<div dir="ltr">Chris is correct. "by most" = "by a majority". Maximum is "<b><i>the</i></b> most".<div><br></div><div>Perhaps I should avoid that word, but I was trying to use small words, as in Randall Munroe's "Thing Explainer".</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2016-09-13 6:28 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
  
    
  
  <div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div>Kevin,<br>
      <br>
      I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted  by most of the
      voters, meaning down-voted on more than half the ballots.<br>
      <br>
      Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".<br>
      <br>
      Chris Benham<div><div class="h5"><br>
      <br>
      <br>
      On 9/13/2016 2:56 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
    </div></div></div>
    <blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="h5">
      <div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
        <div><font size="+1">Hi
            Jameson,</font></div>
        <div><font size="+1"><br>
          </font></div>
        <div><font size="+1">"Downvoted
            by most" means the candidate with the single greatest number
            of downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority
            favorite couldn't it?</font></div>
        <div><font size="+1"><br>
          </font></div>
        <div dir="ltr"><font size="+1">How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must
            be misunderstanding it. Does "max amount of upvotes" mean
            100% of the voters, or just the greatest number of upvotes
            that occurs?</font></div>
        <div><font size="+1"><br>
          </font></div>
        <div><font size="+1">I
            do like antiplurality mechanisms.</font></div>
        <div><font size="+1"><br>
          </font></div>
        <div><font size="+1">Kevin</font></div>
        <div><br>
          <br>
        </div>
        <div style="display:block">
          <div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
            <div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px">
              <div dir="ltr">
                <font face="Arial" size="2">
                  <hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold">De :</span></b>
                  Jameson Quinn <a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank"><jameson.quinn@gmail.com></a><br>
                  <b><span style="font-weight:bold">À :</span></b>
                  Kevin Venzke <a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank"><stepjak@yahoo.fr></a>;
                  electionsciencefoundation
                  <a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com" target="_blank"><electionscience@googlegroups.<wbr>com></a> <br>
                  <b><span style="font-weight:bold">Cc :</span></b> EM
                  <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank"><election-methods@lists.<wbr>electorama.com></a><br>
                  <b><span style="font-weight:bold">Envoyé le :</span></b>
                  Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37<br>
                  <b><span style="font-weight:bold">Objet :</span></b>
                  Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple
                  3-level method.<br>
                </font> </div>
              <div><br>
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <div dir="ltr">Here's
                      a new proposed variant of U/P with a simple
                      default:
                      <div><br clear="none">
                      </div>
                      <div>Voters may rate each candidate as
                        "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred" (upvote),
                        or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.</div>
                      <div><br clear="none">
                      </div>
                      <div>Any
                        candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than
                        half the max amount of upvotes, is disqualified,
                        unless that would disqualify everyone. The
                        winner is the remaining candidate with the most
                        upvotes.</div>
                      <div><br clear="none">
                      </div>
                      <div>The
                        "fewer than half the max" rule prevents
                        dark-horse winners, without resorting to strange
                        defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken
                        dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an
                        evenly-balanced three-way chicken dilemma (in a
                        four-way race), I think there's a negligible
                        chance that such a scenario would be so
                        balanced.</div>
                      <div><br clear="none">
                      </div>
                      <div>I
                        know that Chris doesn't like this method's
                        violation of "irrelevant ballots". Myself, I
                        think that no voters are irrelevant; even if
                        they don't express an opinion between the two
                        frontrunners, they may have one. (True, they may
                        not; but that's not the first assumption I'd
                        make.)</div>
                    </div>
                    <div><br clear="none">
                      <div>2016-09-12
                        20:22 GMT-04:00 Kevin Venzke <span dir="ltr"><<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>></span>:<br clear="none">
                        <div>
                          <blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                            <div>
                              <div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
                                <div>
                                  <div>
                                    <div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
                                      <div><span>Hi
                                          Jameson,</span></div>
                                      <div><span><br clear="none">
                                        </span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span>I think it is a positive
                                          thing that the MTA B/C
                                          majority coalition can give
                                          their sincere preferences (!),
                                          while using the strategy
                                          they're expected to use (i.e.
