<p dir="ltr">I at first didn't realize that this message was sent to EM. So that's why this reply is so late.</p>
<p dir="ltr">On Sep 27, 2016 7:21 AM, "C.Benham" <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> Mike,<br>
><br>
> Your "MAM-like strategy" example:<br>
><br>
> 30: A (sincere may be A>B)<br>
><br>
> 20: B>A<br>
> 25: C>B<br>
><br>
> And you are happy that WV and Smith//MMPO elects B (the supposed/maybe "sincere CW").<br>
<br>
(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Voters will do what it takes, to elect a candidate whom they perceive as the CWs (sincere CW).</p>
<p dir="ltr">Making that as easy as possible has been the appeal of wv.<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">> But WV (including MAM) and Smith//MMPO both have a random-fill incentive. From a recent email:<br>
><br>
>> C: If the method has a random-fill incentive then it is more logical to assume that truncators are more sincere than those<br>
>> who rank more candidates.<br>
>><br>
>> M: True.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But strategic truncation can take the win away from the CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">>><br>
><br>
> Therefore any assumption that B is the "sincere CW" has a very flimsy basis. </p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">As I said above, voters will do what it takes to elect a candidate whom they perceive as a CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Making that as easy as possible has been the appeal of wv.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The message continued:</p>
<p dir="ltr"> A, being positionally dominant (if these are 3-slot<br>
> ratings ballots...</p>
<p dir="ltr">wv & MMPO are intended for unlimited rankings.<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">...then A is the most Top-Rated and the most Approved) and uncovered is arguably the prettiest winner. Most likely<br>
> there is no "sincere CW" and A is the highest Social Utility candidate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Natural, non-strategic, top-cycles are vanishingly rare in political polls. At CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting Service) I'm not aware of there ever having been a top-cycle for top-finisher.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So. Most likely there _is_ a CWs (sincere CW).<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">The message continued:<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">> In any case under WV and Smith//MMPO the A supporters can make A the winner by voting A>C. </p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, that's why the B voters should plump if they feel that B is likely to be a CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">If the CWs's voters plump, in WV or MMPO, that thwarts & penalizes burial.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The message continued:</p>
<p dir="ltr">I don't think that "thwarting"<br>
> a bad "strategy" that is probably sincere or not very insincere at the cost of allowing a more insincere strategy to work fine is<br>
> any achievement.</p>
<p dir="ltr">(endquote)</p>
<p dir="ltr">The purpose is just to minimize the strategy needs of voters trying to protect a perceived CWs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">I don't have a way to delete text. I reply farther down:<br></p>
<p dir="ltr">...as voters will do.<br>
> 30: A>C<br>
><br>
> 20: B>A<br>
> 25: C>B<br>
><br>
> B>A 45-30, A>C 50-25, C>B 55-20. Max PO scores: A45 < C50 <B55.<br>
><br>
> A method that I like that does elect B in your example is Approval Sorted Margins.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Interestingly, ASM seems (at 1st examination at least) to have wv-like strategy, without wv's bottom-end burial-incentive.</p>
<p dir="ltr">If so, that means that, in a strategically-voted election, ASM retains wv's advantages better than wv would.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
<p dir="ltr">><br>
> <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins</a><br>
><br>
> It initially orders the candidates from most approved to least approved. If any adjacent pair is out of order pairwise<br>
> it switches the order of the pair with the smallest difference in their approval scores. If there is a tie for that it switches<br>
> the tied pair lowest in the order. At the end of the process it elects the highest-ordered candidate.<br>
><br>
> The method meets Plurality and Minimal Defense and fails Weak CD. In the second example (with 30 A>C) it narrowly elects C:<br>
><br>
> Approval scores: C55 > A50 > B45. Both C>A and A>B are pairwise out of order and in both cases the difference in approval scores<br>
> is 5, so we switch the lower-ordered of the two pairs to give C>B>A. Now no adjacent pair is pairwise out of order so that order is final<br>
> and C wins.<br>
><br>
> Chris Benham<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
</p>