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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11/3/2016 8:44 AM, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">x: A<br>
1: C=A<br>
1: C=B<br>
x: B<br>
<br>
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.<br>
<br>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">(enduote)<br>
<br>
</div>
1. When I asked who is wronged, you said that the A voters are
wronged, because, rightfully, it should be an A&B tie, and
the A voters should have a 50% probability of their favorite
winning. </blockquote>
<br>
All the voters except 2 are seriously "wronged" because their
exclusive favourite (A or B) should be elected with 50%
probability (instead of 0%),<br>
<br>
(And after randomly choosing one of A and B, only one of the two
who voted C equal-top will not have one of their equal-favourites
elected.)<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Wronged? Sure. Significantly-wronged? No.
It certainly can't be called an outrage.</blockquote>
<br>
That's right. Having your favourite top-voted on half of the
millions of ballots lose to a candidate that is voted above bottom
on only two ballots<br>
certainly can't be called an outrage.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Ridiculous
result? Sure. ...caused by ridiculous voting.<br>
<br>
</div>
...in an implausible example.</blockquote>
<br>
The voting isn't ridiculous. The idea that the A and B voters
should have bothered to "cooperate" against such a minor candidate
is ridiculous.<br>
<br>
The example's "implausibility" is forgiven by its extreme
simplicity. I think of a voting method algorithm as a
quasi-intelligent device. It is more<br>
understandable and maybe forgiveable if the device is "confused"
by a relatively complicated example (say with lots of candidates
in the Smith set<br>
and/or cycles within cycles), but anything that gets it so wrong
in such a simple example is unforgivably "stupid" and should be
binned.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">That being
said, I admit that the bad-example shows that MMPO has a
wrong-looking-result-vulnerability.<br>
<br>
</div>
They go with methods that have deluxe properties. </blockquote>
<br>
I don't think I agree with that premise, or that MMPO has "deluxe
properties" (presumably you mean 'deluxe strategy properties').<br>
<br>
I don't like random-fill incentive and consider Later-no-Harm to
be a mixed blessing, and I'm not very impressed by "Winning Votes<br>
strategy".<br>
<br>
I like that it meets FBC.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5DakmmRczHRMAW+o0kjAT+ustZj0iPaodLV7W==WwW8Yw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
Chris--<br>
<br>
I'd said:<br>
<br>
<div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><span
class="">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div> <span class=""></span><br>
<span class=""> </span></div>
</blockquote>
</span><span class="">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>For #2, it really takes something with a
lot of valuable & otherwise-unobtainable
properties, to justify replacing Approval,
Score or Bucklin with it.<br>
<br>
</div>
I suggest that only Plain MMPO qualifies.</blockquote>
</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">You
replied:<br>
<span class=""><br>
</span> Say you ask people who are used to and/or like
any of Approval, Score, Bucklin, or plurality (aka
FPP) or Top-Two Runoff or IRV or Benham:<br>
<br>
(a) Would you accept a method that in a 3-candidate
election with 20 million voters can elect a candidate
that is voted above equal-bottom<br>
on only two ballots?<br>
<br>
x: A<br>
1: C=A<br>
1: C=B<br>
x: B<br>
<br>
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">(enduote)<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">1. When
I asked who is wronged, you said that the A voters are
wronged, because, rightfully, it should be an A&B
tie, and the A voters should have a 50% probability of
their favorite winning. <br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">My
answer to that was & is that the A voters have
indicated that they don't consider B any better than C.
They're indifferent between C and the other candidate
whom they'd like to have a 50% probability of winning.
Wronged? Sure. Significantly-wronged? No. It certainly
can't be called an outrage.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">2, You
make it sound as if what happened in that example is
entirely the fault of the voting-system, and maybe the
two A=C and B=C voters..<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">But it
was done by the all A voters and B voters. In a method
known to look only at pairwise opposition, those voters
ensured that A & B will have as much pairwise
opposition as anyone can have, because they refused to
rank eachother's candidate over C.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Refusal
to co-operate with a rival can be a mistake in any
method. It's hardly surprising if it's a mistake in MMPO
too.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">So
don't let the A voters & B voters convince, you when
they whine about that result. ...the result of their
refusal to co-operate with eachother.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Think
of it as the chicken-dilemma defection-blunder
magnified.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Ridiculous
result? Sure. ...caused by ridiculous voting.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">...in
an implausible example.<br>
<br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">That
being said, I admit that the bad-example shows that MMPO
has a wrong-looking-result-vulnerability.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">They go
with methods that have deluxe properties. What else is
new.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">The
problem is that, of course, MMPO gets its unqualled
properties-combination by looking only at pairwise
opposition.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">For one
thing, that means that it disregards how much positive
support a candidate has. So it was possible to write a
bad-example in which someone wins with practically no
positive support...without that example's result
seriously wronging anyone.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Also,
because it's _pairwise_ opposition, a candidate with two
factions each ranking a different candidate over C, the
method ignores the fact that C has _two_ candidates
ranked over hir by a large number of voters, whereas A
& B each have only one candidate ranked over them
(by just one more voter). <br>
<br>
MMPO doesn't count how many candidates are ranked over
C, or the total number of voters who rank C lower.
