<p dir="ltr">(Replying farther down)</p>
<p dir="ltr">On Oct 13, 2016 9:03 PM, "C.Benham" <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
><br>
> 43: A<br>
> 03: A>B<br>
> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)<br>
> 10: C<br>
><br>
> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10. <br>
><br>
> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.<br>
><br>
> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval (equivalent here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> On 10/14/2016 1:08 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
><br>
>> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.<br>
></p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr">> C: (By "CWs" Mike means 'sincere CW'). No, in my example A could be a wing candidate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">You said that sincere for the B voters is B>A or B. If it's B>A, then B is middle CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But yes, not if B voters' sincere preference is just B.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But by the assumption of a 1- dimensional political spectrum, a CWs will usually be middle.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The rarity of top cycles in CIVS polls suggests that the 1D assumption is at least fairly good.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(Replying farther down)</p>
<p dir="ltr"> Say A is Centre-Left, B is Centre-Right and C is<br>
> (to use a Kevin Venzke expression) a "Martian" candidate, perhaps Far Right. C should be irrelevant and would be without the B supporters'<br>
> burying.<br>
><br>
><br>
>> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.<br>
>><br>
>> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.<br>
>><br>
>> So the A voters have a more credible threat.<br>
><br>
> C: No.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...unless there's a 1D spectrum, as suggested by poll results.</p>
<p dir="ltr">><br>
>> The A voters could say to the B voters:<br>
>><br>
>> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd place ".<br>
><br>
><br>
> C: This assumes that the B faction gave notice of their intention to bury A</p>
<p dir="ltr">Punitive strategy achieves nothing if not announced.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(Replying farther down)</p>
<p dir="ltr"> (and didn't all just blindly copy their candidates' "how-to-vote card" that they saw<br>
> for the first time just before they voted.)<br>
><br>
> Also it assumes that for all (or nearly all) the A voters the B faction's voting strategy is the most important issue in the election.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Not really.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But, if burial is at all likely, CWs preferrers should plump as a matter of course.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, the CWs can't always be reliablly predicted. The advantage of wv & MMPO over Bucklin is that, if burial is deterred, then failure to plump is harmless.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(You wrote):</p>
<p dir="ltr"> But in any case in the example<br>
> only 6% of the A voters failed to truncate, and that was sufficient to allow the B factions' burial to succeed under Winning Votes (and MMPO).</p>
<p dir="ltr">...and, with the methods you prefer, there's no way the CWs's voters can protect hir (other than by an elaborate Probabilistic voting strategy).</p>
<p dir="ltr">(I'd said):</p>
<p dir="ltr">><br>
>> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than how a natural top cycle is solved.<br>
><br>
><br>
> C: In the 3-candidate (and so 3 factions) scenario, I think we can meaningfully distinguish between a "sincere CW" that in order to be the actual voted<br>
> CW has to rely on rival factions not merely truncating, and one that only needs rival factions to not actively bury (order-reverse or vote an insincere preference).<br>
<br>
(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Exactly. Truncation of a CWs won't take away hir win in WV & MMPO. ...but it will in the methods you prefer.</p>
<p dir="ltr">> I don't much care about the former (weaker) type, and in any case I think they are hopeless cause. Resolving a "natural top cycle" properly is more important<br>
> than trying to save them (or to "deter" big bad "offensive truncators")</p>
<p dir="ltr">Unless you care about what it takes to protect a CWs, as voters try to do. Unless you care how drastic their defensive voting must be.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And big bad truncation needn't be strategic. It could be big bad principled, hurried, careless, etc.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...but in your methods it easily takes away a CWs win. Your choice.</p>
<p dir="ltr">><br>
> On the other hand the largest-of-three factions definitely shouldn't be vulnerable to burial because only 94% of them truncated!</p>
<p dir="ltr">In your methods, S/he's vulnerable to burial with nothing the CWs's voters can do about it. ...and vulnerable even to big bad truncation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff<br>
><br>
> Chris Benham<br>
><br>
><br>
>><br>
>> Hi Chris--<br>
>><br>
>> (Replying farther down)<br>
>><br>
>> On Oct 11, 2016 10:55 PM, "C.Benham" <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br>
>> ><br>
>> > On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
>> ><br>
>> >> Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios in which one of the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > 33: A>B<br>
>> > 32: B (sincere may be B>A)<br>
>> > 34: C<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > Mike,<br>
>> ><br>
>> > I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD. The example I posted recently:<br>
>> ><br>
>> >> Given that burial vulnerability is unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I think that is more democratic if (in this respect) larger factions<br>
>> >> have the advantage over smaller factions.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> 43: A<br>
>> >> 03: A>B<br>
>> >> 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)<br>
>> >> 10: C<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10. <br>
>> >><br>
>> >> Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval elects C.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters for allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating...<br>
>><br>
>> (endquote)<br>
>><br>
>> Yes. If you believe your favorite is CWs, you can protect hir win by defensive plumping. ...or at least not ranking someone whose voters might bury.<br>
>><br>
>> You wrote:<br>
>><br>
>> but if they'd <br>
>> > done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred candidate.<br>
>><br>
>> (endquote)<br>
>><br>
>> Yes, if the B voters bury, then for the A voters, truncation will only worsen their result.<br>
>><br>
>> But such non-risk-free punitive defensive strategies are common throughout the animal kingdom, including in human affairs.<br>
>><br>
>> 1. Typically that CWs is a middle CWs, as in your example.<br>
>><br>
>> So the B voters in your example dislike C more than the A voters do.<br>
>><br>
>> A C victory will be worse for the B voters than for the A voters.<br>
>><br>
>> So the A voters have a more credible threat.<br>
>><br>
>> 2. In such situations, the defender has a more credible threat.<br>
>><br>
>> The A voters could say to the B voters:<br>
>><br>
>> "Ok, let's get this straight: You're going to bury our candidate, and you think we should show our gratitude by supporting your candidate in 2nd place :^) ".<br>
>><br>
>> But, sure, there's at least the hypothetical possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco, if A is in the B voters' bottom set.<br>
>><br>
>> But I've told why that fiasco's requirements are a bit mutually contradictory.<br>
>><br>
>> Even if A is in the B voters' bottom-set, the B voters might not bother to bury (even if it's theoretically optimal), if the chance of success is sufficiently small.<br>
>><br>
>> I'm not saying that the majority are always right, but wv is popular.<br>
>><br>
>> Benham & Woodall don't reliability have wv strategy.<br>
>><br>
>> In Bucklin & Approval, the CWs's voters can protect hir by plumping. Likewise methods with wv strategy.<br>
>><br>
>> Voters will do what it takes to protect a perceived CWs, because that's the best they can get.<br>
>><br>
>> What happens when there's a CWs is more important than hkw a natural top cycle is solved.<br>
>><br>
>> Michael Ossipoff<br>
>><br>
>> ><br>
>> > The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle the scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in breach of <br>
>> > Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted above<br>
>> > bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you voted for C you can have C".<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> >> Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal Defense.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> >> When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected that it penalizes truncation instead of electing the CWs<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I prefer it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Chris Benham<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
><br>
><br>
</p>