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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/31/2016 7:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff
      wrote:<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <div>Of course at EM we discuss two completely separate and
          different method proposal choices:<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        <div>1. Proposals to electorates who have only had Plurality.<br>
          <br>
          2. Later proposals to replace one better voting system with
          another.<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        <div>If we're talking about #1, then there are only a few to
          choose from:<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        Approval, Score, and Bucklin.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Mike,<br>
      <br>
      A short time ago you were in favour of CD methods (and even
      crafted the criterion) and said that your <br>
      favourite method is ICT  (aka 3-slot TTR, Top Ratings).<br>
      <br>
      So what happened to it?    You even seemed ready to tolerate the
      non-FBC  CD methods Benham and IRV.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <div>For #2, it really takes something with a lot of valuable
          & otherwise-unobtainable properties, to justify replacing
          Approval, Score or Bucklin with it.<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        I suggest that only Plain MMPO qualifies.</blockquote>
      <br>
      Say you ask people who are used to and/or like any of  Approval,
      Score,  Bucklin,  or  plurality (aka FPP) or Top-Two Runoff or IRV
      or Benham:<br>
      <br>
      (a) Would you accept a method that in a 3-candidate election with
      20 million voters can elect a candidate that is voted above
      equal-bottom<br>
      on only two ballots?<br>
      <br>
      x: A<br>
      1: C=A<br>
      1: C=B<br>
      x: B<br>
      <br>
      x = any number greater than 1.   MMPO  elects C.<br>
      <br>
      (b) Do you think it is fair and sensible that a voter who is only
      interested in getting their favourite elected can increase the
      chance of that<br>
      happening by fully ranking (below top) all the other candidates at
      random?  <br>
      <br>
      What response do you think you will get?  <br>
      <br>
      I don't live in the US, but I would think that most people
      wouldn't even believe that question (a) is serious, and that
      anyone who tries to<br>
      tell them that that example only "looks bad" would blow their
      credibility.<br>
      <br>
      Chris Benham<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5AgvgW4-_0miNSTPFyrMbv11OJNRNpA0L_qt2k=A+isNA@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">Jameson--<br>
        <br>
        <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Oct 29, 2016 at 11:16 AM,
            Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
                href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span>
            wrote:<br>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr"><br>
                <div>....Here's my "ideal characteristics" for a
                  political single-winner election system, more or less
                  in descending order of importance:</div>
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li>FBC<br>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Yes, I consider FBC to be #!.<br>
               <br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li><br>
                    </li>
                    <li>Handles center squeeze (ie, some form of
                      weakened Condorcet guarantee that's compatible
                      with FBC) <br>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div>But maybe the goal of electing the CWs unnecessarily
              complicates votiing. Maybe someday, there won't be a
              bottom set, for most voters, and, with honest elections
              & honest, open media, it will be clear who's the CWs.
              But now, Approval's best strategy doesn't require that.
              Brams pointed out that Approval's results can be better
              than the CWs.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>But, when it's desirable to elect the CWs, and it isn't
              obvious who's the CWs, then the wv methods, and methods
              with wv-like strategy (such as MMPO), are the methods that
              make it easiest to protect the CWs.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>Also, it should be noted that you can't be sure how
              often there will be a CWs, under different and better
              conditions.<br>
               <br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li><br>
                    </li>
                    <li>Relatively simple to explain<br>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Approval & Score are easy to explain. I've had
              conversations in which only Approval & Score were
              accepted as being plain & un-elaborate enough to be
              acceptable..<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>You know that SARA & XA are complicated and not
              easy to explain. I've tried explaining them.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>MMPO?:<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>"The winner is the candidate who has fewest people
              voting someone else over hir."<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>{...some same other candidate) <br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li><br>
                    </li>
                    <li>Minimal strategic burden</li>
                  </ol>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>We often hear it said that Approval has a large
              strategic burden, but, for most people, with our current
              candidate-lineup, there's nothing difficult about it:
              Approve (only) the progressive candidates. That's optimal
              for most people.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>And if the time comes when, for most people, there
              isn't a bottom-set, then that will be a happy
              circumstance, in which it doesn't matter terribly anyway,
              which candidate wins.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>In such conditions, with honest elections and honest,
              open media, it will likely be pretty obvious who's the
              CWs, and, in the absence of tep-set/bottom-set, the best
              strategy will be to just approve down to the CWs.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>And, if there were no bottom-set, and if it happened
              that it _wasn't_ clear who the CWs was, and it was 0-info,
              then it would just be a matter of approving down to the
              expected winning merit-level. Maybe, under those
              conditions, that would be the candidate-mean.  Or maybe
              (as now)  the estimated mean merit of what voters want
              (which can be estimated by the candidates' merit-midrange,
              if the election is 1D.  ....but it might not remain 1D
              under different and better conditions).<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>..but I repeat that, with only your former top-set
              remaining as winnable candidates, it won't make as much
              difference which one wins anyway.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>People often consider Approval voting more difficult
              than it is.<br>
              <br>
               <br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li>Summable (ideally O(N), no worse than O(N²) in
                      practice, though I might accept some special
                      pleading for the use of prior polling to reduce to
                      O(N²).)<br>
                    </li>
                    <li>Handles CD, or at least, CD offensive strategies
                      don't in practice mess up the center squeeze
                      properties.<br>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>MMPO meets Weak CD.<br>
               <br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li><br>
                    </li>
                    <li>Some arguable track record<br>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Of course at EM we discuss two completely separate and
              different method proposal choices:<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>1. Proposals to electorates who have only had
              Plurality.<br>
              <br>
              2. Later proposals to replace one better voting system
              with another.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>If we're talking about #1, then there are only a few to
              choose from:<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>Approval, Score, and Bucklin.<br>
              <br>
              <div><br>
              </div>
              I suggest that all 3 of those should be offered to
              initiative-proposal committees, and that the public should
              be polled, or consulted in "focus-groups", regarding which
              of those 3 methods they'd  accept<br>
              <br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>For #2, it really takes something with a lot of
              valuable & otherwise-unobtainable properties, to
              justify replacing Approval, Score or Bucklin with it.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>I suggest that only Plain MMPO qualifies.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
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              <div dir="ltr">
                <div>
                  <ol>
                    <li><br>
                    </li>
                  </ol>
                  <div> Approval does well on 1,3,4, and 6, is OK on 2,
                    and bad on 4 and 5.</div>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
            <div><br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>No. Contrary to what we so often hear, Approval doesn't
              have a high strategic burden, as I discussed above. <br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>Other than MMPO's CD, improvements over Approval by
              more complicated methods are illusory.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>And your standard #5 was summability and
              count-complexity. Approval is precinct-summable, and its
              count is the easiest and least computation-intensive,
              among voting-systems.<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div>Michael Ossipoff<br>
              <br>
            </div>
            <br>
          </div>
          <br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <br>
      <p class="" avgcert""="" color="#000000" align="left"><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
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