<div dir="ltr"><div>MAM is fine for polls, especially if experience shows that voting is sincere. <br><br>But official elections need FBC. Especially for current conditions, but in general I consider it a basic requirement for official elections.<br><br></div>Michael Ossipoff<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 11:35 PM, Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div>Right.<br><br></div>Condorcet tries for something ambitious, at the cost of something basic.<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br></font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Michael Ossipoff<br><div><div><br><br></div></div></font></span></div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 10:48 PM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077moz-cite-prefix">You mean "disqualified" like all other
Condorcet methods?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<div><div class="m_-549989215255214052h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
On 10/26/2016 9:05 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div></div></div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="m_-549989215255214052h5">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Oops! Smith//Approval is disqualified by its FBC failure<br>
<br>
</div>
Michael Ossipoff<br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 2:55 PM,
Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<p dir="ltr">But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage,
because the chicken dilemma can be a nuisance in Approval.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.</p>
<span class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
</font></span>
<div class="gmail_quote"><span>On Oct 25, 2016 9:40
AM, "C.Benham" <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br type="attribution">
</span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077h5">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077m_5093405894671064112m_2598036352344469861moz-cite-prefix">On
10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"> When sincerely-voted
Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">(Jameson wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">But even if they do win under
honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in
which the stronger wing truncates the CW to
equal-bottom.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">In rank methods, we've been
calling that offensive truncation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In Approval, I don't regard it as
an offensive strategy at all. In Approval,
the middle CWs doesn't need support from
both sides, as s/he does in general
pairwise-count methods.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The larger wing isn't the one
that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're
talking about a strategy problem that
shouldn't concern voters in Approval.</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
Mike,<br>
<br>
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your
negativity on Smith//Approval (very similar to
Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.<br>
<br>
A couple of somewhat relevant questions: <br>
<br>
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who
is supported by the smallest of three factions
of voters the Approval winner?<br>
<br>
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the
Smith set?<br>
<br>
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Jameson:-In Condorcet systems,
the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the
wrong answer.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't
vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method"
.<br>
<br>
Jameson wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>Support Accept Reject Abstain voting
works as follows:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Voters can support, accept, reject, or
abstain on each candidate. Default is
abstain.<br>
</li>
<li>Call a candidate "acceptable" if they
are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If
any candidates are acceptable, eliminate
all who aren't.<br>
</li>
<li>Give remaining candidates 2 points for
each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each
"abstain". Highest points wins.<br>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
I still hate default being anything other than
bottom/"reject", and the "25%" figure looks
arbitrary.<br>
<br>
With the default rule as it is, it looks like
the method fails Mono-add-Plump.<br>
<br>
Say the winner X has a lower point score than
some other candidate Y that is barely rejected
by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do
nothing <br>
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold
enough so that now Y is no longer eliminated and
wins.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr"><br>
On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
><br>
> Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate
election when the CW is the plurality loser.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So it refers to a special case of
the problem of the defensive strategy needed
to protect the CWs's win.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Certainly, in IRV, Benham, &
Woodall, the main problem is when a middle Cws
has the smallest faction.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And, in other pairwise-count
methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because
it seems more favorable to finding
vulnerability.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But a CWs can lose without being
smallest, and I don't make a distinction about
that except that it's part of the
problem-examples in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.</p>
<p dir="ltr">You wrote:</p>
<p dir="ltr">There are different levels of the
problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Sure. I was saying that with wv
strategy, truncation from one side can't take
the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's
voters can deter burial by mere plumping.</p>
<p dir="ltr">No need for the non-offensive wing
to vote any less than sincerely in methods
with wv strategy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As you know, that isn't so with
other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">><br>
> -In systems like IRV or plurality, in
order for the CW to win even under honesty,
the weaker of the two wings must betray their
sincere favorite.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Well, it isn't so much the size of
the wing factions. It's more a matter of which
wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's
voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That's why I've been saying that
IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.</p>
<p dir="ltr">If the CWs's voters transfer the
other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is
then no better than Plurality.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Many of us have been explaining
that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years or
so.</p>
<p dir="ltr">> -In systems like approval and
score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they
do not, they should not.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Correct. When sincerely-voted
Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV
repealed in Burlington.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Not electing the CWs results in a
majority who'd prefer a different result.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But I think IRV was repealed for
more than that:</p>
<p dir="ltr">Approval let's people protect the
CWs, without favorite-burial, if that were
what they want to do. ...and I suggest that
it isn't, because electing from your top-set
is usually more important than electing the
best particular individual candidate you can.</p>
<p dir="ltr">CWs protection is more for rank
methods, which are about choosing _among_ your
top-set, to elect the best particular
candidate you can.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(But see my earlier post yesterday,
about that.)</p>
<p dir="ltr">If you have a top-set, then, by
definition, electing from it is the important
thing.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Approve (only) your top-set.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(More about that in my post
yesterday)</p>
<p dir="ltr">But, if it turned out to be really
important to avoid having a majority who'd
prefer a different result, then that could be
a reason for voters in Approval to slightly
modify their voting to avoid approving past
the expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would
lower your Pt.</p>
<p dir="ltr">When approving your top-set, you'd
just stop short of approving past the CWse.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yesterday, too, I spoke of the
possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What you're saying doesn't contract
what I've been saying.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">But even if they do win under
honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in
which the stronger wing truncates the CW to
equal-bottom.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">In rank methods, we've been calling
that offensive truncation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In Approval, I don't regard it as
an offensive strategy at all. In Approval, the
middle CWs doesn't need support from both
sides, as s/he does in general pairwise-count
methods.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The larger wing isn't the one that
needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're
talking about a strategy problem that
shouldn't concern voters in Approval.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">The defensive strategies that work
are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give
the stronger wing near-bottom score.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Both, if people are trying for the
best candidate they can get. Then obviously
the smaller wing should support the CWs, and
the CWs's voters should plump.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But I don't suggest that goal for
Approval, for the reasons stated above, &
in earlier posts.</p>
<p dir="ltr">> -In Condorcet systems, the CW
wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong
answer.</p>
<p dir="ltr">No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable
to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the right
answer in such a method.</p>
<p dir="ltr">With burial, a potentially
successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump.
Either way, the CWs doesn't win.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">; the strategy is effective if the
CW faction plumps, and backfires if the CW
faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note
that even a strategy backfire here is not in
my opinion a "good" result; because the
strategy has some chance of winning, it will
be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire is
a good thing if it discourages the strategy,
but a bad thing if it actually occurs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at
least a bit questionable. ...especially with
the possibility of the perpetual burial
fiasco.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But it can probably be argued that,
with rank methods' goal of getting the best
individual candidate you can get, wv strategy
improves on Bucklin, because, even if people
misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters
don't plump, the mere threat of plumping could
be enough to deter burial, because the
would-be buriers don't have better information
than the defenders have.<br>
</p>
<p dir="ltr">> -In most basic Bucklin
systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
to counteract SHOS.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't
majority-favored, and if you rank sincerely,
and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that
can result in the election of someone in your
bottom-set.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">> -In a system like SARA, in
most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give
enough support to the CW to protect them from
SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top.
(If the CW is only barely a CW, the weak wing
may have to rate equal-top for a successful
defense in this case. However, I think that
very tightly-balanced situations like this are
not a large concern.)</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">That makes me sit up & take
notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major,
& could outweigh the lack of CD enough to
compete with the best methods.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
<br>
</div>
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