<p dir="ltr">Ok, the A voters' favorite is A, & it looks more right for hir to have a 50% chance of winning.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But, with everyone bottom-voted by at least half of the voters, no one's very compelling. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, ideally it should be A or B.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But in real life there's be someone more liked in the election. Absurd result in a situation that would never happen. </p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sep 20, 2016 5:29 PM, "C.Benham" <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div>Mike,<br>
<br>
The MinMax Pairwise Opposition (MMPO) "bad example" we are
talking about:<br>
<br>
x: A<br>
1: A=C<br>
1: B=C<br>
x: B<br>
<br>
x = any number greater than 1. MMPO elects C.<br>
<br>
<br>
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone
bottom-rated by nearly everyone?</p>
<p dir="ltr">How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at
least half of the voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...& because it isn't a positional method.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had
a lot of help from everyone else.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C
to each other's candidate. </p>
</blockquote>
<br>
C: There's no evidence on the ballots for that assertion.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Surely the importance of a bad-example
depends on its plausibility.</blockquote>
<br>
C: Not when it's that bad. And not even when it's merely very bad
in such a simple example. It is more understandable<br>
and perhaps forgiveable for an algorithm to become "confused" in a
complicated example (with say, lots of candidates<br>
and cycles within cycles).<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Would you give up the best combination of
the best strategy properties because of a funny, but not
outrageous result, one that doesn't wrong anyone, in a
thoroughly implausible example?</blockquote>
<br>
C: I don't agree with most of the premises in that question.
Other methods meet FBC and CD. What's so good about Later-no-Harm
with a random-fill incentive?<br>
<br>
The result is completely outrageous and absurd. <br>
<br>
The correct result is an A=B tie. All but 2 of the voters were
wronged, because their favourites should have a 50% probability
of winning.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 9/19/2016 4:15 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">A few more comments:</p>
<p dir="ltr">Why should 2 voters have the power to elect someone
bottom-rated by nearly everyone?</p>
<p dir="ltr">How about because everyone is bottom-rated by at
least half of the voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...& because it isn't a positional method.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Those 2 voters didn't do it on their own. They had a
lot of help from everyone else.</p>
<p dir="ltr">...because the A voters & the B voters prefer C
to eachother's candidate. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Given that, C's win isn't so surprising or
outrageous.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Anyway, the example has no plausibility, at all.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Surely the importance of a bad-example depends on its
plausibility.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, MMPO doesn't strictly always elect the CW, and I
don't like that. It's a distinct disadvantage. We expect better
from a pairwise-count method.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But with sincere voting, & with no indifference,
the CWs (sincere CW) always wins.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For the CW to lose, it's necessary for one of hir
pairwise comparisons to have high turnout, & be relatively
nearly tied. ...& for someone else's pairwise comparisons
to all be very low turnout & hir defeats nearly tied.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Would you give up the best combination of the best
strategy properties because of a funny, but not outrageous
result, one that doesn't wrong anyone, in a thoroughly
implausible example?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Sep 17, 2016 1:51 PM, "Michael
Ossipoff" <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br type="attribution">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message
----------<br>
From: "Michael Ossipoff" <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM<br>
Subject: MMPO objections<br>
To: <<a href="mailto:t@gmail.com" target="_blank">t@gmail.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>
<br type="attribution">
<p dir="ltr">Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to
show promise, it hasn't been thoroughly checked out enough
to be a proposal.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But it's different with MMPO. We've heard
people's best arguments against MMPO, & it can be said
to have already been well-discussed.</p>
<p dir="ltr">No rank method's result will always look right.
All will sometimes do something ridiculous.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard
can't do well by other standards.</p>
<p dir="ltr">MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only
at pairwise unpreferredness.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It isn't a positional method, & so you can
find an example in which it does terribly, positionally.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone
twice as bottom-voted as the other candidates, &
nearly not top-voted at all.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It certainly isn't a positional method</p>
<p dir="ltr">MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you
can find an example where it does terribly by pairwise
defeats.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet
loser, who pairwise loses to the others by 1000 to 1, if X
= 1000.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.</p>
<p dir="ltr">We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods
for so long that we tend, maybe subconsciously, to
evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A "beats-diagram" shows <br>
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C
has one.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters
bottom-vote A, & the other half bottom-end vote B.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Say two groups both despise eachother. Does
that mutual despising cancel out, making both groups
un-despised?</p>
<p dir="ltr">But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram
& its "=" sign allows you to believe.</p>
<p dir="ltr">If the A voters voted among themselves, between
B & C, they'd choose C.</p>
<p dir="ltr">If the B voters voted among themselves, between
A & C, they'd choose C.</p>
<p dir="ltr">C is the compromise preferred by the A voters,
& by the C voters, to eachother's candidates.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness
compromise. Rob Richie would be proud. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Of course this bad-example makes that
compromise as little top-voted as possible.</p>
<p dir="ltr">I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as
bad as you think.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It doesn't look good by standards other than
the one by which it achieves the elusive goal of MAM-like
strategy, without chicken-dilemma.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Distinguish between a harmless election of a
low favoriteness compromise, a compromise outcome that
looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual practical
problem, one that will routinely<br>
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not
just aesthetically) bad results.</p>
<p dir="ltr">When proposing better voting to a community of
jurisdiction, of whatever size, offer them a list of
methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers. ...& telling the advantages of each.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It would be irresponsible to leave out one with
an impressive, unique, powerful combination of strategy
advantages.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Let the community, jts voters &/or the
initiative proposal committee choose for themselves. It
isn't necessary to make decisions for them.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<br>
<p color="#000000" align="left">No virus
found in this message.<br>
Checked by AVG - <a href="http://www.avg.com" target="_blank">www.avg.com</a><br>
Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4656/13038 - Release
Date: 09/18/16</p>
</blockquote>
<p><br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote></div>