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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/7/2016 1:21 AM, Jameson Quinn
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>Let's take a case where IBIFA and DA disagree.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>40: D>...>A,B</div>
<div>35: A>B>D</div>
<div>25: B>...>A,D</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>IBIFA elects A; DA elects B. </div>
</blockquote>
<br>
C:I assume comma means = and ... means one skipped grade. I
suppose, since "DA" uses 3-slot ballots. that the ballots
explicitly mention the unapproved (bottom-rated)<br>
candidates. In that case I would translate this as:<br>
<br>
40: D<br>
35: A>B<br>
25: B<br>
<br>
But then IBIFA elects B. No candidate X's Top-Rating score is
higher than any candidate Y's approval (i.e. above-bottom rating)
score on ballots that don't top-rate X, so<br>
IBIFA elects the most approved candidate, B.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Obviously, one could tweak these numbers
to try to make one or the other system look better or worse.</blockquote>
<br>
C: Well then I am very curious to see any example where IBIFA
"looks worse" than DA.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">What I'm saying there is that
200:B>>A>C is actually shorthand for
180:B>>A>C, 20:B>>C>A.</blockquote>
<br>
C: That is very useful and clarifying "shorthand".<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span class="">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> What is
the default rating? </blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>There is a complex rule for this.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
C:I greatly prefer a very simple rule: the default rating is
Bottom (i.e. the lowest possible).<br>
<br>
<span class=""> The rule regarding "the following election" I
consider arbitrary and very undemocratic.<br>
<br>
</span>
<blockquote type="cite"><span class="">This is the case where a
candidate wins despite the fact that the majority of the
electorate put them at bottom. If they are to win a second
term, they must do so as a write-in.</span></blockquote>
<br>
<span class="">C:That is just ridiculous and unfair and arbitrary.
The rule as I read it didn't just refer to the winner (not that
I can accept either version). A lot can happen in the years
between<br>
elections. Why should a candidate be severely disadvantaged
because of how s/he went in the last election?<br>
<br>
<br>
</span>
<blockquote type="cite"><span class="">Note that AD is pretty
similar [to MTA], and arguably farther in the direction you're
favoring. <br>
</span></blockquote>
<br>
<span class="">I assume "AD" is a typo and means DA. Compared
with MTA, DA is needlessly complicated and too (IMO) too focused
on the bottoms of the ballots.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</span><br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAO82iZwtKaFFs71XHjPq-ieqcewdcrLdbH19wGBQTHKcH+Zb1w@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_quote">Sorry; I sent a premature version of
this response to Chris alone. This is the same as that, except
for this paragraph. The one thing I wanted to reemphasize here
is that I'm not trying to make this into a battle between good
systems. IBIFA, Smith//Approval, Schulze, and Approval do not
belong to the class of single-winner methods I call "best"
(though IBIFA almost does); but I still consider all of those
methods extremely good, and would enthusiastically join a
campaign for their use in some jurisdiction.<br>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote"><span class="">2016-09-06 8:56
GMT-04:00 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On
9/6/2016 6:00 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
It's really hard to respond point-by-point as a
third party in a discussion like this. However,
I'd like to say in general that I believe that
Majority Judgment, and more-generally, the class
of "median" or "graded Bucklin" systems which
includes MJ, MCA, GMJ, ERB, DA, etc., are the
best non-delegated single-winner systems for a
potentially-strategic electorate, in terms of
outcome. <br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span>
C: How are they better than IBIFA? Or, say,
Smith//Approval?<br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://wiki.electorama.com/wik<wbr>i/IBIFA</a></blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>First off: IBIFA is similar to MCA, and thus almost
a member of this class. So I definitely consider it to
be a very good system. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Second, I think that DA may be better than IBIFA,
not in outcomes, but in ease of explanation. This may,
in practice, impact outcomes; something that's easier
to understand may make people marginally more likely
to vote.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In terms of outcomes: I think that IBIFA does the
wrong thing when it fails to find a "top-rating"
winner. Falling back to "most above-bottom" rankings
brings the chicken dilemma into the choice of whether
to rank above bottom. That's why, in DA, in the case
where all candidates are majority disqualified, the
winner is the one with the most top ratings, not the
most non-disqualified (above-bottom) ratings.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As to Smith//Approval: also a very good method. But
it does include incentives for non-semi-honest
strategy, which rated Bucklin systems don't.</div>
<span class="">
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span><br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
To me, the toughest realistic election scenario
is the chicken dilemma. For instance, consider
the following 900-voter scenario<br>
300: A>B>>C<br>
200: B>>A>C<br>
400: C>>B>A<br>
<br>
(where ">>" indicates universal agreement,
and ">" at bottom indicates 90% agreement and
10% reversal)<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span>
C: How is this a "chicken dilemma" scenario? In
this context, I don't understand what the words
"agreement" and "reversal" mean.</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>What I'm saying there is that 200:B>>A>C
is actually shorthand for 180:B>>A>C,
20:B>>C>A.</div>
<span class="">
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span><br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
DA: "Double Approval" or "Disqualify/Approve"
voting. Voters can rate each candidate
preferred, neutral, or disqualified. (Both
preferred and disqualified is also legal and
counted, though it's strategically nonsensical.)
