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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/16/2016 4:22 AM, steve bosworth
wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size:
12pt;"><font face="Calibri">MJ simply asks each voter to grade
each candidate when judged against each voter’s own criteria
of what an EXCELLENT candidate would look like.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Any candidate judged to be less than EXCELLENT must
be graded either as VERRY GOOD, GOOD, ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or
REJECTED.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Balinski and Laraki refer to each voters own criteria
for grading candidates as being ‘absolute’ (but this is only
in the sense that these criteria should be independent of
any one set of candidates that might be seeking election).<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></font></span></blockquote>
<br>
C: To begin with superficial aesthetics, the grades should have
simple neutral names (like A B C D E F) and the ballot "request"
should be something like:<br>
"Give your favourite candidate or candidates an A and and your
least preferred candidate or candidates an F and any intermediate
candidates whatever<br>
grade you see fit. Default rating is F."<br>
<br>
As it is if in a given election A , by my "criteria that should
be independent of any one set of candidates that might be seeking
election" , such as those doing so in election A,<br>
I rate my favourite candidate as being merely "Acceptable" I
would resent having to either (a) accept that my vote will have
less influence on the result than voters who rate<br>
their favourite as "Excellent" or (b) "lie" and falsely indicate
that I rate my favourite as "Excellent".<br>
<br>
MJ poses as being somewhat like a jury in a trial, or a panel
that judges say a competitive performance of Gymnastics or Diving.
<br>
<br>
But elections for powerful public political elections are very
different. In those cases the jurors/judges are more-or-less
"disinterested", i.e. it doesn't really make any<br>
possible difference to their lives who wins the competition or
whether the accused is jailed or set free. In elections who wins
the election could have a big effect on the<br>
lives of voters. <br>
<br>
Also in those other cases there is usually general agreement what
an excellent sporting performance looks like and what a terrible
sporting performance looks like and<br>
what constitutes clear proof of guilt or innocence. In elections
voters often have opposing ideologies, i.e. very different ideas
of what policies, priorities, political philosophy,<br>
diplomatic/military strategies the election winner should have.<br>
<br>
Another difference is that in those other cases the people on the
jury in a trial or the panel judging a sporting performance base
their decisions the same evidence. The jurors<br>
all hear the same evidence and arguments and base their verdict on
that. Likewise the judging panel all closely watch the same
performance and give their scores based purely<br>
on that.<br>
<br>
But voters in public elections vary widely in terms of what
information they get, and the quality and quantity of that
information. And of course much of the "information" they<br>
use might be false or misleading, generated by those with a big
interest in who wins the election.<br>
<br>
Leaving aside the strategy incentive for voters to only use the
very top and very bottom grades, suppose that all the voters rate
the candidates as sincerely as they can<br>
in the way MJ "invites" them to. Suppose that that there are
only two candidates with any hope of winning, A and B. Suppose I
think that A is clearly better than B<br>
and you think the opposite. Suppose my rating of A is Good and
B is Poor, and your rating of B is Excellent and A is Rejected.<br>
<br>
Your pairwise preference will have greater weight than mine. Is
that fair? According to the MJ philosophy your vote should have
greater weight because you are more<br>
"enthusiastic" in your support for B over A. Does this greater
enthusiasm mean that your opinion that B is better than A is more
likely to be correct than my opposite<br>
opinion?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size:
12pt;">Also, MJ seems to offer less scope for manipulative
voting than any other method.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></blockquote>
<br>
C: As Kevin has pointed out, sincere voters are less likely to be
at a disadvantage than with Range (aka Average Ratings) but in
both the voter's best strategy is to only<br>
use the two most extreme ratings. If all the voters do that the
method is just Approval.<br>
<br>
What exactly is your definition of "manipulative"?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size:
12pt;">I still favor MJ even though it is theoretically
vulnerable to ‘Later-no-harm’ (LNH).</span></blockquote>
<br>
C: I don't particularly care about Later-no-Harm. It encourages
the expression of preferences that may be very weak, and to the
extent that they are decisive they<br>
would tend to lower the "Social Utility" (SU) of the winner. And
the expressed preferences are also more likely to be the result of
unprincipled mutual back-scratching<br>
deals between candidates. <br>
<br>
I put a greater value on Later-no-Help (which MJ, along with MTA
and MCA meets). Ideally there should be weak zero-info truncation
incentive.<br>
<br>
But MJ has a very strong truncation incentive. It's compliance
with LNHelp is in practice useless if the voters should all
truncate.<br>
<br>
IRV meets both of Later-no-Help and Later-no-Harm, and in my
opinion it is the best of the methods that meet Later-no-Help.<br>
<br>
Other methods I like fail both. That is better than only meeting
LNHarm and so having a random-fill incentive, or only meeting
LNHelp and having a very<br>
strong truncation incentive.<br>
<br>
For reasons I might give in another post, I don't much like MAM.
