<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
  
    
  
  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082moz-cite-prefix"><span class=""><br></span><span class=""><br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">MDDTR:<br>
        <br>
        Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they want to.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br></span>
      I surprised you aren't proposing that it use 3-slot rating
      ballots.<br>
      <br>
      The method obviously has a horrible strong random-fill incentive.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, but as voting problems go, that doesn't seem like one of the worst.<br><br></div><div>You'd want to top-vote your top-set, and you'd want to bottom-vote your bottom-set. But there might be an inbetween set of voters, who are a lot better than your bottom-set, but you don't really like maybe letting their defection-prone voters take the win from your strong top-set. They give you a dilemma.<br><br></div><div>In MDDTR, you can, with compete safety, rank those inbetween candidatates in order of preference, below top and above bottom. Doing so can't possibly hurt your strong top-set.<br><br></div><div>...because of MDDTR's LNHa compliance.  <br><br></div><div>Michael Ossipoff<br><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div class="m_-2032166530897621082moz-cite-prefix">
      <br>
      <br>
      Chris Benham<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="h5">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>
          <div>
            <div>
              <div>
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <div>
                        <div>
                          <div>I should re-state the definition of
                            MDDTR, because we haven't discussed it for a
                            while.<br>
                            <br>
                          </div>
                          Ii don't know who introuced MDDTR. Who
                          introduced it?<br>
                          <br>
                        </div>
                        MDDTR stands for Majority Defeat
                        Disqualification, Top Ratings.<br>
                        <br>
                      </div>
                      MDDTR:<br>
                      <br>
                    </div>
                    Voters can rank as many or as few candidates as they
                    want to.<br>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                  Equal rankings allowed.<br>
                  <br>
                </div>
                1. Disqualify any candidate who has a majority pairwise
                defeat, unless everyone has one.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              2. The winner is the un-disqualified candidate top-ranked
              by the most voters.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            [end of definition]<br>
            <br>
          </div>
          MDDTR meets FBC & CD, an has wv-like stratgy.<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        <div>
          <div>
            <div>
              <div>The cost for that is that MDDTR fails Mono-Add-Plump.
                I've discussed what that is no worse than IRV's failure
                of Mono-Raise. If IRV can be popular in spite of
                Mono-Raise failure, and its favorite-burial need, then
                MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump failure shouldn't have its
                importance & badness exaggerated. <br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div>IRV is popular here. Then there's no reason why MDDTR
                couldn't or shouldn't be at least as popular.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div>Michael Ossipoff<br>
              </div>
              <div><br>
                <br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Michael
          Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>
          wrote:<br>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
            <div dir="ltr"><br>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Chris--<br>
                <br>
                You suggested that Mono-Add-Plump failure is worse than
                Mono-Raise failure because people care more about their
                favorites, and because Mono-Raise failure is simpler.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">1. Caring about favorites:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">a) So you're saying that
                Mono-Raise failure can't happen when someone sincerely
                moves their favorite to top?:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">IRV:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">31: A<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">2: B>A (sincere is A)<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">29: B>C<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">30: C>A<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">1st round totals:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">A = 31<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">B = 29 + 2 = 31<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">C = 30<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">C is eliminated & transferss
                to A<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Now A has a 61 majority and wins.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">But then the 2 B>A voters
                decide to sincerely raise A to top:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">33: A<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">29: B<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">30: C<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">B gets eliminated, and transfers
                to C.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Now C has a 59 majority and wins.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">b) You care about favorite? What
                about when you need to rank Comprmise over favorite to
                keep worst from winning? We're all familiar with that.
                In Burlington, the Republicans didn't do that, and their
                failure to favorite-bury elected their last choice.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Yes, this isn't a monotonicity
                failure, but you used caring about Favorite as an
                advantage of IRV's Mono-Raise failure over MDDTR's
                Mono-Add-Plump failure. But obviously IRV has a bigger
                problem for Favorite. ...the reason why IRV was repealed
                in Burlington.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">So please, let's not use caring
                about Favorite as a reason to prefer IRV with its
                Mono-Raise failure <br>
                & its favorite-burial need, to MDDTR's Mono-Add
                Plump failure.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">2. Simplicity:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">What could be simpler than your
                need, in IRV, to bury your favorite to help Compromise
                beat Worst:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Sincere:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">40: C<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">25: B>C<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">35: A>B<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">A voters vote sincerely, and B,
                the CWv, gets eliminated & transfers to C. C wins
                because the A voters didn't favorite-bury.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Strategic:<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">40: C<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">25: B>C<br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">35: B>A (sincere is A>B)<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Now B wins.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">That's as simple as it gets.
