<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 1:07 PM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely measure the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and if assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we have of that goodness.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It isn't a measure of goodness at all, as my homeless-man/billionaire example shows.<br>. <br></div><div>Yes, D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp are arbitrary.<br><br></div><div>Well, maybe D2 isn't so arbitrary, when it says that the importance of changing a disutility is proportional to the magnitude of the disutility.<br><br></div><div>But D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp all resemble what we know to be right. ...what we intuitively and subjectively know to be right. And the basis of ethics/morality _is_ intuitive and subjective.<br><br> <br></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"> If you want to criticize it, propose an alternative framework for evaluating voting systems.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That's what I've been doing. <br><br></div><div>For one thing, I used D1, D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp to evaluate the election-result in Forest's example. They all choose candidate D in the example., suggesting that D is the right choice by the best ethical/moral standards. <br><br>Of course I claim that D1 isn't the good measure that the others are. If the others agreed with eachother but not with D1, then I'd say that their conclusion is the one that is right.<br><br></div><div>I've also been saying that voting systems should be evaluated according to how little a voter needs insincere strategy to make hir best effort to achieve what s/he wants to achieve.<br><br></div><div>I suggest that, if you have a top-set, then electing from that top-set is, by the definition of a top-set, the most important voting-goal for you.<br><br></div><div>Though it does't match the "sincerity" definition that I use with criteria, I suggest that top-voting one's top-set is sincere in a meaningful sense.<br><br></div><div>A lot of people want to vote _among_ their top-set too. I've been arguing that, in general, doing so lowers their Pt (probability of electing from their top-set), and is therefore suboptimal.<br><br></div><div>But I recognize that people might want rankings, or need them for reasons that I've described in previous posts. In a method that strictly or effectively meets MMC, a majority-favored (MF) voter can safely rank sincerely, choosing among hir top-set, if the other members of hir mutual-majority (MM) do so too.<br><br></div><div>But, for one thing, you can't always be sure if you're MF, and guessing that you are must result in a suboptimal ballot.<br><br></div><div>For another thing, not everyone will be MF, and so that takes some of the importance away from MMC. <br><br>These considerations take away the advantages of rank methods over Approval.<br></div><div><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">...except that there remains the fact that MMPO meets Weak CD, in addition to FBC, and its Strong CD failure is mitigated by its deterrence of burial.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">If you aren't MF, then ranking is suboptimal, so, in Bucklin or MMPO it would be better to approval-vote, to equal-top-rank your top-set.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">That's why I claim that FBC, so that top-voting one candidate won't undo the benefit of top-voting another candidate, is necessary, based on the above standards for evaluating voting-systems.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">But, if some people will want to rank anyway, then it becomes desirable to minimize the insincere strategy that they need, to elect from their top-set, or just to elect the best individual candidate they can (which is why they want to rank).<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">The CWs is the best individual candidate that they one can get. Also, the CWs is maybe most likely (but certainly not necessarily) the candidate who is in the most people's top-set. So, if you aren't MF, then at least it's in your interest to elect the CWs.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">So I've been evaluating methods according to how much insincere strategy is needed to protect the CWs's win.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">So yes, I've been proposing an alternative framework for evaluating voting-systems.<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">Michael Ossipoff<br><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">(I don't have a way to delete the text below)<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"> <br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 1:07 PM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">My
overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely
measure the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully
and if assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased
measure we have of that goodness.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It isn't a measure of goodness at all, as my homeless-man/billionaire example shows.<br>. <br></div><div>Yes, D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp are arbitrary.<br><br></div><div>Well,
maybe D2 isn't so arbitrary, when it says that the importance of
changing a disutility is proportional to the magnitude of the
disutility.<br><br></div><div>But D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp all resemble
what we know to be right. ...what we intuitively and subjectively know
to be right. And the basis of ethics/morality _is_ intuitive and
subjective.<br><br> <br></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"> If you want to criticize it, propose an alternative framework for evaluating voting systems.</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That's what I've been doing.<br><br> <br></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div class="gmail-HOEnZb"><div class="gmail-h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2016-10-26 13:01 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span>On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are more important than others. </div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in a small disutility.<br></div><span><div><br> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">As
a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you. But
it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to
build that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting
system weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will
strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters
will be ignored. </div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .<br><br></div><div>I
like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.<br><br></div><div>As soon as you speak of the social rightness of
BR minimization, then you're already entering the realm of ideal
morality & ethics. In that realm, BR definititely isn't it, because,
obviously, changes to a large disutility are more important than
changes to a small disutility. <br><br></div><div>Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their top-set. Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.<br><br></div><div>In
Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
would be fine for electing a candidate or party.<br><br></div><div>But,
because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here either),
then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on now.<br><br></div><span><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>,
but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long
run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Could you reword that?<br> <br></div><span><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>To
take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than
billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will
(correctly) weight the preferences of homeless people above those of
billionaires. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without utopian altruism.<br></div><span><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>(And
if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people into
thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the
billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about
that.)</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>There's a lot
that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires' media can &
do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad policies, is
the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at all in a
society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.<br><br></div><div>Anyway, when the elections are
illegitimate due to unverifiable vote-counting, there's no particular
reason to believe that the voters and how they vote have any role in