A simpler Condorcet method I like is Smith//Approval:<br>
<br>
Voters ignore candidates they don't approve and rank the rest.
Equal-ranking allowed. Elect the most approved member of the
Smith set.<br>
<br>
The "Smith set" is the smallest set of candidate/s who all
pairwise beat all (if any) outside-the-set members. A
single-member "Smith set" is the <br>
Condorcet winner.<br>
<br>
Compliance with both FBC and Condorcet is impossible. MJ meets
FBC.<br>
<br>
A MJ-like method that is simpler and in my view better is
Majority Top Approval (MTA).<br>
<br>
It uses 3-slot ratings ballots. Default rating is Bottom. If any
candidate is rated above bottom on more than half the ballots,
elect (if there is more than one) the<br>
one of those with the highest number of top ratings. Otherwise
elect the candidate with the highest number of above-bottom
ratings.<br>
<br>
The voters' best strategy is to normally use only the top and
bottom ratings slots, but the middle slot is handy if there is one
or more candidate the voter is<br>
unsure how should rate on a 2-slot ratings ballot, or if the voter
is prepared to maybe take a small strategic risk for the sake of
being more expressive.<br>
<br>
But a more complex method I much prefer is IBIFA.<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA</a><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:AM4PR0202MB292982EBB35A5B2DA27E597EB6F00@AM4PR0202MB2929.eurprd02.prod.outlook.com"
type="cite">
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<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri"> </font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri"> </font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri"> </font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">________________________________________</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">From: Kristofer
Munsterhjelm <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a></font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">Sent: Wednesday, June
1, 2016 9:14 PM</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">To: steve bosworth;
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a></font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">Subject: Re: [EM](6)
To Kristofer and everyone: MJ best to ‘tolerate’</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">___________________________________________</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri"> </font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">To Kristofer and
everyone:</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">Kristofer, while our
most recent exchange was on June 31<sup>st</sup>, I want
to thank you for forcing me to think more carefully and
completely.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>As a result of the clarifications you offered me,
when combined with my recent EM discussions with Kevin and
Jameson, I am currently favoring MJ over all other methods
for electing a president.
</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">MJ simply asks each
voter to grade each candidate when judged against each
voter’s own criteria of what an EXCELLENT candidate would
look like.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Any candidate judged to be less than EXCELLENT must
be graded either as VERRY GOOD, GOOD, ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or
REJECTED.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Balinski and Laraki refer to each voters own
criteria for grading candidates as being ‘absolute’ (but
this is only in the sense that these criteria should be
independent of any one set of candidates that might be
seeking election).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>These criteria are not rankings but they can be
used to make rankings.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>MJ’s winner is the candidate whose majority
‘median-grade’ is higher than any other candidate.</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">For example, I see MJ
as both better than IRV and MJ because:
</font></span></p>
<ol style="list-style-type: decimal; direction: ltr;">
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-size: 11pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">I
believe that ordinary citizens would more easily
understand both how to mark MJ’s ballot and how the
winner is discovered using its count.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>They would find it even more difficulty in
understanding how MAM’s ballots are counted.
</span></p>
</li>
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">At the
same time, both MJ and MAM have the following similar
advantage over IRV:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>All MAM voters’ ‘rankings’ and MJ voters’
‘gradings’ of all candidates continue to count until
their respective winners are discovered.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Some of the IRV voters’ ‘rankings’ are not
counted after any of its candidates are eliminated and
before IRV’s winner is discovered.