                Let's not say that MDDTR's look-bad criterion-failurle
                is simpler than IRV's serious favorite-burial need.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Yes, I'm talking about a problem
                that isn't a monotonicity problem. But its at least as
                simple as MDDTR's Mono-Add-Plump problem, and is worse
                because it's a practical strategy problem that makes
                people need to favorite-bury.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">Michael Ossipoff<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
              </div>
              <div class="gmail_extra">By sincerely raising A to top,
                you made A lose.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              <div>
                <div class="m_-2032166530897621082h5">
                  <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                  <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                  <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                  </div>
                  <div class="gmail_extra">
                    <div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 2:48
                      AM, Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>
                      wrote:<br>
                      <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                        <div dir="ltr"><br>
                          <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                            <div class="gmail_quote"><span>On Sun, Nov
                                6, 2016 at 11:24 PM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>
                                wrote:<br>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"><span>On
                                        11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael
                                        Ossipoff wrote:<br>
                                        <blockquote type="cite">...someone
                                          could say. "You didn't just
                                          favor X. You added a ballot,
                                          thereby spoiling a majority.
                                          It has nothing to do with the
                                          fact that you voted for X. You
                                          could have plumped for any of
                                          various candidates, and the
                                          effect would have been exacsly
                                          the same."<br>
                                        </blockquote>
                                        <br>
                                      </span> "Someone" could <i>say</i>
                                      that, but it wouldn't make any
                                      sense.<br>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                              </span>
                              <div>But how so?<br>
                                 <br>
                              </div>
                              <span>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix">
                                      <br>
                                      <blockquote type="cite">But you
                                        can't say anything like that to
                                        to explain why X lost when I
                                        raised hir in my ranking. In
                                        that instance, making the
                                        ballot-set more favorable to X
                                        is the _only_ thing that I'm
                                        doing.</blockquote>
                                      <br>
                                      Increasing the turnout is
                                      generally regarded as a good
                                      thing.  If the method used was one
                                      of the mono-raise failing methods
                                      I like (such as IRV and Benham), I
                                      would say:<br>
                                      <br>
                                      "Unfortunately it isn't possible
                                      for voting methods to have every
                                      desirable property (because some
                                      of those properties are mutually
                                      incompatible), and this method
                                      economises<br>
                                      by not meeting mono-raise. </div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                              </span>
                              <div>Exactly. The more properties,
                                important desirable ones, a method
                                provides, the more of a cost there is,
                                in terms of "embarrassment criteria",
                                "could-look-bad".<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>So it's a matter of what you're
                                getting in terms of the
                                "could-look-bad", and whether that
                                could-look-bad could be bad in a
                                practical way. As you suggested, MMPO's
                                "Hitler-with-2-votes" would be bad news,
                                and, as you suggested, is more than a
                                "look-bad".<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>But the Mono-Raise failure of Benham,
                                Woodall & IRV is only a
                                could-look-bad. It never bothered me,
                                and never stopped me from saying good
                                thins about those methods.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>Likewise the lesser look-bad of
                                MDDTR, when it fails Mono-Add-Plump.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>MDDTR meets FBC & CD, and it has
                                wv-like strategy.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>...the same advantages that MMPO has.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>...at the cost of Mono-Add-Plump.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>You like IRV, Benham & Woodall.
