<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2016-11-10 9:04 GMT-05:00 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
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<blockquote type="cite">1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject
each candidate. Default is Accept.</blockquote>
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This seems to assume that all the voters are interested in all the
candidates and like checking boxes, whereas<br>
I should think that a lot of voters would be only interested in
their favourite and content to keep voting the<br>
way they did under plurality (and would presumably continue to do
so under Approval).<br>
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They should be allowed to continue giving the most effective vote
possible by simply giving a "Prefer" rating to their<br>
favourite. In-effect penalising such voters for forgetting to
also give "Rejects" to all their non-favourites is unfair<br>
and dumb.<br>
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It will give voters who aren't fans of the new method extra reason
to resent it. Suppose that a strong candidate<br>
from an established party very narrowly loses just because some of
his/her supporters forgot to give out "Rejects".<br>
Don't you think that might fuel a movement to dump the method?<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>My thinking was that in most real-world situations, you'd only have to check one prefer and one reject to get maximum effectiveness, and it would be obvious which to reject.</div><div><br></div><div>But I see your point. So I'm changing the method to: "Default is reject for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, or accept for those who do." <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div class="gmail-m_-4276529064168255280moz-cite-prefix">
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<blockquote type="cite">2.Candidates with a majority of Reject, or
with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would
eliminate all candidates.</blockquote>
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I don't like arbitrary thresholds. Obviously this causes failure
of Irrelevant Ballots Independence. But also there is the problem<br>
that the final exact number of valid ballots can be disputed
and/or take quite a while to establish. <br>
<br>
Postal votes can take a while to come in, or may be mislaid and
later found. The validity of certain ballots can be disputed and<br>
the subject of legal proceedings. Some people might have
initially been denied the right to vote, but then succeed in
having that<br>
over-turned and are then allowed to vote.<br>
<br>
It is much better if the algorithm just (more-or-less directly)
compares the candidates with each other rather than measure them
against<br>
arbitrary percentage-of-the-votes thresholds.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If the number of uncounted ballots is enough to sway the election using a threshold, it has every chance of being enough to sway the election without thresholds. Only under the assumption that all uncounted ballots are irrelevant does your objection apply particularly to threshold methods.</div><div><br></div><div>...</div><div><br></div><div>I'm giving up on the method I'd proposed earlier. It's now called "CPAR", for Complicated PAR. But I do have a new patch to PAR to make it pass FBC:</div><div><br></div><div><ol><li>Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is "Accept"; except that for voters who do not explicitly reject any candidates, default is "Reject". Voters can also mark a global option that says: "I believe that voters like me should be the first to compromise." <br></li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates. If a candidate would have been eliminatable considering all the "prefer" votes they got on "compromise" ballots as "rejects", then they are considered "eager to compromise"</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">The winner is the non-eliminated candidate with the highest score. Candidates score 1 point for each voter who prefers them, and 1 point for each voter who accepts them and prefers only candidates who were eliminated or eager to compromise.</li></ol><div><font color="#252525" face="sans-serif"><span style="font-size:14px">The above method meets FBC, except in vanishingly rare cases where multiple candidates are simultaneously at a threshold (analogous to perfect ties).</span></font></div></div></div></div></div>