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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/6/2016 10:47 AM, steve bosworth
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="color: black; font-size:
12pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri">S: For B&L, the grades used are not
‘magically standardized’ but culturally determined by human
definitions and practices, e.g. at least from our school
days we all are prompted to develop our own understanding of
such common words as EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, etc., i.e. as
used in the various contexts in which we are called upon to
evaluate proposals, decisions, performances, etc.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Do we disagree about this?</font></span></blockquote>
<br>
C: Yes. Candidates for political office are in a different
category.<br>
<br>
Suppose there are several candidates and in your sincere opinion
they are all very bad and deserve the lowest possible grade but
one is significantly even worse than the others.<br>
<br>
Would you (a) abstain from voting, or (b) turn up and give all
the candidates the lowest rating or (c) give the bottom-most
rating only to the worst candidate and "insincerely"<br>
give the other bad candidates a higher rating?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</div>
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<div style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
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"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
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<hr align="left" size="2" width="98%">
</font></span></div>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<b><span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New
Roman";"><font face="Calibri">From:</font></span></b><span
style="color: black; font-size: 12pt; mso-ascii-font-family:
Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New
Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri"> C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, September 3, 2016 10:13 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Kevin Venzke; steve bosworth;
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [EM] (3) MJ -- The easiest method to
'tolerate' </font></span></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 0pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri"> </font></span></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 12pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri">Hi C. Benham and everyone,<br>
<br>
C: [C. Benham wrote:] An election for a powerful political
office isn't a jury-like
<br>
collaboration among voters to select the best winner.
Rather it is<br>
competition between factions of voters who are trying to
elect their <br>
favourites and/or prevent the election of some candidate<br>
they consider relatively bad.</font></span></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 12pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<font face="Calibri"><span style="color: black; font-size:
12pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri;
mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";">S:<span style="mso-spacerun:
yes;">
</span>Perhaps we do not entirely disagree as you also
want the ‘best winner’ to be elected.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, we would seem to disagree if, as a
democrat, you are really saying that you do not want the
winner to be the one who is most highly valued by a
majority of the voters.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Of course, different citizens will have different
ideas about what an EXCELLENT candidate would look like
and MJ allows each voter honestly (or dishonestly) to
‘evaluate’ each candidate using a rich common language,
i.e. to ‘grade’ each to the extent that each does or does
not come close to being EXCELLENT.<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>By discovering the one candidate whose majority
‘median-grade’ is highest, MJ most efficiently allows a
society to discover that most highly valued winner. This
is partly because ‘</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family:
Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New
Roman";">majorities of grades are … considerably more
discerning decisions than are majorities of preferences’ (<span
style="color: black;">Belinski & Laraki,
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Majority
Judgment</i>, </span>p.283). <span style="color:
black;">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Do we disagree?<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span></span></span></font></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 12pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<font face="Calibri"><span style="color: black; font-size:
12pt; mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri;
mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";
mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family:
"Times New Roman";">Also, to the extent that I
understand your IBIFA method as contrasted to MJ, IBIFA
1): is more likely to prompt voters to ‘rank’ rather than
to ‘evaluate’ the competing candidates, and 2): its
reasons for its different stages of rules for discovering
its winner are more complex and less obvious than the
reasons for MJ’s count.’ 3): Also, as explained by
B&L, IBIFA (as a ‘point-summing method’) is more
vulnerable to strategic ‘manipulation’, as well as to
Condorcet ties and Arrow’s paradoxes. In this last regard,
do you see any flaws in B&L’s argument that MJ is
entirely strategy-proof with regard to grading?<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Also, in contrast to the many ways that all the
‘point-summing methods’ offer opportunities for voters to
‘manipulate’ the results, do you see any flaws in their
<span style="text-transform: uppercase;">mathematical
proof</span> that MJ is almost ‘half’ as vulnerable in
this regard, i.e. if and when MJ ballots might be used to
‘rank’ rather than to ‘grade’ the candidates (see
</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; mso-ascii-font-family:
Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New
Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";">pp.14,
15, 189-198, 282<span style="color: black;">-292)?</span></span></font></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 12pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri">S:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>With regard to your example (below), I also see X
as winning by MJ.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>X’s median grade is ‘b’ [or Very Good’] while Y’s
is ‘c’ [or Good], i.e. 51% of the ‘grades’ evaluated X as
Very Good, while 51% of the grades evaluated Y only as
Good.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>What is the problem with this?</font></span></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 12pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri">You suggest below:<span
style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>‘The 11 who voted Ya,Xb and the 11 who voted Yc, Xf<br>
might wish they had "lied" and voted like the rest of Y's
supporters.’<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>However, please also note that the 11 who voted
Ya,Xb’ also agreed that X is Very Good, and thus it is
only ‘the 11 who voted Yc, Xf’ who presumably will be less
satisfied with X’s win.