                                Lots of people here love IRV. I don't
                                reject those methods, though they aren't
                                my main proposals, because of FBC, and
                                the fact that there's nothing the CWs's
                                voters can do to protects hir from
                                losing, and the fact that Benham &
                                Woodall are pairwise-count methods very
                                vulnerable to pairwise-count offensive
                                strategy, and innocent, nonstrategic
                                truncation.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>If you aren't majority-favored, the
                                elimination of the CWs is disadvantages
                                for you. But, in Bucklin, sometimes it
                                might not be known who the CWs is, and
                                s/he might not defenseiveliy plump, and
                                so s/he (& you too) lose anyway,
                                even though it isn't IRV. I don't know
                                that the Bucklin failure that I just
                                described will be rarer than the IRV
                                failure that I just described. And IRV
                                brings some big advantages for people
                                who are majority-favored...MMC, CD,
                                LNHa, LNHe. <br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>If your candidate is big enough to
                                eliminate the CW, then s/he's big enough
                                that s/he's fairly well-known, and that
                                CW's voters would know something about
                                hir, and would be unlikely to reject hir
                                & transfer the other way when s/he's
                                close enough to what you want that you'd
                                prefer to elect hir.<br>
                              </div>
                              <br>
                              <div>So I don't reject IRV--I just don't
                                emphasize it as a proposal.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>Anyway, as I said, lots of people
                                here love IRV, and its Mono-Raise
                                failure doesn't seem to hurt its
                                popularity. You like IRV, and its
                                Mono-Raise failure doesn't put you off
                                from it. I agree with you on that.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>And, for the same reason, we needn't
                                & shouldn't be put off by MDDTR's
                                Mono-Add-Plump failure.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <span>
                                <div> <br>
                                </div>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix"><br>
                                      But generally speaking people care
                                      most about their favourites</div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                              </span>
                              <div>True.<br>
                                 <br>
                              </div>
                              <span>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix">,
                                      and IRV meets not only
                                      mono-add-plump but also
                                      mono-add-top. It's true that after
                                      the election<br>
                                      some of losing candidate X's
                                      supporters could complain "If we
                                      hadn't top-ranked X, then X would
                                      have won" but that is unlikely to
                                      be noticed and of course isn't <br>
                                      true of all (or anything like all)
                                      of X's supporters.  So the X
                                      supporters as a whole could
                                      complain "If we had been well
                                      informed and coordinated we could
                                      have <br>
                                      used a mixed strategy (with not
                                      all of us voting the same way) and
                                      elected X."   <br>
                                      <br>
                                      But if voters accept the method as
                                      fair and legitimate then that
                                      "complaint" won't be taken
                                      seriously or get much sympathy.<br>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                              </span>
                              <div>...as with MDDTR.<br>
                                 <br>
                              </div>
                              <span>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix">
                                      <br>
                                      Just as no quasi-intelligent
                                      device should be so "stupid" as to
                                      be confused by the very simple and
                                      spectacular MMPO failure example,
                                      neither should it be<br>
                                      confused by the very very simple
                                      mono-add-plump scenario.<br>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                              </span>
                              <div>...or the fact that in IRV you can
                                make someone lose by ranking them
                                higher?<br>
                                 <br>
                              </div>
                              <span>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix">
                                      <br>
                                      What (arguably) desirable
                                      properties (or criterion
                                      compliances)  are incompatible
                                      with meeting Mono-add-Plump?<br>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                                <div><br>
                                </div>
                              </span>
                              <div>FBC, CD, & wv-like strategy are
                                evidently require failing
                                Mono-Add-Plump, or having MMPO's
                                Hitler-with-2-votes problem.<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              <div>With MDDTR, the price of FBC, CD
                                & wv-like strategy is
                                Mono-Add-Plump. That's a very small
                                price, arguably less than IRV's
                                Mono-Raise failure (though I note that
                                you mentioned that Mono-Add-Plump is
                                about a favorite).<span class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
                                    <br>
                                  </font></span></div>
                              <span class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
                                  <div>Michael Ossipoff <br>
                                  </div>
                                </font></span><span>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385moz-cite-prefix">
                                      <br>
                                      Chris Benham<br>
                                      <br>
                                      <br>
                                    </div>
                                    <blockquote type="cite">
                                      <div dir="ltr">
                                        <div>
                                          <div><span>
                                              <div>
                                                <div>
                                                  <div>
                                                    <div>
                                                      <div>
                                                        <div>
                                                          <div>Ok,
                                                          thanks, Chris,
                                                          for settling
                                                          that matter. I
                                                          guess we have
                                                          to reluctantly
                                                          give up
                                                          Conditional
                                                          Bucklin. <br>
                                                          <br>
                                                          But it would
                                                          have been
                                                          strategically
                                                          great!<br>
                                                          <br>
                                                          </div>
                                                          Now, here's a
                                                          question on a
                                                          related topic:<br>
                                                          <br>
                                                        </div>
                                                        Say I arrive at
                                                        the
                                                        polling-place
                                                        late. Before I
                                                        arrive X is
                                                        winning. I show
                                                        up & plump
                                                        for X, and that
                                                        causes X to
                                                        lose.<br>
                                                         <br>
                                                        <br>
                                                        ...is that worse
                                                        than if I raise
                                                        X in my ranking,
                                                        and that causes
                                                        X to lose? <br>
                                                        <br>
                                                        If so, why?<br>
                                                        <br>
                                                      </div>
                                                      It seems to me
                                                      that the latter is
                                                      worse than the
                                                      former.<br>
                                                      <br>
                                                    </div>
                                                    I if show up late
                                                    and plump for X, I'm
                                                    doing two things:
                                                    I'm adding a ballot,
                                                    and I'm voting that
                                                    ballot in a way that
                                                    clearly should favor
                                                    X.<br>
                                                    <br>
                                                  </div>
                                                  If i angrily complain,
                                                  "Hey, how come, when I
                                                  arrived and plumped
                                                  for X, that made X
                                                  lose??!"<br>
                                                  <br>
                                                </div>
                                                ...someone could say.