                                          middle slot as tiebreaker
                                          given multiple majorities),
                                          without risk of this strategy
                                          backfiring. (Voters can
                                          accidentally elect the less
                                          preferred of B or C, but that
                                          is the inescapable chicken
                                          dilemma, I would say.)</span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span><br clear="none">
                                        </span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span>I have some sympathy for your
                                          claim that C should not be
                                          able to win with few top
                                          ratings. But that sympathy is
                                          not tied to Borda counts, it
                                          is based on wanting to reduce
                                          the truncation incentive for
                                          the B voters. This, U/P does
                                          not really do, because the
                                          B>C voters would be taking
                                          a large risk that they are
                                          helping to put C (alone) over
                                          the threshold of majority
                                          approval.</span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span><br clear="none">
                                        </span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span>So I don't think either of
                                          these ballot sets is likely
                                          under U/P, and it sounds like
                                          you agree with that and think
                                          it is good (because it deters
                                          a pathological ballot set)? Do
                                          you have a stance (or at
                                          least, see use in determining
                                          a stance) on how U/P voters in
                                          these scenarios should be
                                          voting?</span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span><br clear="none">
                                        </span></div>
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span>Kevin</span></div>
                                      <div><br clear="none">
                                        <br clear="none">
                                      </div>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </div>
                                <div>
                                  <div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
                                    <div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px">
                                      <div dir="ltr"><span> <font face="Arial" size="2"> </font></span>
                                        <hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold">De :</span></b>
                                        Jameson Quinn <<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br clear="none">
                                        <b><span style="font-weight:bold">À :</span></b>
                                        EM <<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.
                                          electorama.com</a>> <br clear="none">
                                        <b><span style="font-weight:bold">Envoyé
                                            le :</span></b> Dimanche 11
                                        septembre 2016 1h51<br clear="none">
                                        <b><span style="font-weight:bold">Objet :</span></b>
                                        [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new
                                        name for simple 3-level method.<br clear="none">
                                      </div>
                                      <div>
                                        <div>
                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                            <div><br clear="none">
                                              <br clear="none">
                                            </div>
                                            <div>
                                              <div>
                                                <div dir="ltr">
                                                  <div>
                                                    <div dir="ltr">
                                                      <div>
                                                        <div><span>2016-09-10 21:26 GMT-04:00
                                                          C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br clear="none">
                                                          </span>
                                                          <blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span>On 9/11/2016 5:02 AM,
                                                          Kevin Venzke
                                                          wrote:<br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          </span>
                                                          <blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                                                          43: A<br clear="none">
                                                          24: B>C<br clear="none">
                                                          23: C>B<br clear="none">
                                                          10: D<br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          Under MTA the
                                                          B and C voters
                                                          are being
                                                          completely
                                                          reasonable:
                                                          They hope for
                                                          majority
                                                          approval but
                                                          can still hope
                                                          for a win if
                                                          they<br clear="none">
                                                          don't get it.<br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          Strategy is
                                                          less likely to
                                                          produce these
                                                          ballots under
                                                          U/P because
                                                          the B and C
                                                          voters are
                                                          taking a
                                                          gamble. To get
                                                          a similar
                                                          outcome<br clear="none">
                                                          they have to
                                                          vote B=C.
                                                          Anyone who
                                                          doesn't is
                                                          functionally
                                                          defecting!<br clear="none">
                                                          </blockquote>
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                           C: A very
                                                          good example! 