</span></p>
</li>
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">However,
MJ has another advantage over MAM: because ‘grades’ are
more evaluatively clear than are ‘ranks’, MJ’s ‘</span><span
style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;">‘majorities of grades are … considerably more
discerning decisions than are [MAM’s] majorities of
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>preferences’
(Belinski & Laraki, Majority Judgment, p.283)?
</span></p>
</li>
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">Moreover,
unlike the different intensities of each MJ voter’s
‘grades’ (evaluations) for each candidate, the different
intensities of each MAM voter’s ‘rankings’ recorded on
her ballot are not directly counted.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>For example, an MAM voter’s different intensities
of preference for A over B and A over G in the following
list of preferences are not differently counted:<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>A>B>C>D>E>F>G.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In contrast, all
the ‘grades’ given to all candidates by all MJ voters
continue fully to count until the highest
‘majority-grade’ winner is discovered.
</span><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;">T</span><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;">hus, I see MJ as the most democratic
method because it both wastes no citizen’s vote and is
most likely to elect the candidate who is supported as
enthusiastically as possible by the larges majority of
citizens.</span></p>
</li>
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">Also, MJ
seems to offer less scope for manipulative voting than
any other method.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>B&L argue that MJ is entirely strategy-proof
with regard to grades.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>At the same time, if B&L’s mathematical
proofs are correct, even when and if voters might
instead use MJ’s ‘gradings’ as ‘rankings’, MJ
structurally cuts by almost ‘half’</span><span
style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;">
</span><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">all
the opportunities for all the manipulative strategies
that are offered by all the methods other than MJ
</span><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;">(Belinski & Laraki, Majority Judgment,
pp.14, 15, 189-198, 212, 245, 282-292)</span><span
style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">. (I assume
that your mathematical knowledge is currently much
superior to mine.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Consequently, I’m hoping that you will be able to
tell me whether the above B&L claim of ‘almost half’
is fully justified by B&L’s mathematical proofs.)</span></p>
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">If it is
fully justified, MJ would have this advantage over IRV
and MAM.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I say this even though it still seems to me that,
in any case, it would also be extremely unlikely that
strategic voting would be successful when using IRV or
MAM to elect one winner by millions of voters.</span></p>
</li>
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 0pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">I still
favor MJ even though it is theoretically vulnerable to
‘Later-no-harm’ (LNH).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>I am currently persuaded by B&L that this
could occur in practice only in an election composed of
voters and candidates whose numbers could be counted on
one person’s hands.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span><span
style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;">This is confirmed by Jameson in his 1st
informative and recent EM posts: 1): ‘there is the
failure of the later-no-harm (LNH) criterion. But note:
MJ actually does pass a weaker version of LNH: rating
additional candidates at above bottom will not harm the
winner as long as those candidates are ranked below the
winning median. My claim is that over time, the winning
median grade will mostly fall in a given band of grades;
for instance, using letter grades, between B- and D+. In
that case, making distinctions between A and B at the
top or D and F at the bottom are strategically safe.’ </span></p>
</li>
<li style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; font-style:
normal; font-weight: normal;">
<p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;
font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; margin-top: 12pt;
margin-bottom: 8pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0
level1 lfo1;">
<span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;">Similarly,
I am aware that MJ fails the strong Independence of
Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) candidates test.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However,</span><span
style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;"> B&L explain how MJ does at least pass a
weaker IIA test</span><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;">.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>As Jameson put in his 2<sup>nd</sup> recent and
informative EM contribution:
</span><span style="line-height: 107%; font-size: 12pt;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri;">‘Note that this strategy will almost certainly
not affect the medians, and thus will not change the
winner. Though technically it breaks IIA, it only does
so in bizarre cases where both voter and candidate
distributions differ severely from historical norms.’</span></p>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="margin: 12pt 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">S: I would very much
appreciate anyone explaining why you think any of the
above views are mistaken.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Please try to correct any mistakes you have noticed
in the above.</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">I look forward to
hearing from you,</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri">Steve</font></span></p>
<br>
</div>
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