<br>
<br>
<br>
C: But suppose that MJ is used and the voters give their
sincere absolute <br>
ratings (on some magically standardised scale, independent<br>
of the actual candidates).</font></span></p>
<p style="background: white; margin: 0in 0in 12pt; line-height:
normal; vertical-align: middle;">
<span style="color: black; font-size: 12pt;
mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New Roman"; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri;
mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><font
face="Calibri">S: For B&L, the grades used are not
‘magically standardized’ but culturally determined by
human definitions and practices, e.g. at least from our
school days we all are prompted to develop our own
understanding of such common words as EXCELLENT, VERY
GOOD, etc., i.e. as used in the various contexts in which
we are called upon to evaluate proposals, decisions,
performances, etc.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Do we disagree about this?<br>
<br>
C: Say there are candidates X and Y and voters rate them
on A-B-C-D-E-F <br>
grading ballots.<br>
<br>
40: X a, Yf<br>
11: Ya, Xb<br>
38: Ya, Xf<br>
11: Yc, Xf<br>
<br>
60% of these voters prefer Y to X but MJ elects X. Is
this really the <br>
best result? The 11 who voted Ya,Xb and the 11 who voted
Yc, Xf<br>
might wish they had "lied" and voted like the rest of Y's
supporters.<br>
<br>
I like expressive ballots and there's no reason why IBIFA
can't also use <br>
6-slot ratings ballots. Here it elects Y. Whenever the
winners of<br>
IBIFA and MJ (or Bucklin or MCA or Range) differ the IBIFA
winner will <br>
pairwise-beat the other.<br>
<br>
</font><a moz-do-not-send="true" id="LPlnk602433"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA"><span
style="color: blue;"><font face="Calibri">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA</font></span></a><br>
<font face="Calibri"><br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</font><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA"><span
style="color: blue;"><font face="Calibri">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA</font></span></a><br>
<font face="Calibri"><br>
<br>
<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;">
<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;">
</font></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="line-height: 107%;
font-size: 12pt;"><font face="Calibri"> </font></span></p>
<br>
<br>
<div style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<div>
<hr tabindex="-1" style="width: 98%; display: inline-block;">
<div id="x_divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><font style="font-size:
11pt;" face="Calibri, sans-serif" color="#000000"><b>From:</b>
C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, September 3, 2016 10:13 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Kevin Venzke; steve bosworth;
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [EM] (3) MJ -- The easiest method to
'tolerate'</font>
<div> </div>
</div>
</div>
<font size="2"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">
<div class="PlainText">Steve,<br>
<br>
An election for a powerful political office isn't a
jury-like <br>
collaboration among voters to select the best winner.
