<div dir="ltr">Again, correct.</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2016-09-13 9:17 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div>And I took " the max amount of
upvotes" to refer to the maximum number of up-votes received by
any candidate.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<div><div class="h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
On 9/13/2016 10:31 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
</div></div></div>
<blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="h5">
<div dir="ltr">Chris is correct. "by most" = "by a majority".
Maximum is "<b><i>the</i></b> most".
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Perhaps I should avoid that word, but I was trying to use
small words, as in Randall Munroe's "Thing Explainer".</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">2016-09-13 6:28 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div>Kevin,<br>
<br>
I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted by most
of the voters, meaning down-voted on more than half the
ballots.<br>
<br>
Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".<br>
<br>
Chris Benham
<div>
<div><br>
<br>
<br>
On 9/13/2016 2:56 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>
<div>
<div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
<div><font size="+1">Hi Jameson,</font></div>
<div><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font size="+1">"Downvoted by most" means the
candidate with the single greatest number of
downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique)
majority favorite couldn't it?</font></div>
<div><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div dir="ltr"><font size="+1">How does this
violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be
misunderstanding it. Does "max amount of
upvotes" mean 100% of the voters, or just the
greatest number of upvotes that occurs?</font></div>
<div><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font size="+1">I do like antiplurality
mechanisms.</font></div>
<div><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div><font size="+1">Kevin</font></div>
<div><br>
<br>
</div>
<div style="display:block">
<div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
<div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px">
<div dir="ltr"> <font face="Arial" size="2">
<hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold">De :</span></b>
Jameson Quinn <a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank"><jameson.quinn@gmail.com></a><br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">À :</span></b>
Kevin Venzke <a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank"><stepjak@yahoo.fr></a>;
electionsciencefoundation <a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com" target="_blank"><electionscience@googlegroups.<wbr>com></a>
<br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">Cc :</span></b>
EM <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank"><election-methods@lists.electo<wbr>rama.com></a><br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">Envoyé
le :</span></b> Lundi 12 septembre
2016 20h37<br>
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">Objet :</span></b>
Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name
for simple 3-level method.<br>
</font> </div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr">Here's a new proposed
variant of U/P with a simple
default:
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Voters may rate each candidate
as "unacceptable" (downvote),
"preferred" (upvote), or
"acceptable" (neither). Default is
neither.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Any candidate downvoted by
most, or with fewer than half the
max amount of upvotes, is
disqualified, unless that would
disqualify everyone. The winner is
the remaining candidate with the
most upvotes.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>The "fewer than half the max"
rule prevents dark-horse winners,
without resorting to strange
defaults. It has no effect on a
two-way chicken dilemma. Though in
theory it could affect an
evenly-balanced three-way chicken
dilemma (in a four-way race), I
think there's a negligible chance
that such a scenario would be so
balanced.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I know that Chris doesn't like
this method's violation of
"irrelevant ballots". Myself, I
think that no voters are
irrelevant; even if they don't
express an opinion between the two
frontrunners, they may have one.
(True, they may not; but that's
not the first assumption I'd
make.)</div>
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
<div>2016-09-12 20:22 GMT-04:00
Kevin Venzke <span dir="ltr"><<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>></span>:<br clear="none">
<div>
<blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
<div>
<div>
<div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
<div><span>Hi
Jameson,</span></div>
<div><span><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span>I
think it is a
positive thing
that the MTA B/C
majority
coalition can
give their
sincere
preferences (!),
while using the
strategy they're
expected to use
(i.e. middle
slot as
tiebreaker given
multiple
majorities),
without risk of
this strategy
backfiring.
(Voters can
accidentally
elect the less
preferred of B
or C, but that
is the
inescapable
chicken dilemma,
I would say.)</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span>I
have some
sympathy for
your claim that
C should not be
able to win with
few top ratings.
But that
sympathy is not
tied to Borda
counts, it is
based on wanting
to reduce the
truncation
incentive for
the B voters.
