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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11/7/2016 6:18 PM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5Cj==NBH+H0cBrQK-MgxwhwPG__1HH8FA7D5KkmFaOoEg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 11:24 PM,
C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"><span
class="">On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">...someone could say. "You
didn't just favor X. You added a ballot, thereby
spoiling a majority. It has nothing to do with the
fact that you voted for X. You could have plumped
for any of various candidates, and the effect
would have been exacsly the same."<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span> "Someone" could <i>say</i> that, but it
wouldn't make any sense.<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>But how so?<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<br>
C: Failing mono-add-plump is as stupid as a quasi-"intelligent"
device can be, in a pure and starkly obvious way, and with the
lamest possible excuse.<br>
<br>
The algorithm/device decides that X should win, and then receives
some more ballots that contain nothing whatsoever but the pure and
simple message:<br>
"You are right! X should win" and responds with the bizarre
malfunction "I've changed my mind, Y should win" and offers the
nonsensical excuse "Hey those<br>
extra ballots didn't just say that X should win. They also increased
the total number of ballots!".<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">C: What (arguably) desirable properties (or
criterion compliances) are incompatible with meeting
Mono-add-Plump?<br>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Mike: FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require
failing Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes
problem.<br>
<br>
</div>
With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy is
Mono-Add-Plump.</blockquote>
<br>
C: There are methods that meet FBC and CD and mono-add-plump. So
your proposition boils down to saying that it's worth giving up
compliance with <br>
mono-add-plump just to gain "wv-like strategy".<br>
<br>
That argument is impossible to make. And it isn't clear to me that
"wv-like strategy" is even something we should take if it was free.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5Cj==NBH+H0cBrQK-MgxwhwPG__1HH8FA7D5KkmFaOoEg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
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<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div> <br>
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<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
<blockquote type="cite">But you can't say anything
like that to to explain why X lost when I raised hir
in my ranking. In that instance, making the
ballot-set more favorable to X is the _only_ thing
that I'm doing.</blockquote>
<br>
Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good
thing. If the method used was one of the mono-raise
failing methods I like (such as IRV and Benham), I
would say:<br>
<br>
"Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to
have every desirable property (because some of those
properties are mutually incompatible), and this method
economises<br>
by not meeting mono-raise. </div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Exactly. The more properties, important desirable ones,
a method provides, the more of a cost there is, in terms
of "embarrassment criteria", "could-look-bad".<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>So it's a matter of what you're getting in terms of the
"could-look-bad", and whether that could-look-bad could be
bad in a practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's
"Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad news, and, as you
suggested, is more than a "look-bad".<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham, Woodall & IRV
is only a could-look-bad. It never bothered me, and never
stopped me from saying good things about those methods.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Likewise the lesser look-bad of MDDTR, when it fails
Mono-Add-Plump.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has wv-like strategy.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>...the same advantages that MMPO has.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>You like IRV, Benham & Woodall. Lots of people here
love IRV. I don't reject those methods, though they aren't
my main proposals, because of FBC, and the fact that
there's nothing the CWs's voters can do to protects hir
from losing, and the fact that Benham & Woodall are
pairwise-count methods very vulnerable to pairwise-count
offensive strategy, and innocent, nonstrategic truncation.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>If you aren't majority-favored, the elimination of the
CWs is disadvantages for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes
it might not be known who the CWs is, and s/he might not
defenseiveliy plump, and so s/he (& you too) lose
anyway, even though it isn't IRV. I don't know that the
Bucklin failure that I just described will be rarer than
the IRV failure that I just described. And IRV brings some
big advantages for people who are majority-favored...MMC,
CD, LNHa, LNHe. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div>If your candidate is big enough to eliminate the CW,
then s/he's big enough that s/he's fairly well-known, and
that CW's voters would know something about hir, and would
be unlikely to reject hir & transfer the other way
when s/he's close enough to what you want that you'd
prefer to elect hir.<br>
</div>
<br>
<div>So I don't reject IRV--I just don't emphasize it as a
proposal.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Anyway, as I said, lots of people here love IRV, and
its Mono-Raise failure doesn't seem to hurt its
popularity. You like IRV, and its Mono-Raise failure
doesn't put you off from it. I agree with you on that.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>And, for the same reason, we needn't & shouldn't be
put off by MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div> <br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"><br>
But generally speaking people care most about their
favourites</div>
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</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>True.<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix">, and
IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also
mono-add-top. It's true that after the election<br>
some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain
"If we hadn't top-ranked X, then X would have won" but
that is unlikely to be noticed and of course isn't <br>
true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters.
So the X supporters as a whole could complain "If we
had been well informed and coordinated we could have <br>
used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the
same way) and elected X." <br>
<br>
But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate
then that "complaint" won't be taken seriously or get
much sympathy.<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>...as with MDDTR.<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so
"stupid" as to be confused by the very simple and
spectacular MMPO failure example, neither should it be<br>
confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump
scenario.<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>...or the fact that in IRV you can make someone lose by
ranking them higher?<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion
compliances) are incompatible with meeting
Mono-add-Plump?<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are evidently require
failing Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's
Hitler-with-2-votes problem.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD & wv-like strategy
is Mono-Add-Plump. That's a very small price, arguably
less than IRV's Mono-Raise failure (though I note that you
mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is about a favorite).<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Michael Ossipoff <br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div><span class="">
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>Ok, thanks, Chris, for
settling that matter. I guess we
have to reluctantly give up
Conditional Bucklin. <br>
<br>
But it would have been
strategically great!<br>
<br>
</div>
Now, here's a question on a
related topic:<br>
<br>
</div>
Say I arrive at the polling-place
late. Before I arrive X is winning.
I show up & plump for X, and
that causes X to lose.<br>
<br>
<br>
...is that worse than if I raise X
in my ranking, and that causes X to
lose? <br>
<br>
If so, why?<br>
<br>
</div>
It seems to me that the latter is
worse than the former.<br>
<br>
</div>
I if show up late and plump for X, I'm
doing two things: I'm adding a ballot,
and I'm voting that ballot in a way that
clearly should favor X.<br>
<br>
</div>
If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come,
when I arrived and plumped for X, that
made X lose??!"<br>
<br>
</div>
...someone could say. "You didn't just favor
X. You added a ballot, thereby spoiling a
majority. It has nothing to do with the fact
that you voted for X. You could have plumped
for any of various candidates, and the
effect would have been exacsly the same."<br>
<br>
</div>
</span> But you can't say anything like that to
to explain why X lost when I raised hir in my
ranking. In that instance, making the ballot-set
more favorable to X is the _only_ thing that I'm
doing.<br>
<br>
</div>
<span class=""> So plainly violating Mono-Raise is
worse than violating Mono-Add-Plump. <br>
<br>
</span></div>
Michael Ossipoff<br>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
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</div>
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<span class="">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at
10:27 AM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div
class="m_-1309907814637489385m_1670892361041670316moz-cite-prefix">The
example I just posted of "IBIFA with an
anti-defection device" failing FBC I'm
afraid also works for both Mike's
suggested <br>
"Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's
suggested "TopMiddleBottom".<br>
<br>
20: F=C >>B<br>
07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of
Forest's method suggestion, F >>
C=B)<br>
25: B<br>
48: W<br>
<br>
All three of these methods elect W, but if
the 20 F=C >> B voters change their
rating of F from Top to Middle or Bottom<br>
then the winner changes to B.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham
<div>
<div class="m_-1309907814637489385h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</span></blockquote>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
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