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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/16/2016 3:03 AM, robert
bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">still seems that Condorcet -> Ranked
Pairs -> Margins is the simplest, mostly fair (doesn't
deviate from Schulze-Margins) method to simply adopt this
principle: "When more voters mark their ballots that they prefer
Candidate A over Candidate B than the number of voters who
prefer the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected." </blockquote>
<br>
Robert,<br>
<br>
Take this example:<br>
<br>
40: C<br>
35: A>B<br>
25: B<br>
<br>
There is no Condorcet winner. Margins (using Ranked Pairs,
Schulze, River or MinMax) elects A.<br>
<br>
Please take off your Pairwise-Margins glasses for a moment and put
on your Common-sense Positional ones, and then tell us <br>
how you would feel as a C supporter about C losing to A. <br>
<br>
Electing A here is a failure of the "Plurality criterion" and a
very bad failure of Later-no-Help (assuming that we don't elect A
if the 35 A>B<br>
had just voted A).<br>
<br>
All Condorcet methods fail Later-no-Help, but in my view no
acceptable method fails Plurality. (IRV meets both Plurality and
Later-no-Help).<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Plurality_criterion">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Plurality_criterion</a><br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"> Who can argue with that?? Whenever
Candidate B is elected when more of us wanted Candidate A or
Candidate C or someone else, i mean WTF? how can anyone who
believes in majority rule and one-person-one-vote disagree with
that?</blockquote>
<br>
Some people think that it is more important that the method meets
Later-no-Help, and so isn't vulnerable to Burial strategy; or that
the method <br>
meets the Favorite Betrayal Criterion and so has no
order-reversal Compromise incentive.<br>
<br>
But I nonetheless like compliance with the Condorcet criterion.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"> so i think, as long as we may leave the
details about what to do about cycles to a future debate, it's
an acceptable semantic to use the term "Condorcet method"
or "Condorcet voting" in the discussion of RCV.</blockquote>
<br>
That isn't very fair on IRV (aka RCV, aka Alternative Vote)
because then the comparison is between (on the one hand) an actual
method with some problems and<br>
(on the other hand) a motherhood criterion (with a presumption
that at some time in the future we'll discover some way of
resolving cycles without any problems).<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:8868cca70dbc1a8727d3c2fdd3f4f560.squirrel@webmail04.register.com"
type="cite">
<p>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval
voting<br>
From: "C.Benham" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
Date: Sat, October 15, 2016 11:01 am<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
><br>
>> I want to briefly address another form of ranked voting
called<br>
>> Condorcet voting. Condorcet voting also uses a ranked
ballot, but the<br>
>> votes are counted in a different way.<br>
>> While Condorcet voting is a great voting method, ...<br>
><br>
> "Condorcet voting" isn't decisive enough to qualify as a
"voting<br>
> method". Condorcet is just a criterion (or a category of
methods that<br>
> meet the criterion).<br>
><br>
> Min-Max Margins, Schulze (Winning Votes), Smith//Approval,
"Benham"<br>
> (check for a CW among remaining candidates before each
IRV-style<br>
> elimination)<br>
> are all very different methods that happen to meet the
Condorcet criterion.</p>
<p>forgot Tideman (ranked-pairs).</p>
<p> </p>
<p>regarding semantics: i think that it is loosely appropriate,
in discussion here and in discussion among the laity to use the
term "Condorcet
method" or "Condorcet voting" as any of the Condorcet-compliant
methods for the sake of discussion to differentiate
ranked-choice methods from each other. i.e. Condorcet vs. IRV
or Condorcet vs. Bucklin or Condorcet vs. Borda . the different
Condorcet-compliant methods
potentially differ in outcome only when there is a cycle, which
in real elections continues to appear to be a rare occurrence.
not only that, at least when margins are considered and there
is only three candidates in the cycle, the outcome of Schulze
and Ranked Pairs and Min-Max appear to the
same. so, as rare as cycles are, even rarer in the real world
are cycles with a Smith set of more than 3 candidates. so i
think, as long as we may leave the details about what to do
about cycles to a future debate, it's an acceptable semantic to
use the term "Condorcet method"
or "Condorcet voting" in the discussion of RCV.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>that said, i think *any* of these Condorcet methods are far
better than IRV because when IRV actually fails to elect the CW
(which has happened in reality in a governmental election in
2009), even if voters don't know or
understand exactly what went wrong, they know **something** did
and Ranked-Choice Voting (in general) is discredited along with
IRV. so also are other voting reforms. Fairvote doesn't get it
and even after the experience of 2009, they push IRV portraying
it as the *only* way of reform
realizing RCV, which is explicitly dishonest. and they don't
get it that somewhere, sometime again, they will get a skeptical
jurisdiction to adopt IRV and when it fails again (which may
well happen when there are three equally viable candidates), IRV
(and, by dishonest association, RCV) will
be again discredited.<br>
</p>
<p>still seems that Condorcet -> Ranked Pairs -> Margins is
the simplest, mostly fair (doesn't deviate from Schulze-Margins)
method to simply adopt this principle: "When more voters mark
their ballots that they prefer Candidate A over Candidate B than
the number of voters who
prefer the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected." Who can
argue with that?? Whenever Candidate B is elected when more of
us wanted Candidate A or Candidate C or someone else, i mean
WTF? how can anyone who believes in majority rule and
one-person-one-vote disagree with
that?</p>
<p> </p>
<p><br>
--</p>
<p>r b-j <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a></p>
<p>"Imagination is more important than knowledge."</p>
<p> </p>
<br>
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