</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">It even meets weakened versions of
both Later No Help and Later No Harm; weak enough so that
they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest.
Later No Help holds if there's no possible Condorcet
cycle; and Later No Harm holds if the "later" candidate
isn't on the edge of being eliminated.</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">I think that the explanation is
clear and intuitive enough to be reasonably acceptable to
most voters. It involves only simple adding to tallies,
not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or
the like.</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font face="sans-serif" color="#252525"><span
style="font-size:14px">Does anybody have any reason why
this system should not be considered a leading contender
for "next step after approval"?</span></font></div>
</div>
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