public policy..<br><br></div><div>Michael Ossipoff<br><br></div><div>(I don't have a way to delete the text below)<br></div><span><div><br><br><br>'s a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more important<span class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br></font></span></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808HOEnZb"><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><span class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Michael Ossipoff.<br></font></span></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918h5">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 4:07 PM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br></div></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918h5"><div dir="ltr">I've
tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".<div><br></div><div>Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:</div><div><br></div><div><p style="margin:0.5em 0px;line-height:inherit;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:</p><ol style="margin:0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em;padding:0px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><span><b>Voters
can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. Default is
abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support" and 1
point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.</b></span><ul style="list-style-type:disc;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 1.6em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><i>"Support"
the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them), "reject" the worst
(perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for the ones in the
high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help them beat
somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are hoping
for somebody better.</i></li></ul></li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><b>Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves no candidates with over 50 points.</b><ul style="list-style-type:disc;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 1.6em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><i>If
possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a majority. But
this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't at least
get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a majority
subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).</i></li></ul></li><span><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><b>Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.</b><ul style="list-style-type:disc;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 1.6em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><i>This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.</i></li></ul></li></span></ol></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span>2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span>:<br></span><div><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918m_8320139414680177766h5"><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:</div><div><br></div><div><ul><li>Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. Default is abstain.<br></li><li>Call
a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.<br></li><li>Give remaining candidates 2 points
for each "support", 1 point for each "accept", and half a point for
each "abstain". Highest points wins.<br></li></ul></div><div><br></div><div>This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.</div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div><br></div>
<br></div></div><span>----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
<br></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></span></div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div><div>take away some of the advantage of rank methods over Approval.<br></div><div><br><br></div><div><br> <br></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div class="gmail-HOEnZb"><div class="gmail-h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2016-10-26 13:01 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span>On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are more important than others. </div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in a small disutility.<br></div><span><div><br> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you. But it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to build that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting system weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be ignored. </div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .<br><br></div><div>I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it, along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies Score.<br><br></div><div>As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility. <br><br></div><div>Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their top-set. Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.<br><br></div><div>In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval would be fine for electing a candidate or party.<br><br></div><div>But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on now.<br><br></div><span><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Could you reword that?<br> <br></div><span><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly) weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without utopian altruism.<br></div><span><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>(And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires' media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, & agenda-free.<br><br></div><div>Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and how they vote have any role in public policy..<br><br></div><div>Michael Ossipoff<br><br></div><div>(I don't have a way to delete the text below)<br></div><span><div><br><br><br>'s a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more important<span class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br></font></span></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808HOEnZb"><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><span class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Michael Ossipoff.<br></font></span></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918h5">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 4:07 PM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br></div></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918h5"><div dir="ltr">I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to "more than 50 points".<div><br></div><div>Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:</div><div><br></div><div><p style="margin:0.5em 0px;line-height:inherit;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px">Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:</p><ol style="margin:0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em;padding:0px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><span><b>Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support" and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.</b></span><ul style="list-style-type:disc;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 1.6em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><i>"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them), "reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are hoping for somebody better.</i></li></ul></li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><b>Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves no candidates with over 50 points.</b><ul style="list-style-type:disc;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 1.6em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><i>If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the example below).</i></li></ul></li><span><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><b>Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.</b><ul style="list-style-type:disc;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 1.6em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><i>This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.</i></li></ul></li></span></ol></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote"><span>2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a target="_blank" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span>:<br></span><div><div class="gmail-m_8680021679192316356m_8078831557014404808m_5537608590861622918m_8320139414680177766h5"><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div>Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:</div><div><br></div><div><ul><li>Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate. Default is abstain.<br></li><li>Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.<br></li><li>Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.<br></li></ul></div><div><br></div><div>This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.</div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div><br></div>
<br></div></div><span>----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
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