<html><head></head><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:12px"><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14419" dir="ltr"><font size="3" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14438">There are conflicting incentives, at least under the Schwartz methods. Contributing to the defeat strength of some candidate A>B is bad for B, but it can be good for A, because it can give A a stronger path against "top-set" candidates, and make *them* lose. There's a transitivity to defeats.</font></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14419" dir="ltr"><font size="3"><br></font></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14419" dir="ltr"><font size="3" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14739">If you have an estimate of who is the worse of two frontrunners (and there are just two), you shouldn't rank that candidate over anybody. This is true even if you feel indifferent among your bottom-set.</font></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14419" dir="ltr"><font size="3"><br></font></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14419" dir="ltr"><font size="3">Kevin</font></div><div class="qtdSeparateBR" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14418"><br><br></div><div class="yahoo_quoted" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14260" style="display: block;"> <div style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 12px;" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14259"> <div style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14258"> <div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14417"> <font size="2" face="Arial" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14465"> <hr size="1" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14464"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold;">De :</span></b> Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">À :</span></b> election-methods@electorama.com; C. Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Envoyé le :</span></b> Vendredi 30 septembre 2016 20h40<br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Objet :</span></b> [EM] Alright, burial might be prohibitive problem for wv & MMPO.<br> </font> </div> <div class="y_msg_container" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14257"><br><div id="yiv0280540889"><div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14416">Chris was right about bottom-end burial being a likely big problem for wv & MMPO.</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14335">In wv & MMPO, if people rate candidates as top-set & bottom-set, then, contrary to what I said, they _won't_ be deterred from burial among their bottom-set. ...because they don't care which of them wins, if they have at least some tiny chance of defeating them all...as they could if the CWs's voters ever forget to plump, or misjudge who's CWs. (If the CWs is in their bottom-set).</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14256">If so, then maybe burial could be so rampant that the CWs would rarely win.</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14838">..a mess.</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14336">Bucklin & Approval (including 3-Slot ICT as an Approval-version) have a simplicity, solidity & reliability that pairwise-count unlimited-rank methods don't have.</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14415">Michael Ossipoff</div></div><br>----<br>Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1475333142388_14839">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list info<br><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></div></body></html>