Winner is the most-preferred among those not
majority disqualified. If all candidates are
majority-disqualified, winner is simply
most-preferred. Any candidate who is
majority-disqualified is prohibited from
appearing on the ballot for the same office in
the following election.<br>
<br>
Lately, I favor DA,<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span>
C: Why is rating a candidate both approved and
"disqualified" "legal and counted"?</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>Two reasons:</div>
<div>1. Even though it doesn't make any sense
strategically, it avoids throwing away the ballot as
spoiled. In general, for most candidates, only one of
the two kinds of votes is going to matter; and insofar
as the voter meant either of the marks, it seems more
likely that they mean the one that matters.</div>
<div>2. This makes the system meet the Frohnmayer
balance criterion.</div>
<span class="">
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
What is the default rating? </blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>There is a complex rule for this.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There are three check mark spaces per ballot, for
approve, explicit neutral, and disqualify. Explicit
neutral, when it's in combination with another mark or
marks, has no meaning. For blank lines, use the
following rules, in order:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. If a voter has used any explicit neutral
rankings, any blank rankings they include are
considered "semi-explicit" disqualify ratings. (This
is a case where I think intent is pretty clear.)</div>
<div>2. If the top two candidates by approvals both have
a majority of explicit or semi-explicit disqualify
ratings, then neutral rankings are all counted as
implicit disqualify ratings. (This helps prevent
unintentional "dark horse" wins. It's also a
statistical view of intent: if voters tend to be
negative with their explicit votes, then implicit
votes should be considered negative too.)</div>
<div>3. If neither of the above hold, then blank lines
are considered as neutral grades. (As above: if voters
aren't too negative with explicit votes, then I think
their intent is most likely not negative with implicit
ones.)</div>
<span class="">
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
The rule regarding "the following election" I
consider arbitrary<br>
and very undemocratic.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>This is the case where a candidate wins despite the
fact that the majority of the electorate put them at
bottom. If they are to win a second term, they must do
so as a write-in.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>"NOTA" is a popular proposal. I consider it
wrong-headed as part of plurality, but I understand
the sentiment, and so I think the above is a
reasonable compromise.</div>
<span class="">
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
In all these Bucklin/MJ/MCA methods the strategic
incentive for the voters to just cast approval-type
votes (i.e. only use the top and bottom
slots/grades) is in my view<br>
far too strong. The least bad of them is 3-slot MTA
(where if more than one candidate exceeds the
majority threshold in the second round the winner is
the one of those with the<br>
most Top Ratings), which is simple and slightly
reduces the truncation incentive. It didn't make
your list.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>That was not intentional. Note that AD is pretty
similar, and arguably farther in the direction you're
favoring. </div>
<span class="">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
All them absurdly fail Irrelevant Ballots
independence and (unless you have a fetish for
strict compliance with Later-no-Help) are completely
dominated by IBIFA.<br>
The IBIFA winner will always pairwise beat any
different winner that any of these methods come up
with.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
</span>
<div>Let's take a case where IBIFA and DA disagree.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>40: D>...>A,B</div>
<div>35: A>B>D</div>
<div>25: B>...>A,D</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>IBIFA elects A; DA elects B. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Obviously, one could tweak these numbers to try to
make one or the other system look better or worse. But
I think that this scenario is more or less a neutral
example of its class. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The main question is: are the B voters being
honest? If they truly feel that A is unacceptable,
then I think that B should win. If they are using a
chicken strategy and hiding their true preference for
A over D, then A should win.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>My feeling is that this kind of situation, where
the strategic symmetry between the A and B factions is
badly broken, is more likely to occur through some
honest difference rather than through strategy. After
all, if their sizes are similar, their strategic
incentives are relatively symmetric; and if the A
group is highly dominant, then it's likely that A
voters would disqualify B, given that even a minority
of A voters would be enough to do so.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So, while I think that this is a legitimately hard
kind of scenario and there is some argument for the
IBIFA answer, I still feel that DA is not only
undominated by IBIFA, it's actually better here.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
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