<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 01 Nov 2016, at 20:07, Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" class="">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><p dir="ltr" class="">B, as a 2nd choice, is at the borderline for approval, if the ">" have uniform magnitude for a particular faction.</p></div></blockquote><div>I didn't assume anything very specific on the strength of the preferences in the sincere preferences. Unless the preference strengths are not totally radical (e.g. A>>>>>>>>>>>>B>C), B can be presented to the A supporters as an acceptable compromise candidate (when compared to the even worse C).</div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><p dir="ltr" class="">Approving hir or not is ok. </p><p dir="ltr" class="">I don't understand why you say that the B voters shouldn't approve B.</p></div></blockquote><div>That's because A supporters should be made not to think that A and B are the leading candidates (as they are based on the sincere preferences), but that A and C are the leading candidates. If A supporters believe that A and C are the leading candidates (because of the strategic answers to the approval polls), some of them will approve also B, and with good probability that makes B the winner in the actual approval election (although A supporters have 51% majority and they would win if all of them simply bullet voted).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>The strategic plan is thus to hide the fact that in sincere opinions A and B are clearly the two leading candidates, and make the A supporters think that C is the second strongest candidate. That's why it makes sense not to approve one's favourite (B) in the approval polls. In the actual approval election B supporters will naturally all approve B.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Juho</div><div><br class=""></div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><p dir="ltr" class="">Michael Ossipoff</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Nov 1, 2016 1:41 AM, "Juho Laatu" <<a href="mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com" class="">juho.laatu@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution" class=""><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word" class=""><div class="">I generated one example of strategic polling in approval elections with approval polls. No specific claims included. Just some food for your thoughts.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class=""><div style="margin:0px" class="">Sincere preferences:</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">51: A>B>C</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">49-c: B>C>A</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">c: C>B>A</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">Approval poll results:</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">51-ab: {A}</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">ab: {A, B}</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">49-c-x: {B, C} (strategic, see Note 1)</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">x: {C} (strategic and insincere, see Note 2)</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">c-cb: {C}</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">cb: {C, B}</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">Note 1: All B supporters should approve C.</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">Note 2: Some B supporters should possibly not approve B. The intention is to keep the approval level of B (49-x+cb) high enough to make B look like a credible potential winner, but not as high as the approval level of C.</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">Approval election results:</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">51-ab': {A}</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">ab': {A, B}</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">49-c-bc: {B} (can be sincere)</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">bc: {B, C} (can be sincere)</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">c-cb': {C}</div><div style="margin:0px" class="">cb': {C, B}</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">The strategic target of B supporters is to keep ab' and cb' as large as possible. The A supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid C that seems to be very popular in the polls. The C supporters should approve also B as a lesser evil, to avoid A that seems to be very popular in the polls. Preferably ab' > ab, and cb' > cb.</div><div style="margin:0px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">Most voters know that (in sincere preferences) B is some sort of a middle candidate between A and C.</div><div style="margin:0px;min-height:14px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">The best strategy (that we know but voters do not) of the A supporters would be to bullet vote, but some are likely to approve also B. The best strategy of the C supporters is to approve also B.</div></div><div style="margin:0px" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="margin:0px" class="">This example says that approval polls may be used as a strategic tool, but I don't claim that approval polls would be worse (in approval elections) from this point of view than some other kind of polls.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Juho</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class=""><br class=""></div><br class=""><div class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 31 Oct 2016, at 01:11, Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank" class="">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="m_-6289367750198196682Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><div dir="ltr" class=""><div class=""><h2 class="">I'd like to comment on the article's strategy-suggestions. My comments will be interspersed below, demarkated above & below by a line of "&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&"</h2><p class="">Introduction</p><p class="">Tactical voting is when voters don’t cast purely honest ballots. While voters do this to a limited extent with <a href="http://approval-voting/" class="m_-6289367750198196682ext" target="_blank">approval voting<span class="m_-6289367750198196682ext"><span class="m_-6289367750198196682element-invisible"> (link is external)</span></span></a>,
the voting system still behaves remarkably well. For instance, voters
can always express their honest favorite. And choosing just one
candidate (bullet voting) only occurs in limited situations.</p><p class="">Below is how approval voting strategy is likely to play out in a variety of common scenarios.</p>
<h2 class="">Polling Assumption</h2><p class="">Since there’d be approval voting, there’d also be approval polling.
It would make no sense to do polling framed in plurality when a
different system is used; it would cease to be informative.</p>
<h2 class="">Utility Assumption for Hypotheticals</h2><p class="">In these cases, let’s assume you hate Candidate Awful, are okay with
Candidate Better, and love Candidate Classy. Let’s give them honest
utility values (we’re rating them on a 0-10 scale):</p>
<ul class=""><li class="">Awful: 0</li><li class="">Better: 6</li><li class="">Classy: 10</li></ul><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<br class=""></p><p class="">{Classy, Better} is a top-set, for you.</p><p class="">You should approve both.<br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<br class=""></p><p class="">Polling Assumption
</p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">Since there’d be approval voting,
there’d also be approval polling. It would make no sense to do polling
framed in plurality when a different system is used; it would cease to
be informative.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""></span>I don't agree. Either Brams or Fishburn or both wrote a paper suggesting an Approval-poll to provide tactical informaton. But such information could only come from a poll that asked people to indicate their favorite, or better-yet,their merit-ranking.<br class=""></p><br class=""></div>The 2nd election, the binding one, is, by assumption, intended to benefit from the information from the first poll. But the 1st poll, if by Approval, is either 0-info, or has ulnreliable, guessed, predictive information. Then why would it indicate winnability in the 2nd vote?<br class=""><br class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<br class=""><br class=""><br class=""><div class=""><h3 class="">Approval Voting Example #1</h3><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">If approval polls:</span></p>
<ul class=""><li class="">Awful: 50%</li><li class="">Better: 50%</li><li class="">Classy: 30%</li></ul><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">You want to vote for Better and
Classy here. <br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">Yes.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">You vote for Better because you want Better to beat Awful.