This, U/P does
not really do,
because the
B>C voters
would be taking
a large risk
that they are
helping to put C
(alone) over the
threshold of
majority
approval.</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span>So
I don't think
either of these
ballot sets is
likely under
U/P, and it
sounds like you
agree with that
and think it is
good (because it
deters a
pathological
ballot set)? Do
you have a
stance (or at
least, see use
in determining a
stance) on how
U/P voters in
these scenarios
should be
voting?</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div dir="ltr"><span>Kevin</span></div>
<div><br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:12px">
<div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px">
<div dir="ltr"><span>
<font face="Arial" size="2"> </font></span>
<hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold">De :</span></b> Jameson Quinn <<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>><br clear="none">
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">À :</span></b>
EM <<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.
electorama.com</a>>
<br clear="none">
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">Envoyé
le :</span></b>
Dimanche 11
septembre 2016
1h51<br clear="none">
<b><span style="font-weight:bold">Objet :</span></b>
[EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P
voting: new name
for simple 3-level
method.<br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div><br clear="none">
<div><br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div><span>2016-09-10
21:26
GMT-04:00
C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br clear="none">
</span>
<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span>On
9/11/2016 5:02
AM, Kevin
Venzke wrote:<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</span>
<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
43: A<br clear="none">
24: B>C<br clear="none">
23: C>B<br clear="none">
10: D<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Under MTA the
B and C voters
are being
completely
reasonable:
They hope for
majority
approval but
can still hope
for a win if
they<br clear="none">
don't get it.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Strategy is
less likely to
produce these
ballots under
U/P because
the B and C
voters are
taking a
gamble. To get
a similar
outcome<br clear="none">
they have to
vote B=C.
Anyone who
doesn't is
functionally
defecting!<br clear="none">
</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
C: A very
good example!
Assuming MTA
and MCA use
Top Ratings
scores to
break Approval
ties, they
both elect the
Condorcet
winner B.<br clear="none">
</blockquote>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>But both
could be
shifted to C
with a single
C-only ballot,
even if the
B:C ratio were
46:1 instead
of 24:23.</div>
<span></span>
<div> </div>
<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br clear="none">
U/P's
under-use of
the middle
ratings slot
means that it
relies more on
its "majority
disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more<br clear="none">
vulnerable to
irrelevant
ballots, as in
the example.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Under U/P,
without the
irrelevant D
ballots, A and
D are
disqualified
and B is the
glorious
winner. With
them, B and C
and D are
disqualified
and (without
needing<br clear="none">
any others to
be
disqualified)
A wins.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
This causes me
to reject U/P
as clearly
worse than MTA
and MCA. Of
the three I
(again) rate
MTA as the
least bad.<br clear="none">
</blockquote>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I think
MTA is pretty
darn good. I
still prefer
U/P.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I think
that scenarios
like the above
are
fundamentally
pathological;
any possible
winner has
only minority
approval, so
that even
assuming all
ballots are
semi-honest,
any of them
could be a
true Condorcet
loser. Thus, I
believe that
it's more
important for
a system to
try to avoid
scenarios like
the above,
than to try to
find a perfect
winner in such
a scenario. In
fact, in the
related
scenario:</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
43: A<br clear="none">
40: B>C</div>
<div>6: C>B<br clear="none">
1: C<br clear="none">
10: D<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>... I
think that a
case can be
made for
either A or B.
After all,
they'd be tied
if we try to
approximate
Score by using
truncatable
Borda here.
But no serious
case can be
made for C or
D, even though
C wins MTA and
MCA.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Anyway, I
think U/P does
a better job
trying to
discourage the
kind of
strategy that
would lead to
a scenario
like the
above. And
part of that
is the default
rule which
Chris has
criticized.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>One
possible
alternative
default rule:
ballots
alternate
between
defaulting to
"acceptable"
and to
"unacceptable".
Each ballot
clearly states
which default
it uses, and
there is a
place on the
ballot to
globally
change that
default. (I
doubt Chris
will like this
idea, but it
is at least
straightforward,
explicit, and
easy to
describe.)</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br clear="none">
Chris Benham<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</blockquote>
</div>
<br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
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mailing list -
see <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list info<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
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</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</div>
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