Rather it is<br>
competition between factions of voters who are trying to
elect their <br>
favourites and/or prevent the election of some candidate<br>
they consider relatively bad.<br>
<br>
But suppose that MJ is used and the voters give their
sincere absolute <br>
ratings (on some magically standardised scale,
independent<br>
of the actual candidates).<br>
<br>
Say there are candidates X and Y and voters rate them on
A-B-C-D-E-F <br>
grading ballots.<br>
<br>
40: X a, Yf<br>
11: Ya, Xb<br>
38: Ya, Xf<br>
11: Yc, Xf<br>
<br>
60% of these voters prefer Y to X but MJ elects X. Is
this really the <br>
best result? The 11 who voted Ya,Xb and the 11 who voted
Yc, Xf<br>
might wish they had "lied" and voted like the rest of
Y's supporters.<br>
<br>
I like expressive ballots and there's no reason why
IBIFA can't also use <br>
6-slot ratings ballots. Here it elects Y. Whenever the
winners of<br>
IBIFA and MJ (or Bucklin or MCA or Range) differ the
IBIFA winner will <br>
pairwise-beat the other.<br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" id="LPlnk120596"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA</a><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/IBIFA</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 9/4/2016 4:35 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
> Hi Steve,<br>
><br>
> I wrote a full response but then trimmed sections
to reduce redundancy. There is still a fair amount.<br>
><br>
> Steve wrote:<br>
>> At the same time, I see B&L as correctly
assuming (with E. J. Nanson ) that the ‘object of … an
election is to select …<br>
>> some candidate who shall, in the opinion of a
majority of the electors, be most fit for the
post….(p.209). I also find<br>
>> it hard to disagree with B&L’s following 2
assertions: ‘Clearly …. majorities of grades are …
considerably more discerning<br>
>> decisions than are majorities of preferences’
(p.283); Therefore, ‘A method [of voting] should elicit
the honest expression of<br>
>> voters’ opinions as inputs, for the aim of an
election is to produce outputs which represent as [well]
as possible the true<br>
>> wishes of societies and of juries’ (p.352).<br>
> I agree that a method should elicit the honest
expression of opinions as inputs, but I believe they
should do that by making<br>
> it in the voter's strategic interest to express
them.<br>
><br>
>> Consequently, I see MJ as always having the
advantage over competing methods by allowing each voter
clearly to express his<br>
>> or her evaluation of each candidate. MJ
invites each voter to ‘grade’ each candidate as being
either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD,<br>
>> ...<br>
> And I will say again that I don't feel it is
sufficient to simply "allow" and "invite" these things.<br>
><br>
>>> K: The notion that the voter should rate
[evaluate] candidates independently of how they rated
other candidates is basically<br>
>>> true. But this applies both to sincere
voters and to voters interested in maximizing the effect
of their vote. If the latter<br>
>>> voters conclude (as I believe they usually
should) that only the two extreme ratings can maximize
the effect of their vote,<br>
>>> then they should only use the two extreme
ratings.<br>
>> S: Depending on their own scale of values, I
accept that some voter may validly choose to use only
these two ‘extreme<br>
>> ratings’. However, MJ also allows other
voters who may have a greater knowledge of the different
qualities of the candidates,<br>
>> appropriately from their point of view, to use
all 6 grades accurately to evaluate each candidate.<br>
> Well, strategic voters don't have different scales
of values or inferior knowledge of the different
candidates. They are simply<br>
> trying to maximize the effect of their vote given
the method's rules.<br>
><br>
>> If a voter sees 6 candidates<br>
>> as EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD, ACCEPTABLE, and
to REJECT, respectively, she may see that to reject all
except her excellent<br>
>> candidate might allow her rejected candidate to
win, rather than her very good, good, or acceptable
candidate. Why should she<br>
>> take this risk [...]<br>
> But this risk is exactly what strategic voting aims
to reduce.<br>
><br>
>> and thus also to choose not to contribute
honestly to the discovery of the socially most valued
winner?<br>
> If I could disagree with only one thing it would be
this notion, that voters care about discovering the best
winner, as opposed<br>
> to trying to get their preferred candidates
elected.<br>
><br>
>> K: Relatedly, I don't see it as an inherently
valuable feature of a method for voters to be able to
"clearly express his<br>
>> or her evaluation" of a candidate, without it
actually being in their strategic interest to do that.<br>
>><br>
>> S: Surely, to the extent that citizens might
evaluate all the candidates honestly, this would help
greatly to inform all<br>
>> candidates and the public both about the real
values held by citizens and the perceived value of each
candidate. Perhaps<br>
>> most importantly, it would also have the best
chance of electing the candidate with the qualities
needed successfully to<br>
