<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 11:25 PM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix"><span>On 11/9/2016 8:35 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><br><p dir="ltr"><br></p>
<p dir="ltr">In Benham, Woodall, ICT, & probably many or
most pairwise-count methods, the CWs has no protection from
burial, or even from innocent, non-strategic truncation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With wv-like strategy, truncation from one side
can't take victory from the CWs & give it to the
truncators' candidate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...and plumping by the CWs's voters makes it
impossible for burial to succeed. In fact, the mere threat of
that plumping can deter burial.</p>
</blockquote>
<br></span>
So to "protect" some candidate that some voters imagine is the
sincere CW </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In Burlington, IRV got repealed because it didn't "protect" the CWv.<br><br></div><div>The Burlington Republicans would have had to favorite-bury in order to "protect" the CWs.<br><br></div><div>As for "imagine", yes it can't always be reliably-predicted who's the CWs, That isn't a good reason to make it difficult to "protect" the expected or evident CWs.<br><br></div><div>When you let the CWv lose, you have an angry majority after the election, as exemplified in Burlilngton. For many people, the CWs is the best that they can get, and that's a reason to make it easy to "protect" the expected or evident CWs.<br><br></div><div> You wrote:<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix"> (when perhaps there is no sincere CW or some other
candidate <br>
is the sincere CW) you want to have a "defensive truncation"
strategy available<i> inside</i> a method with a very strong
random-fill incentive?<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">(endquote)<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">As a deterence against burial, sure. <br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">I admit that it's difficult to improve on Approval, and that such improvement is usually/mostly illusory. But, as I've said, organizations, activists, and many progressive parties want rankings. And ranking might soften or partly avoid the voting-errors of overcompromisers & rival parties.<br><br>Polls with Approval & Score balloting showed voters doing better with Score than with Approval. Maybe rankings, too, would soften voting-errors.<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>And you should add (and stress) that it needs plumping by <i>all
</i>of the "CWs voters to make it impossible for burial to
succeed", and not ,say, <br>
merely 93% of them (with the other 7% sincerely fully ranking):<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">(endquote)<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">In your example below, I find nothing wrong with B winning. The example has no CWv. As you yourself have said, the voting-system can't read the voters' minds.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">After the election, the important thing about electing the CW is to avoid having an angry majority. In your example, the winner was the candidate over whom the fewest voters preferred someone else. That isn't a bad result.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">You speculate that A was the CWs in the example. <br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">If A was the CWs, then plumping by even 100% of the A voters wouldn't have foiled the burial by the B voters.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">Your "CW" (Candidate A) is a peculiarly unsupported CWs.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">"Protecting" such a CWs wasn't what wv was proposed, offered & advocated for.<br><br>When I first proposed wv in the late '80s, I showed its "protection" of a middle CWs who is supported from both sides. I never claimed that it could "protect" a CWs who is entirely unsupported by preferrers of any other candidate. "Protection" of an entirely outside-unsupported CWs was never the intended purpose of wv.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">You "CWs" is entirely unsupported by preferrers of any other candidate.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">You said that maybe the B voters are indifferent between A & C (...that their sincere preferences are "B".), or that maybe their sincere 2nd choice is A.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">In the former scenario, we have 3 factions with no support for anyone other than their favorite. <br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">In the 2nd scenario, the B voters, preferring A as their 2nd choice, reverse that preference to bury B. ...and the C voters, few in number, give no support to A. In both scenarios, A isn't supported by the preferrers of any other candidate.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">So, is that the big-bad bad-example for MDDTR & wv?<br><br>
43: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
44: B>C (sincere may be B or B>A)<br>
10: C<br>
<br>
100 ballots. C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10. Top
Ratings A46 > B44 > C10. Approvals: C54 > A46 > B44.<br>
<br>
Here MDDTR (like MDDTA and WV and Margins and MMPO and Jameson's
latest "holy grail") all elect the possibly burying voters'
favourite, B.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">(endquote)<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">"Possiblely burying". The voting system needn't worry about "possibly". As I said, you've sometimes pointed out that the voting system can't read voters' minds. What the voting-system is given, in your example, is the fact that there's no CWv, and that B is the candidate to whom fewest voters prefer someone else. The election of B will result, after the election, in the least-opposed winner.<br><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">Somehow the rest of your post got deleted. I'll reply to it later.<br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix"><br></div><div class="m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">Michael Ossipoff<br></div><div> </div></div><br></div></div>