Classy doesn’t have a shot, but you vote for her anyway to show your
support and give her ideas more legitimacy.</span></p>
<h3 class="">Approval Voting Example #2</h3><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">If approval polls:</span></p>
<ul class=""><li class="">Awful: 50%</li><li class="">Better: 50%</li><li class="">Classy: 50%</li></ul><p class="">You still vote for Better and Classy. <br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&</p><p class="">Yes.</p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class="">You don’t vote for Classy alone
because you have a strong preference for Better against Awful. By only
voting for Better or Classy, you risk Awful winning against both of
them.</p>
<h3 class="">Approval Voting Example #3</h3><p class="">If approval polls:</p>
<ul class=""><li class="">Awful: 30%</li><li class="">Better: 50%</li><li class="">Classy: 50%</li></ul><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">You actually only vote for Classy
here. <br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">I disagree.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">{Classy, Better} is your top-set. Electing from that set matters more than the matter of _which_ of is members wins.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">In fact, Awful's win-probability is 60% as great as those of Better & Classy. You don't want to take that chance of Awful outpolling Classy. So you approve your top-set.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&<br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">When Awful is enough out of the race, you can narrow your sights
against Better and show your support for Classy.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">But Awful isn't fully out of the race.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class="">When exactly do you only vote for Classy? It depends on how far out
of the competition Better is. And it depends on how much you dislike
Better along with how likable Better is compared to Awful. If Awful and
Better are similarly unlikable (you’re indifferent to which one wins), a
voter may be more inclined to vote for Classy alone when she is closer
to winning.</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&</p><p class="">Of course. That's why you wouldn't approve Hillary if we were holding the November 2016 election by Approval.</p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&</p><p class=""><br class=""></p>
<h3 class=""><span style="color:rgb(24,24,24);font-size:1.17em;letter-spacing:-1px;line-height:25.5528px" class="">Approval Voting Example #4</span></h3><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">If approval polls:</span></p>
<ul class=""><li class="">Awful: 50%</li><li class="">Better: 30%</li><li class="">Classy: 50%</li></ul><p class="">Again, your only vote is for Classy here. <br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&</p><p class="">Disagree.</p><p class="">Awful has a 50% chance of outpolling Classy, and, even if Better's win-probability is slightly less than that of Awful & Classy, you should still approve (only) your entire top-set, which is {Classy, Better}.</p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class="">It’s not Better that’s
giving competition to Awful anymore; it’s Classy competing against
Awful. Whether you include Better in the vote would depend on how much
you actually supported Better's views. Like in the first example where
Classy had 30% and was a token vote, support for Better in this case is
also a token vote because it likely won’t change the outcome. So, if you
wanted to give support for Better because of some view he had that you
liked, then you could get away with supporting him and Classy.</p>[...]<br class=""><h2 class="">Conclusion</h2><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">These examples remove the argument
that approval voting regresses to plurality voting (via bullet voting). <br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">Of course.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">There are numerous scenarios (as shown above) when bullet voting simply
makes no strategic sense. But notice that when you do only vote for one
candidate, it’s done in a way that’s not damaging to the outcome. Also,
factoring in who is likely to win is something we do anyway when
considering what to do under plurality voting. But with approval voting,
we just have more options on what we can do with that information. Also
note that it was always to your advantage to vote your favorite. That
will ALWAYS be true with approval voting.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">Disregard who you think is likely to win. Nearly everyone's "information" about that comes from disinformational, wealthy-agenda media, and should be completely disregarded.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">Though honest Internet polls give us a hint about who's the CWs (Jill Stein), for nearly everyone, it's a 0-info election. Anyway, as i've mentioned elsewhere, in our distorted electoral-system, voters who want something better instead of the Republocrat status-quo have a top-set & a bottom-set. When you do, you should approve (only) your top-set.</span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&<br class=""></span></p><p class=""><span style="line-height:1.5" class=""><br class=""></span></p><p class="">Also, when there are more candidates, there are more variations on
what to do. Though the concepts are the same. Expectantly, with more
candidates, voters will also approve of more candidates on average.
There may also be cross-support from multiple independents/third parties
that share certain views.</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&</p><p class="">Yes. <br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class="">Finally, even with “tactical” voting, approval voting will nearly
always choose the candidate that can beat everyone in a head-to-head
race. This is called a Condorcet winner. Approval voting does not
achieve this flawlessly, but it does an excellent job nonetheless. It is
also argued that when approval voting doesn’t select the Condorcet
winner, it does so for good reason.</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&</p><p class="">Yes. <br class=""></p><p class="">&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&<wbr class="">&&&&&&&&&&</p><p class=""><br class=""></p><p class=""> More on this topic here.</p>
<div class="m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field-type-taxonomy-term-reference m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field-name-field-topic m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field-label-above"><div class="m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field-label">Topic: </div><div class="m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field-items"><div class="m_-6289367750198196682even m_-6289367750198196682gmail-field-item"><a href="https://electology.org/topic/tactical-voting" target="_blank" class="">Tactical Voting</a></div></div></div><br class=""></div></div>
----<br class="">Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank" class="">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br class=""></div></blockquote></div><br class=""></div><br class="">----<br class="">
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" class="">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br class="">
<br class=""></blockquote></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=""></body></html>