>> face her official challenges.<br>
>> If so, contrary to what you say several
paragraphs below, this inclines me to say that each
voter usually *should* grade<br>
>> each candidate on their own merits, not ‘rate’
or rank each in relation to one another.<br>
> "Should" in what sense? If voters don't want the
method to violate Arrow/IIA then they "should" decline
to rate anybody<br>
> EXCELLENT if there is no EXCELLENT candidate. But
the strategic voter "should" not refrain from this, if
his concern is to<br>
> get the best outcome for himself.<br>
><br>
>> On the other hand, if a voter or a group<br>
>> of voters wish to manipulate the MJ ballot to
maximize the chances of their favorite candidate winning
(i.e. by attempting to<br>
>> translate the ‘grades’ into ‘rankings’), MJ’s
method of electing a winner only by his highest
median-grade minimizes ‘cheating’,<br>
>> ‘minimizes the probability that a judge may be
found who can effectively raise or lower the grade in
the worst case’ (p.212).<br>
>> MJ reduces such opportunities almost by ‘half’
(pp. 15, 197, 282), i.e. it is still only ‘partially
strategy-proof-in ranking’<br>
>> (pp.15, 245). Do you see any errors in
B&L’s mathematical proofs of the above claims.<br>
> Is this quote the basis of claims that MJ reduces
manipulability? Because most methods don't even have the
mechanism<br>
> discussed... Like I've said, I understand this
claim as a comparison to Range, but not much else.<br>
><br>
>> S: MJ avoids Arrow’s paradoxes. Do you
disagree?<br>
>><br>
>> K: [….] This is not a particularly impressive
way to evade Arrow because practically speaking voters
under rated methods<br>
>> *should* be expected to rate candidates
differently based on which other candidates are in the
race.<br>
>> S: Up until now, I thought you were using
‘rate’ as equivalent to ‘grade’ but now you seem to be
using it as equivalent<br>
>> to ‘rank’.<br>
> No, rate means grade. I am not using it here to
mean rank.<br>
><br>
>> As I understand it, MJ’s design prompts each
citizen to ‘grade’ each candidate with respect only to
her own concept of<br>
>> what her EXCELLENT candidate would be. Each
candidate can be judged on their own merits in the light
of each voter’s own<br>
>> criteria, not in the light of who else is
running. Thus, while rankings can be deduced from
grades, grading is not ranking.<br>
>> The MJ winner is intended not to be decided by
ranking.<br>
> Yes, that is MJ's intention, and if people do that
(rate in comparison to a hypothetical candidate that
might not be in<br>
> the race), then it does not run afoul of Arrow/IIA.
However, if voters do the strategically obvious thing of
rating their<br>
> favorite candidate EXCELLENT even if he is not
exactly excellent, then in effect the method will not be
independent of<br>
> irrelevant alternatives, and the method isn't
dodging Arrow in any meaningful way.<br>
><br>
>> K: The alternative is that many voters will
choose not to rate *any* candidate "excellent" or
"rejected."<br>
>> S: I agree that this is one ‘option’ among
many but I do not see why you say it is ‘the
alternative’, as if this option<br>
>> is the only option or the one that should be
preferred.<br>
> I am speaking of something that is either true or
false:<br>
><br>
> True means: Some voters use the top and bottom
grades even if the best/worst candidates do not deserve
them<br>
> False means: No voters ever assign grades outside
the range that the actual candidates actually merit<br>
><br>
> If the case is "True" then the method isn't
avoiding Arrow in a practical sense. It will have the
same issues with<br>
> irrelevant alternatives that rank methods do.<br>
><br>
>> K: But I think even sincere-minded voters will
be inclined to make sure somebody is getting those
ratings.<br>
>> S: Yes, especially if they see them as
deserving these different grades.<br>
> Yes, that is obvious ("those ratings" referring to
the top and bottom ones). I'm saying I think
sincere-minded voters<br>
> will probably use the top and bottom ratings even
when no candidate actually deserves them.<br>
><br>
>> K: But under MJ all the ratings [gradings] are
independent. The only reason for a strategic-minded MJ
voter to rate B<br>
>> between A and C is if he has peculiarly good
information about what (final) score for B will be good
enough to beat C but<br>
>> not so good that it creates a problem for A.<br>
>><br>
>> S: Yes, but with MJ he is less like to have
such ‘peculiarly good information’. MJ makes it less
likely that this<br>
>> ‘strategic-minded voter’ will be able to make
this calculation with confidence.<br>
> Completely agree. However, while I am saying that
this means the strategic voter cannot calculate any good
way to use the<br>
> intermediate ratings, you want to take it further:<br>
><br>
>> Therefore, he is more likely simply to grade
the candidates ‘honestly’, [...]<br>
> I don't believe this is true. I think the strategic
voter can do better than that. I think I've probably
done simulations<br>
> on the exact question, I should probably check or
make a new one...<br>
><br>
>> S: > Currently, these features incline me to
see MJ as the best method for electing a President.
