<p> </p><p>it seems to me that *any* Condorcet-compliant method (Schulze, MinMax, Ranked-Pairs) can be extended from single-winner to multi-winner.</p><p>why not just run the procedure multiple times, each time removing from the list the candidate that was elected from the single-winner
procedure and, at the same time, reducing the number of office seats available by one? why can't we do that? what is wrong with that?</p><p>seems to me that it would work.</p><p>r b-j</p><p><br />---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------<br />
Subject: Re: [EM] Using Schulze Election Method to elect a flexible amount of winners<br />
From: "VoteFair" <ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org><br />
Date: Tue, October 4, 2016 8:23 pm<br />
To: "election-methods@lists.electorama.com" <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br />
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
> On 10/3/2016 7:29 AM, Paul Smits wrote:<br />
> > Now the question arose how we could use the Schulze method in a decision<br />
> > where the amount of winners is also up for debate. ...<br />
><br />
> Single-winner methods, such as the Condorcet-Schulze method and the<br />
> Condorcet-Kemeny method, cannot be used to elect a second winner. Why?<br />
><br />
> The voters who favor the most popular choice need to have their<br />
> influence reduced in order to correctly identify the second winner.<br />
><br />
> As explained here,<br />
><br />
> http://www.votefair.org/calculation_details_representation.html<br />
><br />
> "Without this adjustment the same voters who are well-represented by the<br />
> most popular choice could also determine the second-place winner."<br />
><br />
> To understand this concept, imagine a group of participants who vote in<br />
> order to choose two events that will happen at the same time. The<br />
> single-winner method can easily identify the most popular activity. But<br />
> if the single-winner method is also used to identify the "second-most<br />
> popular" activity, then the second activity will not be well-attended<br />
> because most of the participants will attend the most popular activity.<br />
> In the meantime, the remaining participants, who were outvoted, will<br />
> not be interested in the second activity, and they will be frustrated<br />
> that their preferred activity was not chosen as the second event.<br />
><br />
> I created VoteFair representation ranking to handle such situations.<br />
> Later, Markus Schulze created what he calls Schulze-STV to serve this<br />
> purpose.<br />
><br />
> The link above explains how VoteFair representation ranking works. My<br />
> ebook "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections" (which also<br />
> applies to other nations as explained near the end of the book) also<br />
> explains this concept. It is available for most ebook readers, and I<br />
> priced it as low as allowed (which mostly just covers the download fee).<br />
><br />
> BTW, what many people overlook is the fact that "second-most popular"<br />
> has multiple possible interpretations.<br />
><br />
> If you have more questions, please ask. And thank you for learning<br />
> about election-method reform!<br />
><br />
> Richard Fobes<br />
><br />
><br />
> On 10/3/2016 7:29 AM, Paul Smits wrote:<br />
>> Dear election enthusiasts,<br />
>><br />
>> First of all I would like to congratulate you on the great wealth of<br />
>> works and ideas you brought into the world of voting/election methods.<br />
>> Even though it may be out of the scope of your focus, I have a<br />
>> consideration I would like to consult you on. If I came to the wrong<br />
>> place, let me know.<br />
>><br />
>> In my organisation we are implementing the Schulze method to all<br />
>> situations where a single winner or sorted list of winners has to be<br />
>> chosen from more than two options. We basically did a straight<br />
>> implementation from the wikipedia pseudocode into our own online voting<br />
>> system.<br />
>><br />
>> Now the question arose how we could use the Schulze method in a decision<br />
>> where the amount of winners is also up for debate. We used to make this<br />
>> decision by conducting an approval vote with a certain threshold for<br />
>> winners. I was not happy about this slightly arbitrary choice of<br />
>> threshold. Now some colleagues wish to again see some value by which the<br />
>> quantity of support for all the candidates can be understood.<br />
>><br />
>> I propose to use the Schulze method and add an option of "no further<br />
>> winner" to the list of candidates, which is comparable to what is<br />
>> defined as the "status quo" as mr Schulze described in his paper in the<br />
>> section super-majorities. I.e. the status quo is 'no winners', and each<br />
>> candidate has to beat the option of 'no winners' in order to qualify.<br />
>><br />
>> Would you think this is an adequate procedure to make this decision on<br />
>> both the choice of winners and the amount of winners? I am aware there<br />
>> is a risk of electing no candidates, or all candidates. But at least it<br />
>> is less artificial than a fixed percentage of votes as was done before.<br />
>><br />
>> Best regards,<br />
>><br />
>> Paul L. Smits<br />
>><br />
>><br />
>><br />
>> ----<br />
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info<br />
><br />
> ----<br />
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info<br />
><br />
<br />
<br />
--</p><p> </p><p><br />
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com</p><p> </p><p><br />
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."</p>