<div dir="ltr">I'd said:<br><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr"><span class="gmail-"><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail-m_-1773224632416758659m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">
<br>
</div>
If A was the CWs, then plumping by even 100% of the A voters
wouldn't have foiled the burial by the B voters.<br>
</blockquote>
You wrote:<br></span></div></div></blockquote><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr"><span class="gmail-"></span>
Mike,<br>
<br>
Thanks for pointing that out!<br>
<br>
46: A<br>
44: B>C (sincere is B>A)<br>
10: C<br>
<br>
100 ballots. C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 44-10.
Top Ratings: A46 > B44 > C 10. Approvals: C54 > A46
> B44.<br>
<br>
A is the sincere CW. MDDTR elects B.<span class="gmail-"><br></span></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure. I said that.<br> <br></div><div><br></div><div>I'd said:<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr"><span class="gmail-">
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">With wv-like strategy, truncation from one side
can't take victory from the CWs & give it to the
truncators' candidate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...and plumping by the CWs's voters makes it
impossible for burial to succeed.</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br></span>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr">From this we see that MDDTR <i>doesn't</i> have "wv-like
strategy". </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Incorrect. <br><br></div><div>Here's what I just finished saying:<br><br><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">"Your "CW" (Candidate A) is a peculiarly unsupported CWs.<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">" "Protecting" such a CWs wasn't what wv was proposed, offered & advocated for.<br><br>"When
I first proposed wv in the late '80s, I showed its "protection" of a
middle CWs who is supported from both sides. I never claimed that it
could "protect" a CWs who is entirely unsupported by preferrers of any
other candidate. "Protection" of an entirely outside-unsupported CWs was
never the intended purpose of wv.<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">"You "CWs" is entirely unsupported by preferrers of any other candidate."<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">"wv-like strategy" can only refer to strategy-properties that I claim for wv. At no time did I ever guarantee that wv will "protect" the CW under the conditions of your example.<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">No such guarantee can be made, not have I made one.<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">"But wait, wv _does_ thwart & penallize burial in Chris's example!"<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">...but not because of any guarantee that can be made for wv. Not because of any guarantee-able & guaranteed wv property.<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">In your example, wv elects C, thwarting & penalizing the burial, because of an accident of faction-sizes. <br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">(Try reversing the size-relation of A & B.)<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">Sure, by suitable adjustment of faction-sizes,any pairwise-count method could achieve (whatever you think is) the right result, in a cycle.<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">So, not electing B in your example is not a test of "wv-like strategy".<br><br></div><div class="gmail-m_2095362792134820979m_-2574322773842955947m_2128683487745746556moz-cite-prefix">Your example isn't a test of "wv-like strategy", and has no resemblance to the conditions for which that property was defined, and for which wv was proposed.<br><br></div><div>And yes, I made it clear, with many examples, what wv's desirable properties are. <br> <br></div></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr">A is the sincere CW and all of A's supporters
plumped for A,<br>
but nonetheless the Buriers' favourite, B, won. Winning Votes
would have elected C.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>...by an accident of faction-sizes, not as an instance of any guarantee that can be or has been made for wv properties. Electing a CWs with no support from preferrers of any other candidate has never been claimed as a wv property, and is not a "wv-like strategy" property.<br></div><div><br></div><div>And I'll remind you that you neglected to comment on vulnerability to truncation. Could that be because, even in your example, truncation by B voters wouldn't succeed in taking the election from A to elect B? <br><br></div><div>I'll also remind you that truncation from one side, which could be innocent (careless, hurried, lazy or principled), will likely be considerably more frequent than burial.<br><br></div><div>But, in MDDTR, voters should be advised to not rank short of the CWse (expected or evident CWs), because indifference is the threat to MDDTR's success. Any candidate rank-order distinction that you don't bother to make when you vote, just might not be reflected in the outcome.<br><br></div><div>But, then, that's pretty much true of rank-methods in general.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr">
<br>
Also we see that MDDTR fails the Plurality criterion. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, in the standard chicken-dilemma example, MDDTR elects A, and that's a violation of the Plurality Criterion. Try to forgive MDDTR for electing the most favorite-popular candidate who isn't majority-beaten :^)<br><br></div><div>(Of course that's a way of saying MDDTR's rule but it hardly sounds unjustified, by general objective standards, independent of any rule.)<br><br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr"><br>
<br>
So to sum up, MDDTR doesn't have "wv-like strategy"</div></div></blockquote><div><br><br></div><div>Incorrect. See above.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr">, but does
fail Mono-add-Plump</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>...but IRV's, Benham's & Woodall's failure of Mono-Raise is ok :^)<br><br></div><div>Mono-Add-Plump failure is where X loses _in spite of_ your favoring X on the ballot that you add. X is made to lose because you added a ballot, and the fact that you favored X on that ballot has nothing to do with how or why it happened. X would have been made to lose if you'd added any of many other kinds of ballot.<br><br><br></div><div>Mono-Raise failure: X loses for no reason other than because you moved X up.<br><br></div><div>Notice the difference?<br><br></div><div><br> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr"> and Plurality</div></div></blockquote><div><br><br></div><div>I answered, above, about Plurality.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr"> and has a strong random-fill<br>
incentive.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Because of LNHa, you can safely rank your inbetween (neither strong top-set not strong bottom-set) in sincere order, below top & above bottom. ...ranking them all with respect to eachother, and giving to all of them the "protection" of wv. Adding a candidate to that ranking can't harm anyone whom you've ranked higher.<br><br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr">
<br>
I vastly prefer 3-slot TTR,TR (aka ICT). <br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It doesn't have "wv-like strategy". When you demote a good candidate whose voters you don't trust, you're giving hir no "protection" from burial, and hir voters have no way of "protecting" hir from burial. And s/he also has no "protection" from truncation, including innocent, non-strategic truncation.<br> <br></div><div>Michael Ossipoff<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div dir="ltr">
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
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<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
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</blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>