However, you do not seem<br>
>> to agree, given your next sentence, even though
‘approval voting’ does not allow each voter to express
the deferent<br>
>> intensities with which<br>
>> they might approve of the different candidates:<br>
>><br>
>> K: >This is because in the scenario I
discuss below, MJ would offer different intensities, but
nobody (who knew what they<br>
>> were doing) would use them.<br>
>> S: Given that MJ offers something like half
the scope for manipulation, I would like to understand
why you still think a<br>
>> knowing MJ voter would choose not to use the
different intensities it offers.<br>
>> At the same time, no method allows a voter to
‘know what they are doing’,<br>
> By "know what they are doing" I'm talking about
understanding the strategy of a method.<br>
><br>
> Regarding "half the scope for manipulation" I would
need to understand what that is referring to, if it's
the thing quoted<br>
> above, or something else. As someone who has
created simulations to measure strategic incentive, I
don't feel like much<br>
> can be summarized with that kind of language. The
claim could well be true in proper context; for example
as I was saying<br>
> above, I see that a strategic voter will have a
very hard time making intelligent use of intermediate
grades, and by that I<br>
> certainly mean to include the idea of manipulating
the outcome with them. On the other hand if
"manipulation" includes such<br>
> simple strategies as using only the extreme grades,
then I don't think MJ compares that well.<br>
><br>
>> K: That transforms the method into Approval.
You are right, that I’m not certain that Approval (be it
actual Approval or<br>
>> MJ that turned into Approval) is the best
method for electing a president.<br>
>> S: Again, am I correct in believing that
whenever MJ might be ‘turned into Approval’, this use
could still allow only<br>
>> half the manipulation offered by actual
Approval?<br>
> Well, two-slot MJ, two-slot Range, and Approval are
exactly the same method, so the answer must be no, no
matter what the<br>
> manipulability claim is.<br>
><br>
>> Also, given that Approval does not allow any
voter to express different<br>
>> intensities of approval, I would like to
understand why you might still consider it to be the
‘best’.<br>
> I might but probably wouldn't deem it best. I've
already explained why I prefer it to MJ: MJ "allows" and
"invites" voters<br>
> to fill out the ballot in a way that is probably
not strategically ideal. That feels deceptive to me, in
that less savvy<br>
> voters could be at a disadvantage.<br>
><br>
>> K: If [MJ] voters have this perception and
respond with this behavior, then the method is just an
overly complicated form<br>
>> of approval voting.<br>
>> S: But do you agree that this is a largely
mistaken ‘perception’?<br>
> Not really.<br>
><br>
>> In any case, if some citizens make this
mistake, they<br>
>> could only blame themselves for failing both to
take advantage of the opportunity to help elect the most
valued candidate<br>
>> by honestly evaluating all of them, and perhaps
to have partly wasted their vote by voting strategically
but only with<br>
>> half a chance of being successful in their own
eyes. Consequently, we could argue that MJ at least has
the clear virtue<br>
>> over the ‘traditional’ methods of most
certainly offering these democratic advantages most
completely to citizens.<br>
> But I don't view it as a mistake.<br>
><br>
>> K: In that case, I'd rather just use approval,
because it's clearer what's going on.<br>
>> S: As I see it, no method allows us to know
exactly the motives or calculations which each voter is
making when they<br>
>> vote. However, is it not true that citizens
are more like to ‘evaluate’ the candidates, given that
MJ’s ballots alone<br>
>> asks for these grades?<br>
> Once again, just because you ask for the grades
doesn't mean you're going to get them or that the voter
should (per his<br>
> own interests) want to give them to you. It is
trivially true that if the grades aren't present on the
ballot then<br>
> nobody gets to submit them, of course.<br>
><br>
>> At the same time, I would like to understand
why you might ‘rather’ use an ‘impoverished’ method like
APPROVAL rather<br>
>> than MJ which is ‘rich’ with the above
opportunities.<br>
> I think the "opportunities" are not likely an
advantage for those who take them.<br>
><br>
>> K: If I understand correctly, Orsay was a poll
with no stakes. I would be curious to know whether/how
the voters were<br>
>> told how the ballots would be counted.<br>
>> S: In this regard, you may wish to consider
Belinski’s following report on page 255 in his book with
Laraki (B&L:<br>
>> Majority Judgment): ‘The experiment—the ballot
and the method of ranking—was explained to potential
participants well<br>
>> before election day in individual letters, an
article in the town’s quarterly magazine, posters, and
an evening presentation<br>
>> open to all.’ Also, on page 17, B&L report
their following instructions to the participants in
their different October 2008<br>
>> experiment conducted on the Web: ‘You will be
asked to evaluate in a language of grades. A
candidate’s majority-grade is<br>
>> the middlemost of her/his grades… The
candidates are ranked according to their
majority-grades.’<br>
>> S: While B&L openly accept that a binding
election was not at ‘stake’, I see that experiment as
surely providing some<br>
>> empirical evidence that goes some why to
suggesting how people would use the MJ ballot in an
actual election. Of course,<br>
>> better empirical evidence would be provided, at
least by a ‘trial’ adoption of MJ for some actual
elections.<br>
> Thank you for this summary.<br>
><br>
>> K: In any case, don't think I am saying that
under MJ, voters would all become strategic and this
would make the outcomes<br>
>> worse. I actually think it would make the
outcomes better. (As in "more plausible," if the voters
had been a legislature.)<br>
>> The downside of the voters being strategic is
just that the different rating [grading] options become
pointless. So my<br>
>> criticism is not that MJ is bad, it's that it
is needlessly complicated for what it might and
*hopefully would* turn into.<br>
>> S: Yes, MJ offers ‘different rating [grading]
options’, and much less scope for manipulation.
