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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11/7/2016 6:07 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">...someone could say. "You didn't just
favor X. You added a ballot, thereby spoiling a majority. It has
nothing to do with the fact that you voted for X. You could have
plumped for any of various candidates, and the effect would have
been exacsly the same."<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
"Someone" could <i>say</i> that, but it wouldn't make any sense.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">But you can't say anything like that to to
explain why X lost when I raised hir in my ranking. In that
instance, making the ballot-set more favorable to X is the
_only_ thing that I'm doing.</blockquote>
<br>
Increasing the turnout is generally regarded as a good thing. If
the method used was one of the mono-raise failing methods I like
(such as IRV and Benham), I would say:<br>
<br>
"Unfortunately it isn't possible for voting methods to have every
desirable property (because some of those properties are mutually
incompatible), and this method economises<br>
by not meeting mono-raise. You were unlucky to be stung by that
failure."<br>
<br>
But generally speaking people care most about their favourites,
and IRV meets not only mono-add-plump but also mono-add-top. It's
true that after the election<br>
some of losing candidate X's supporters could complain "If we
hadn't top-ranked X, then X would have won" but that is unlikely
to be noticed and of course isn't <br>
true of all (or anything like all) of X's supporters. So the X
supporters as a whole could complain "If we had been well informed
and coordinated we could have <br>
used a mixed strategy (with not all of us voting the same way) and
elected X." <br>
<br>
But if voters accept the method as fair and legitimate then that
"complaint" won't be taken seriously or get much sympathy.<br>
<br>
Just as no quasi-intelligent device should be so "stupid" as to be
confused by the very simple and spectacular MMPO failure example,
neither should it be<br>
confused by the very very simple mono-add-plump scenario.<br>
<br>
What (arguably) desirable properties (or criterion compliances)
are incompatible with meeting Mono-add-Plump?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
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<div>Ok, thanks, Chris, for settling that
matter. I guess we have to reluctantly give up
Conditional Bucklin. <br>
<br>
But it would have been strategically great!<br>
<br>
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Now, here's a question on a related topic:<br>
<br>
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Say I arrive at the polling-place late. Before I
arrive X is winning. I show up & plump for X,
and that causes X to lose.<br>
<br>
<br>
...is that worse than if I raise X in my ranking,
and that causes X to lose? <br>
<br>
If so, why?<br>
<br>
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It seems to me that the latter is worse than the
former.<br>
<br>
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I if show up late and plump for X, I'm doing two
things: I'm adding a ballot, and I'm voting that
ballot in a way that clearly should favor X.<br>
<br>
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If i angrily complain, "Hey, how come, when I arrived
and plumped for X, that made X lose??!"<br>
<br>
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...someone could say. "You didn't just favor X. You added
a ballot, thereby spoiling a majority. It has nothing to
do with the fact that you voted for X. You could have
plumped for any of various candidates, and the effect
would have been exacsly the same."<br>
<br>
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But you can't say anything like that to to explain why X
lost when I raised hir in my ranking. In that instance,
making the ballot-set more favorable to X is the _only_
thing that I'm doing.<br>
<br>
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So plainly violating Mono-Raise is worse than violating
Mono-Add-Plump. <br>
<br>
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Michael Ossipoff<br>
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<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 10:27 AM,
C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div class="m_1670892361041670316moz-cite-prefix">The
example I just posted of "IBIFA with an anti-defection
device" failing FBC I'm afraid also works for both
Mike's suggested <br>
"Conditional Bucklin" and Forest's suggested
"TopMiddleBottom".<br>
<br>
20: F=C >>B<br>
07: F > C=B (or, for the sake of Forest's method
suggestion, F >> C=B)<br>
25: B<br>
48: W<br>
<br>
All three of these methods elect W, but if the 20 F=C
>> B voters change their rating of F from Top to
Middle or Bottom<br>
then the winner changes to B.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham
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