                                                "You didn't just favor
                                                X. You added a ballot,
                                                thereby spoiling a
                                                majority. It has nothing
                                                to do with the fact that
                                                you voted for X. You
                                                could have plumped for
                                                any of various
                                                candidates, and the
                                                effect would have been
                                                exacsly the same."<br>
                                                <br>
                                              </div>
                                            </span> But you can't say
                                            anything like that to to
                                            explain why X lost when I
                                            raised hir in my ranking. In
                                            that instance, making the
                                            ballot-set more favorable to
                                            X is the _only_ thing that
                                            I'm doing.<br>
                                            <br>
                                          </div>
                                          <span> So plainly violating
                                            Mono-Raise is worse than
                                            violating Mono-Add-Plump. <br>
                                            <br>
                                          </span></div>
                                        Michael Ossipoff<br>
                                        <div>
                                          <div>
                                            <div>
                                              <div>
                                                <div>
                                                  <div>
                                                    <div>
                                                      <div><br>
                                                        <br>
                                                      </div>
                                                    </div>
                                                  </div>
                                                </div>
                                              </div>
                                            </div>
                                          </div>
                                        </div>
                                      </div>
                                      <span>
                                        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                                          <div class="gmail_quote">On
                                            Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27
                                            AM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>
                                            wrote:<br>
                                            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                              <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                                                <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385m_1670892361041670316moz-cite-prefix">The
                                                  example I just posted
                                                  of  "IBIFA with an
                                                  anti-defection
                                                  device"  failing FBC
                                                  I'm afraid also works
                                                  for both Mike's
                                                  suggested <br>
                                                  "Conditional Bucklin"
                                                  and Forest's suggested
                                                  "TopMiddleBottom".<br>
                                                  <br>
                                                  20: F=C >>B<br>
                                                  07: F > C=B   (or,
                                                  for the sake of
                                                  Forest's method
                                                  suggestion, F >>
                                                  C=B)<br>
                                                  25: B<br>
                                                  48: W<br>
                                                  <br>
                                                  All three of these
                                                  methods elect W, but
                                                  if the 20 F=C >>
                                                  B voters change their
                                                  rating of F from Top
                                                  to Middle or Bottom<br>
                                                  then the winner
                                                  changes to B.<br>
                                                  <br>
                                                  Chris Benham
                                                  <div>
                                                    <div class="m_-2032166530897621082m_5597329454959110605m_786044671103368669m_-1309907814637489385h5"><br>
                                                      <br>
                                                      <br>
                                                    </div>
                                                  </div>
                                                </div>
                                              </div>
                                            </blockquote>
                                          </div>
                                        </div>
                                      </span></blockquote>
                                    <br>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                              </span></div>
                            <br>
                          </div>
                        </div>
                      </blockquote>
                    </div>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </div>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
      </div>
      </div></div><p color="#000000" align="left"><span class="">No virus
        found in this message.<br>
        Checked by AVG - <a href="http://www.avg.com" target="_blank">www.avg.com</a><br></span>
        Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13366 - Release
        Date: 11/07/16</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div>

</blockquote></div><br></div></div>