Admittedly, the counting<br>
>> of MJ is slightly more complicated than simply
summing approvals or scores. However, is not MJ’s
potential for periodically<br>
>> and more precisely informing all citizens and
candidates about the actual intensities with which the
many different scales of<br>
>> values and concerns that actually exist within
one’s society an additional benefit well worth this
slight additional<br>
>> complication, e.g. a complication which is also
much less than any Condorcet methods or IRV?<br>
> But it would only do that (i.e. "more precisely
informing all citizens and candidates about the actual
intensities.....")<br>
> if voters use it as intended. I don't think they
would. If you want to say that Approval isn't going to
produce a lot of<br>
> information on the preferences, I will totally
agree, and agree that it's not ideal, but I don't think
the conclusion to draw<br>
> is that MJ is better than Approval.<br>
><br>
>>>>> Later-no-harm (IRV satisfies, MJ
and MAM don't).<br>
> I am going to trim your argument from B&L
because the point of disagreement becomes quickly
obvious and has little to<br>
> do with LNHarm itself:<br>
><br>
>> B&L admit and address this theoretical
failure and explain<br>
>> why it is unimportant in practice
(pp.285-287). I will try to explain why.<br>
> [...]<br>
>> Thus, by the 1st voter now ‘giving a more
‘positive rating [than before (i.e. Good rather than<br>
>> Poor) to her] less-preferred candidate’, this
has caused her ‘more-preferred candidate to lose. This
criterion presumes<br>
>> that this result would not have been 1st
voter’s intention. It assumes that each voter is only
interested in maximizing<br>
>> the chances that the candidate she personally
most favors will be the winner. B&L see this as the
flawed assumption made<br>
>> by advocates of the ‘traditional methods’.<br>
>> Instead, B&L assume that voters want the
winner to be the candidate most highly valued by a
majority of all the voters.<br>
> I think this is bizarre and unrealistic. It's hard
for me to believe that somebody thinks this is what
motivates voters.<br>
> The premise would render moot all concerns, not
just about LNHarm, but about probably *all* strategy
criteria and<br>
> guarantees. This is such an unbridgeable gap that I
guess we may soon be able to wrap up this discussion.<br>
><br>
>> At the same time, do you disagree with
Belinski’s claims both<br>
>> 1. that MJ discovery of the winner only by
his median grade makes it only half as like that one
voter changing her<br>
>> grade for one candidate will change who is the
winner, and<br>
>> 2. that with many candidates and millions
of voters, it is ‘almost certain’ that any manipulation
sought by such<br>
>> changes would not be successful?<br>
> 1. compared to Range? maybe. Otherwise the question
is not clear<br>
> 2. Depends what you mean by manipulation. With some
limited definition I might agree (see earlier thoughts
in this post).<br>
><br>
>> The (seeming) incompatibility that frustrates
me the most is that between minimal defense and LNHarm.<br>
>> S: In practice, there should be no need for
such ‘frustration’ if you answers ‘yes’ to both
questions posed by the last<br>
>> sentence in my immediately above paragraph.<br>
> Were those questions related to LNHarm? Are you
perhaps implying that if a voter truncates due a LNHarm
concern that<br>
> this counts as "manipulation," and would not likely
be "successful"? If so, I don't agree with that at all;
truncation<br>
> under MJ will have a similar effect as under many
other methods.<br>
><br>
>> K: Of the three methods (MAM, IRV, MJ) I would
pick MAM. I'm not sure if I prefer MJ to IRV. Even if we
replace MJ in the<br>
>> question with Approval, I am not sure.<br>
>> S: Given my above points plus the fact that MAM
gives each voter less opportunity to express the
different intensities of<br>
>> support they might have for the different
candidates, and the much greater difficulty that
ordinary citizens would have in<br>
>> understanding exactly how MAM is counted, I
