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43: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)<br>
10: C<br>
<br>
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10. <br>
<br>
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three
factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by
electing B.<br>
<br>
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval
(equivalent here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted
Margins elect C.<br>
<br>
<br>
On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as
in your example.</blockquote>
<br>
C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could
be a wing candidate. Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right
and C is<br>
(to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps
Far Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B
supporters'<br>
burying.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">So the B voters in your example dislike C more than
the A voters do.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for
the A voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So the A voters have a more credible threat.</p>
</blockquote>
C: No.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">The A voters could say to the B voters:</p>
<p dir="ltr">"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury
our candidate, and you think we should show our gratitude by
supporting your candidate in 2nd place ".</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention
to bury A (and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates'
"how-to-vote card" that they saw<br>
for the first time just before they voted.)<br>
<br>
Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B
faction's voting strategy is the most important issue in the
election. But in any case in the example<br>
only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was
sufficient to allow the B factions' burial to succeed under
Winning Votes (and MMPO).<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">What happens when there's a CWs is more
important than how a natural top cycle is solved.</blockquote>
<br>
C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can
meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to
be the actual voted<br>
CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one
that only needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse
or vote an insincere preference).<br>
<br>
I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case
I think they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle"
properly is more important<br>
than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive
truncators").<br>
<br>
On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely
shouldn't be vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them
truncated!<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5BjLkj2Ra4dCs+mXi2O-2DiEKEFBs9BTi81u12V5hy3WA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p dir="ltr"><br>
Hi Chris--</p>
<p dir="ltr">(Replying farther down)</p>
<p dir="ltr">On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
><br>
> On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
><br>
>> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in
which one of the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.<br>
><br>
><br>
> 33: A>B<br>
> 32: B (sincere may be B>A)<br>
> 34: C<br>
><br>
><br>
> Mike,<br>
><br>
> I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with
CD. The example I posted recently:<br>
><br>
>> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in
Condorcet methods, I think that is more democratic if (in this
respect) larger factions<br>
>> have the advantage over smaller factions.<br>
>><br>
>> 43: A<br>
>> 03: A>B<br>
>> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)<br>
>> 10: C<br>
>><br>
>> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10. <br>
>><br>
>> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest
of the three factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the
buriers by electing B.<br>
>><br>
>> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A.
Smith//Approval elects C.<br>
><br>
><br>
> The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B
voters for allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not
truncating...</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can
protect hir win by defensive plumping. ...or at least not
ranking someone whose voters might bury.</p>
<p dir="ltr">You wrote:</p>
<p dir="ltr">but if they'd <br>
> done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred
candidate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters,
truncation will only worsen their result.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies
are common throughout the animal kingdom, including in human
affairs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your
example.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So the B voters in your example dislike C more than
the A voters do.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for
the A voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So the A voters have a more credible threat.</p>
<p dir="ltr">2. In such situations, the defender has a more
credible threat. </p>
<p dir="ltr">The A voters could say to the B voters:</p>
<p dir="ltr">"Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury
our candidate, and you think we should show our gratitude by
supporting your candidate in 2nd place :^) ".</p>
<p dir="ltr">But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical
possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco, if A is in the B
voters' bottom set.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a
bit mutually contradictory.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B
voters might not bother to bury (even if it's theoretically
optimal), if the chance of success is sufficiently small.</p>
<p dir="ltr">I'm not saying that the majority are always right,
but wv is popular.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv
strategy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can
protect hir by plumping. Likewise methods with wv strategy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived
CWs, because that's the best they can get.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What happens when there's a CWs is more important
than hkw a natural top cycle is solved.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff<br>
</p>
<p dir="ltr">><br>
> The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME
handle the scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and
electing A in breach of <br>
> Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots
oriented Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved"
(i.e. voted above<br>
> bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since
you voted for C you can have C".<br>
><br>
><br>
>> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD
& Minimal Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or
WDSC).<br>
><br>
><br>
> C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and
Minimal Defense.<br>
><br>
><br>
>> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected
that it penalizes truncation instead of electing the CWs<br>
><br>
><br>
> C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods,
but I prefer it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.<br>
><br>
> Chris Benham<br>
><br>
><br>
</p>
</blockquote>
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