Thereby we get the wrong-looking result where C has both
of the other candidates ranked over hir by a lot of
people, but still beats A & B, each of which have
just one candidate ranked over hir--by one more voter..<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">These
are obvious inevitable results of looking only at
pairwise opposition.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">But,
even with those wrong-result vulnerabilities, the
resulting bad-example doesn't significantly wrong
anyone.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Even
though no serious wrong is done by those wrong-looking
results, what can be done to avoid them?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">* Rank
some in-between compromise candidates over the worst
one, ok? Is that too much to ask?<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">In that
way, you rank eachother's candidate over the worst one,
giving hir more people ranking those candidates over
hir, to give hir more pairwise opposition than the
candidates you like better.<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Set
your rivalry aside and do that.<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><br>
* Don't allow write-ins. Or, if you do allow write-ins,
make sure that you rank compromises, not just your
favorite, so that you're all voting eachother over
whatever unknown write-in comes along, so that hir
individual pairwise oppositions won't be less than those
of the candidates you like more..<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">All the
rank methods have strategy problems, to go with the
deluxe properties that they bring. The more deluxe
properties, the more kinds of wrong-looking results are
possible. You get what you pay for.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">So you
deal with those special vulnerabilities, as the price
of the deluxe properties.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix">Michael
Ossipoff<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"><br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-7655863722893086320moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
(b) Do you think it is fair and sensible that a voter
who is only interested in getting their favourite
elected can increase the chance of that<br>
happening by fully ranking (below top) all the other
candidates at random? <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
What response do you think you will get? <br>
<br>
I don't live in the US, but I would think that most
people wouldn't even believe that question (a) is
serious, and that anyone who tries to<br>
tell them that that example only "looks bad" would blow
their credibility.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div>
<div class="h5">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Jameson--<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Oct 29,
2016 at 11:16 AM, Jameson Quinn <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com"
target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div>....Here's my "ideal
characteristics" for a political
single-winner election system, more
or less in descending order of
importance:</div>
<div>
<ol>
<li>FBC<br>
</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, I consider FBC to be #!.<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<ol>
<li><br>
</li>
<li>Handles center squeeze (ie,
some form of weakened Condorcet
guarantee that's compatible with
FBC) <br>
</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>But maybe the goal of electing the
CWs unnecessarily complicates votiing.
Maybe someday, there won't be a bottom
set, for most voters, and, with honest
elections & honest, open media, it
will be clear who's the CWs. But now,
Approval's best strategy doesn't require
that. Brams pointed out that Approval's
results can be better than the CWs.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>But, when it's desirable to elect the
CWs, and it isn't obvious who's the CWs,
then the wv methods, and methods with
wv-like strategy (such as MMPO), are the
methods that make it easiest to protect
the CWs.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Also, it should be noted that you
can't be sure how often there will be a
CWs, under different and better
conditions.<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<ol>
<li><br>
</li>
<li>Relatively simple to explain<br>
</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Approval & Score are easy to
explain. I've had conversations in which
only Approval & Score were accepted
as being plain & un-elaborate enough
to be acceptable..<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>You know that SARA & XA are
complicated and not easy to explain.
I've tried explaining them.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>MMPO?:<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>"The winner is the candidate who has
fewest people voting someone else over
hir."<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>{...some same other candidate) <br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<ol>
<li><br>
</li>
<li>Minimal strategic burden</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>We often hear it said that Approval
has a large strategic burden, but, for
most people, with our current
candidate-lineup, there's nothing
difficult about it: Approve (only) the
progressive candidates. That's optimal
for most people.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>And if the time comes when, for most
people, there isn't a bottom-set, then
that will be a happy circumstance, in
which it doesn't matter terribly anyway,
which candidate wins.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>In such conditions, with honest
elections and honest, open media, it
will likely be pretty obvious who's the
CWs, and, in the absence of
tep-set/bottom-set, the best strategy
will be to just approve down to the CWs.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>And, if there were no bottom-set, and
if it happened that it _wasn't_ clear
who the CWs was, and it was 0-info, then
it would just be a matter of approving
down to the expected winning
merit-level. Maybe, under those
conditions, that would be the
candidate-mean. Or maybe (as now) the
estimated mean merit of what voters want
(which can be estimated by the
candidates' merit-midrange, if the
election is 1D. ....but it might not
remain 1D under different and better
conditions).<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>..but I repeat that, with only your
former top-set remaining as winnable
candidates, it won't make as much
difference which one wins anyway.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>People often consider Approval voting
more difficult than it is.<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<ol>
<li>Summable (ideally O(N), no
worse than O(N²) in practice,
though I might accept some
special pleading for the use of
prior polling to reduce to
O(N²).)<br>
</li>
<li>Handles CD, or at least, CD
offensive strategies don't in
practice mess up the center
squeeze properties.<br>
</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>MMPO meets Weak CD.<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<ol>
<li><br>
</li>
<li>Some arguable track record<br>
</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Of course at EM we discuss two
completely separate and different method
proposal choices:<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>1. Proposals to electorates who have
only had Plurality.<br>
<br>
2. Later proposals to replace one better
voting system with another.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>If we're talking about #1, then there
are only a few to choose from:<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Approval, Score, and Bucklin.<br>
<br>
<div><br>
</div>
I suggest that all 3 of those should be
offered to initiative-proposal
committees, and that the public should
be polled, or consulted in
"focus-groups", regarding which of those
3 methods they'd accept<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>For #2, it really takes something
with a lot of valuable &
otherwise-unobtainable properties, to
justify replacing Approval, Score or
Bucklin with it.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>I suggest that only Plain MMPO
qualifies.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<ol>
<li><br>
</li>
</ol>
<div> Approval does well on 1,3,4,
and 6, is OK on 2, and bad on 4
and 5.</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
<div>No. Contrary to what we so often
hear, Approval doesn't have a high
strategic burden, as I discussed above.
<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Other than MMPO's CD, improvements
over Approval by more complicated
methods are illusory.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>And your standard #5 was summability
and count-complexity. Approval is
precinct-summable, and its count is the
easiest and least computation-intensive,
among voting-systems.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Michael Ossipoff<br>
<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<br>
<p color="#000000" align="left"><br>
</p>
</blockquote>
<p><br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://electorama.com/em"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a>
for list info<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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