<div dir="ltr"><div>MAM is fine for polls, especially if experience shows that voting is sincere. <br><br>But official elections need FBC. Especially for current conditions, but in general I consider it a basic requirement for official elections.<br><br></div>Michael Ossipoff<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 11:35 PM, Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div>Right.<br><br></div>Condorcet tries for something ambitious, at the cost of something basic.<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br></font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">Michael Ossipoff<br><div><div><br><br></div></div></font></span></div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 10:48 PM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
  
    
  
  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077moz-cite-prefix">You mean "disqualified"  like all other
      Condorcet  methods?<br>
      <br>
      Chris Benham<div><div class="m_-549989215255214052h5"><br>
      <br>
      <br>
      On 10/26/2016 9:05 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
    </div></div></div>
    <blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="m_-549989215255214052h5">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>Oops! Smith//Approval is disqualified by its FBC failure<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        Michael Ossipoff<br>
      </div>
      <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 2:55 PM,
          Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>
          wrote:<br>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
            <p dir="ltr">But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage,
              because the chicken dilemma can be a nuisance in Approval.</p>
            <p dir="ltr">So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.</p>
            <span class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
                <p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
              </font></span>
            <div class="gmail_quote"><span>On Oct 25, 2016 9:40
                AM, "C.Benham" <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
                wrote:<br type="attribution">
              </span>
              <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                <div>
                  <div class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077h5">
                    <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
                      <div class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077m_5093405894671064112m_2598036352344469861moz-cite-prefix">On
                        10/25/2016 4:47 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
                        <br>
                        <blockquote type="cite"> When sincerely-voted
                          Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
                          it's choosing socially better.</blockquote>
                        <blockquote type="cite">
                          <p dir="ltr">(Jameson wrote):</p>
                          <p dir="ltr">But even if they do win under
                            honesty, they will probably lose under
                            "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in
                            which the stronger wing truncates the CW to
                            equal-bottom.</p>
                          <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                          <p dir="ltr">In rank methods, we've been
                            calling that offensive truncation.</p>
                          <p dir="ltr">In Approval, I don't regard it as
                            an offensive strategy at all. In Approval,
                            the middle CWs doesn't need support from
                            both sides, as s/he does in general
                            pairwise-count methods.</p>
                          <p dir="ltr">The larger wing isn't the one
                            that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
                            particular candidate you can get. But you're
                            talking about a strategy problem that
                            shouldn't concern voters in Approval.</p>
                        </blockquote>
                        <br>
                        Mike,<br>
                        <br>
                        Given my selection of quotes above, I find your
                        negativity on Smith//Approval  (very similar to
                        Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.<br>
                        <br>
                        A couple of somewhat relevant questions:  <br>
                        <br>
                        (1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who
                        is supported by the smallest of three factions
                        of voters the Approval winner?<br>
                        <br>
                        (2) How often is the Approval winner not in the
                        Smith set?<br>
                        <br>
                        And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?<br>
                        <br>
                        <blockquote type="cite">
                          <p dir="ltr">Jameson:-In Condorcet systems,
                            the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
                            under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the
                            wrong answer.</p>
                          <p dir="ltr">Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't
                            vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
                            ...the right answer in such a method.</p>
                        </blockquote>
                        <br>
                         But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method"
                        .<br>
                        <br>
                        Jameson wrote:<br>
                        <br>
                        <blockquote type="cite">
                          <div>Support Accept Reject Abstain voting
                            works as follows:</div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                          <div>
                            <ul>
                              <li>Voters can support, accept, reject, or
                                abstain on each candidate. Default is
                                abstain.<br>
                              </li>
                              <li>Call a candidate "acceptable" if they
                                are rejected by 50% or less and
                                supported or accepted by over 25%. If
                                any candidates are acceptable, eliminate
                                all who aren't.<br>
                              </li>
                              <li>Give remaining candidates 2 points for
                                each "support", 1 point for each
                                "accept", and half a point for each
                                "abstain". Highest points wins.<br>
                              </li>
                            </ul>
                          </div>
                          <div><br>
                          </div>
                        </blockquote>
                        I still hate default being anything other than
                        bottom/"reject", and the "25%" figure looks
                        arbitrary.<br>
                        <br>
                        With the default rule as it is, it looks like
                        the method fails Mono-add-Plump.<br>
                        <br>
                        Say the winner X has a lower point score than
                        some other candidate Y that is barely rejected
                        by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do
                        nothing <br>
                        but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold
                        enough so that now Y is no longer eliminated and
                        wins.<br>
                        <br>
                        Chris Benham<br>
                        <br>
                        <br>
                      </div>
                      <blockquote type="cite">
                        <p dir="ltr"><br>
                          On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn" <<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>>
                          wrote:<br>
                          ><br>
                          > Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate
                          election when the CW is the plurality loser.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">So it refers to a special case of
                          the problem of the defensive strategy needed
                          to protect the CWs's win.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Certainly, in IRV, Benham, &
                          Woodall, the main problem is when a middle Cws
                          has the smallest faction.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">And, in other pairwise-count
                          methods, when I test for truncation or burial
                          vulnerability, I use such an example, because
                          it seems more favorable to finding
                          vulnerability.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">But a CWs can lose without being
                          smallest, and I don't make a distinction about
                          that except that it's part of the
                          problem-examples in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">You wrote:</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">There are different levels of the
                          problem, characterized by the level of
                          strategy necessary for the CW to win:</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Sure. I was saying that with wv
                          strategy, truncation from one side can't take
                          the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's
                          voters can deter burial by mere plumping.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">No need for the non-offensive wing
                          to vote any less than sincerely in methods
                          with wv strategy.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">As you know, that isn't so with
                          other Condorcet versions or general
                          pairwise-count methods.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">><br>
                          > -In systems like IRV or plurality, in
                          order for the CW to win even under honesty,