                                                           Assuming MTA
                                                          and MCA use
                                                          Top Ratings
                                                          scores to
                                                          break Approval
                                                          ties, they
                                                          both elect the
                                                          Condorcet
                                                          winner B.<br clear="none">
                                                          </blockquote>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div>But
                                                          both could be
                                                          shifted to C
                                                          with a single
                                                          C-only ballot,
                                                          even if the
                                                          B:C ratio were
                                                          46:1 instead
                                                          of 24:23.</div>
                                                          <span></span>
                                                          <div> </div>
                                                          <blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          U/P's
                                                          under-use of 
                                                          the middle
                                                          ratings slot
                                                          means that it
                                                          relies more on
                                                          its "majority
disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more<br clear="none">
                                                          vulnerable to
                                                          irrelevant
                                                          ballots, as in
                                                          the example.<br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          Under U/P,
                                                          without the
                                                          irrelevant D
                                                          ballots, A and
                                                          D are
                                                          disqualified
                                                          and B is the
                                                          glorious
                                                          winner. With
                                                          them, B and C
                                                          and D are
                                                          disqualified
                                                          and  (without
                                                          needing<br clear="none">
                                                          any others to
                                                          be
                                                          disqualified)
                                                          A wins.<br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          This causes me
                                                          to reject U/P
                                                          as clearly
                                                          worse than MTA
                                                          and MCA. Of
                                                          the three I
                                                          (again) rate
                                                          MTA as the
                                                          least bad.<br clear="none">
                                                          </blockquote>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div>I think
                                                          MTA is pretty
                                                          darn good. I
                                                          still prefer
                                                          U/P.</div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div>I think
                                                          that scenarios
                                                          like the above
                                                          are
                                                          fundamentally
                                                          pathological;
                                                          any possible
                                                          winner has
                                                          only minority
                                                          approval, so
                                                          that even
                                                          assuming all
                                                          ballots are
                                                          semi-honest,
                                                          any of them
                                                          could be a
                                                          true Condorcet
                                                          loser. Thus, I
                                                          believe that
                                                          it's more
                                                          important for
                                                          a system to
                                                          try to avoid
                                                          scenarios like
                                                          the above,
                                                          than to try to
                                                          find a perfect
                                                          winner in such
                                                          a scenario. In
                                                          fact, in the
                                                          related
                                                          scenario:</div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          43: A<br clear="none">
                                                          40: B>C</div>
                                                          <div>6:
                                                          C>B<br clear="none">
                                                          1: C<br clear="none">
                                                          10: D<br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div>... I
                                                          think that a
                                                          case can be
                                                          made for
                                                          either A or B.
                                                          After all,
                                                          they'd be tied
                                                          if we try to
                                                          approximate
                                                          Score by using
                                                          truncatable
                                                          Borda here.
                                                          But no serious
                                                          case can be
                                                          made for C or
                                                          D, even though
                                                          C wins MTA and
                                                          MCA.</div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div>Anyway,
                                                          I think U/P
                                                          does a better
                                                          job trying to
                                                          discourage the
                                                          kind of
                                                          strategy that
                                                          would lead to
                                                          a scenario
                                                          like the
                                                          above. And
                                                          part of that
                                                          is the default
                                                          rule which
                                                          Chris has
                                                          criticized.</div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <div>One
                                                          possible
                                                          alternative
                                                          default rule:
                                                          ballots
                                                          alternate
                                                          between
                                                          defaulting to
                                                          "acceptable"
                                                          and to
                                                          "unacceptable".
                                                          Each ballot
                                                          clearly states
                                                          which default
                                                          it uses, and
                                                          there is a
                                                          place on the
                                                          ballot to
                                                          globally
                                                          change that
                                                          default. (I
                                                          doubt Chris
                                                          will like this
                                                          idea, but it
                                                          is at least
                                                          straightforward,
                                                          explicit, and
                                                          easy to
                                                          describe.)</div>
                                                          <div><br clear="none">
                                                          </div>
                                                          <blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          Chris Benham<br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          <br clear="none">
                                                          </blockquote>
                                                        </div>
                                                        <br clear="none">
                                                      </div>
                                                    </div>
                                                  </div>
                                                  <br clear="none">
                                                </div>
                                              </div>
                                            </div>
                                            <br clear="none">
                                          </div>
                                        </div>
                                        <span>----<br clear="none">
                                          Election-Methods mailing list
                                          - see <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em
                                          </a>for list info<br clear="none">
                                          <br clear="none">
                                          <br clear="none">
                                        </span></div>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                          </blockquote>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                      <br clear="none">
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </div>
                <br>
                <div>----<br clear="none">
                  Election-Methods mailing list - see <a shape="rect" href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em
                  </a>for list info<br clear="none">
                </div>
                <br>
                <br>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre>----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <br>
      </div></div><p color="#000000" align="left"><span class="">No virus
        found in this message.<br>
        Checked by AVG - <a href="http://www.avg.com" target="_blank">www.avg.com</a><br></span>
        Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4649/13003 - Release
        Date: 09/12/16</p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </div>

<br>----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>