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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/12/2016 12:12 PM, Michael
Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested
scenarios in which one of the other candidates, not A, is the
CWs.</blockquote>
<br>
33: A>B<br>
32: B (sincere may be B>A)<br>
34: C<br>
<br>
<br>
Mike,<br>
<br>
I don't recall doing that exactly. I like compliance with CD.
The example I posted recently:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Given that burial vulnerability is
unavoidable in Condorcet methods, I think that is more
democratic if (in this respect) larger factions<br>
have the advantage over smaller factions.<br>
<br>
43: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A)<br>
10: C<br>
<br>
C>A 54-46, A>B 46-44, B>C 47-10. <br>
<br>
Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the
three factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers
by electing B.<br>
<br>
Benham and LV(erw)SME easily elect A. Smith//Approval
elects C.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
The "WV strategy" enthusiast might chastise the 3 A>B voters
for allowing the B supporters' burial to succeed by not truncating
but if they'd <br>
done that then WV would have elected their least-preferred
candidate.<br>
<br>
The tops-of-the-ballots oriented Benham and LV(erw)SME handle
the scenario by (effectively) laughing off C (and electing A in
breach of <br>
Minimal Defense), while the more bottoms-of-the-ballots oriented
Smith//Approval notes that C is the most "approved" (i.e. voted
above<br>
bottom) candidate and says to the 44 B>C voters "since you
voted for C you can have C".<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Chris recently mentioned an
incompatibility between CD & Minimal Defense (Eppley's
votes-only version of SDSC or WDSC).</blockquote>
<br>
C: Certainly we can't have all three of Plurality, CD and Minimal
Defense.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I
objected that it penalizes truncation instead of electing the
CWs</blockquote>
<br>
C: MSA isn't one of my very favourite Condorcet methods, but I
prefer it to Winning Votes. In the example it elects C.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5D87YR6uYP89godJrNEeqHL+GOSDdagJ3zwcQ_3A5o4rg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Regarding the CD example, Chris suggested scenarios
in which one of the other candidates, not A, is the CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What if B is CWs?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Then we have a truncation example, in which the C
voters are truncating B.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For C to win would be a violation of truncation
resistance. ...if B is CWs & this is a truncation example.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But no problem: MMPO elects A instead of C.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Chris recently mentioned an incompatibility between
CD & Minimal Defense (Eppley's votes-only version of SDSC or
WDSC).</p>
<p dir="ltr">Maybe the truncation resistance failure of electing C
is related to that incompatibility.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Electing A avoids the problem.</p>
<p dir="ltr">When discussing Margins Sorted Approval, I objected
that it penalizes truncation instead of electing the CWs. But
that isn't really a problem:</p>
<p dir="ltr">If your truncation is principled, then you have no
reason to object when the CWs thai you don't like doesn't win.</p>
<p dir="ltr">..nor does anyone have a complaint.</p>
<p dir="ltr">If your truncation is careless, then just be more
careful</p>
<p dir="ltr">If your truncation is hurried, then allow yourself
more time.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So the election of A isn't a problem if B is CWs
& it's a truncation example.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Plurality Criterion? Of the candidates other than the
most pairwise-opposed one, A is the most favorite.</p>
<p dir="ltr">There's no important objection to electing A if B is
CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What if C is the CWs, & the A voters are burying
C?</p>
<p dir="ltr">C would be a peculiar CWs, unsupported from both
sides. No support other than hir 1st choice voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">There's surely no important objection if such an
unsupported candidate doesn't win.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So, no matter how you look at it, there's no
objection to electing A in the CD example.<br>
--------------------<br>
I told of how someone didn't accept ICT because of its
relatively wordy & unfamiliar definition.</p>
<p dir="ltr">When offered list of methods, that person chose
Approval as favorite.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Hearing the MMPO definition, she didn't consider it
un-intuitive, complicated, overly wordy or without obvious
justification.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It elects someone least unpreferred to someone else.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What could be more simple, obvious & natural?</p>
<p dir="ltr">She didn't object to MMPO as she objected to ICS </p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes there are strongly-felt objections to MMPO. I've
answered them.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes MMPO shares wv's possibility of perpetual burial
fiasco, but it may well never happen. It doesn't keep wv from
being one of the most popular methods.</p>
<p dir="ltr">FBC, Weak CD, wv strategy. A lot of important
advantages.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Wv strategy means that the CWs is better & more
easily protected than in any other rank-methods.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
<br>
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</blockquote>
<p><br>
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