                          the weaker of the two wings must betray their
                          sincere favorite.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Well, it isn't so much the size of
                          the wing factions. It's more a matter of which
                          wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's
                          voters.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">That's why I've been saying that
                          IRV is fine for you if you're
                          majority-favored.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">If the CWs's voters transfer the
                          other way, then you aren't in a
                          mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is
                          then no better than Plurality.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Many of us have been explaining
                          that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years or
                          so.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">> -In systems like approval and
                          score, the CW may or may not win under
                          "honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they
                          do not, they should not.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Correct. When sincerely-voted
                          Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
                          it's choosing socially better.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV
                          repealed in Burlington.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Not electing the CWs results in a
                          majority who'd prefer a different result.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">But I think IRV was repealed for
                          more than that:</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Approval let's people protect the
                          CWs, without favorite-burial,  if that were
                          what they want to do.  ...and I suggest that
                          it isn't, because electing from your top-set
                          is usually more important than electing the
                          best particular individual candidate you can.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">CWs protection is more for rank
                          methods, which are about choosing _among_ your
                          top-set, to elect the best particular
                          candidate you can.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(But see my earlier post yesterday,
                          about that.)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">If you have a top-set, then, by
                          definition, electing from it is the important
                          thing.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Approve (only) your top-set.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(More about that in my post
                          yesterday)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">But, if it turned out to be really
                          important to avoid having a majority who'd
                          prefer a different result, then that  could be
                          a reason for voters in Approval to slightly
                          modify their voting to avoid approving past
                          the expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would
                          lower your Pt.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">When approving your top-set, you'd
                          just stop short of approving past the CWse.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Yesterday, too, I spoke of the
                          possibility of your wing-faction having a
                          social agreement to that effect.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">What you're saying doesn't contract
                          what I've been saying.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">But even if they do win under
                          honesty, they will probably lose under
                          "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in
                          which the stronger wing truncates the CW to
                          equal-bottom.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">In rank methods, we've been calling
                          that offensive truncation.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">In Approval, I don't regard it as
                          an offensive strategy at all. In Approval, the
                          middle CWs doesn't need support from both
                          sides, as s/he does in general pairwise-count
                          methods.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">The larger wing isn't the one that
                          needs the CWs, if you're after the best
                          particular candidate you can get. But you're
                          talking about a strategy problem that
                          shouldn't concern voters in Approval.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">The defensive strategies that work
                          are for the weaker wing to give the CW
                          near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give
                          the stronger wing near-bottom score.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Both, if people are trying for the
                          best candidate they can get. Then obviously
                          the smaller wing should support the CWs, and
                          the CWs's voters should plump.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">But I don't suggest that goal for
                          Approval, for the reasons stated above, &
                          in earlier posts.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">> -In Condorcet systems, the CW
                          wins under honesty by definition. But under
                          SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong
                          answer.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable
                          to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the right
                          answer in such a method.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">With burial, a potentially 
                          successful buial can succeed or fail,
                          depending on whether the CWs's voters plump.
                          Either way, the CWs doesn't win.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">; the strategy is effective if the
                          CW faction plumps, and backfires if the CW
                          faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note
                          that even a strategy backfire here is not in
                          my opinion a "good" result; because the
                          strategy has some chance of winning, it will
                          be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire is
                          a good thing if it discourages the strategy,
                          but a bad thing if it actually occurs.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at
                          least a bit questionable. ...especially with
                          the possibility of the perpetual burial
                          fiasco.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">But it can probably be argued that,
                          with rank methods' goal of getting the best
                          individual candidate you can get, wv strategy
                          improves on Bucklin, because, even if people
                          misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters
                          don't plump, the mere threat of plumping could
                          be enough to deter burial, because the
                          would-be buriers don't have better information
                          than the defenders have.<br>
                        </p>
                        <p dir="ltr">> -In most basic Bucklin
                          systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
                          to counteract SHOS.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't
                          majority-favored, and if you rank sincerely,
                          and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that
                          can result in the election of someone in your
                          bottom-set.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">> -In a system like SARA, in
                          most cases, even if the CW does not
                          defensively plump, the weaker wing can give
                          enough support to the CW to protect them from
                          SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top.
                          (If the CW is only barely a CW, the weak wing
                          may have to rate equal-top for a successful
                          defense in this case. However, I think that
                          very tightly-balanced situations like this are
                          not a large concern.)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">That makes me sit up & take
                          notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
                          strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major,
                          & could outweigh the lack of CD enough to
                          compete with the best methods.</p>
                        <p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
                        <br>
                      </blockquote>
                      <br>
                    </div>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                </div>
                <span>----<br>
                  Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for
                  list info<br>
                  <br>
                </span></blockquote>
            </div>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre>----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="m_-549989215255214052m_9036029232732643077mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><p color="#000000" align="left">No virus
        found in this message.<br>
        Checked by AVG - <a href="http://www.avg.com" target="_blank">www.avg.com</a><br>
        Version: 2016.0.7859 / Virus Database: 4664/13271 - Release
        Date: 10/25/16</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div>

<br>----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>