would like to understand why you would ‘prefer’ MAM over
MJ.<br>
> I grant that MAM is harder to understand, but I
think it gets more mileage out of its complexity than MJ
gets out of its.<br>
><br>
> When it comes to expressiveness, I think that
practically speaking MAM is actually better than MJ, due
to the scenario that<br>
> MJ turns into Approval and consequently expresses
very little.<br>
><br>
>>> K: [….] Otherwise, I'm afraid of
Approval's potential to produce results that appear
arbitrary and inconclusive (fragmented<br>
>>> electorate, unconvincing winner).<br>
>>>> K: In general I feel that election
methods should produce an outcome that would be
plausible if the voters had been able<br>
>>>> to gather and vote in person, just as a
legislature.<br>
>>> K: For example, MJ violates Condorcet
Loser. In theory it can elect a candidate who could not
win head-to-head against any<br>
>>> of the other candidates. It is not likely
that a legislature would settle on an outcome that could
not survive a one-on-one<br>
>>> vote against any of the other options.<br>
>> S: Contrary to B&L’s belief, your worry
here regarding Condorcet seems to assume that
‘preferences’ are more important<br>
>> than ‘evaluations’. However, if all MJ voters
equally distributed their EXCELLENTs between all the
candidates except the<br>
>> one candidate to which they all gave VERY GOOD,
why would you (or a legislature) be justified in not
seeing the one with<br>
>> all these VERY GOODs as the appropriate
winner? This is an example of the fact that MJ seems
naturally to discover the<br>
>> most valued candidate unless every voter grades
all the candidates exactly in the same way.<br>
>><br>
>> S: Why would you not see MJ as ‘plausible’ in
this sense? For example, a legislature could elect its
prime minister<br>
>> in a parliamentary system using MJ. In the
extremely unlikely event that this might result in an MJ
tie, it could be<br>
>> quickly resolved by electing one winner by a
head to head vote. I.e. after discovering to 2
candidates to be equally<br>
>> qualified, the winner would be the one
‘preferred’ by the majority for whatever reason.<br>
> Let me clarify my thought experiment. I'm not
saying to imagine using MJ (or another method) being
used in a legislature.<br>
> Legislators talk to each other, gauge support for
positions, and vote yea or nay on specific proposals (or
they delay<br>
> and don't vote at all), usually ending up with a
majority approving a single outcome. I'm saying take the
cast ballots<br>
> for an electorate, and the method's outcome, and
ask whether a traditional legislature could have
realistically arrived<br>
> at the same outcome using the same proportions of
voters. If it doesn't make sense, then somebody probably
has a basis<br>
> to complain about the method and undermine the
legitimacy of the winner.<br>
><br>
> Now why do I say to do this, and why I do not care
about "preferences" vs "evaluations":<br>
> Legislatures normally function according to
majority rule. The electorate is basically a legislature
that can't fit in<br>
> a single room, so they have to record their voting
instructions on a ballot paper. If majority rule is
violated in a<br>
> legislature, people will cry foul. It shouldn't be
expected to be different for an electorate (this is my
opinion). So I<br>
> say that a good way to minimize strategy
complaints/concerns is to make sure the interpretation
of the ballots produces<br>
> an outcome that would be plausible if the
electorate had actually met in a room.<br>
><br>
>> K: Also, suppose that an MJ voter doesn't like
any candidate and his best rating awarded is
"acceptable." In so doing he<br>
>> can actually cause his "favorite" candidate to
lose to somebody else. I would expect a legislator to
understand the risk<br>
>> of this happening<br>
>> and not cast votes that could have such an
effect.<br>
>> S: Yes, in this context, if he greatly fears
any other candidate winning, rationally he should give
his ‘favorite’ an<br>
>> excellent and reject the rest.<br>
> Glad we agree. Note that it is this behavior
(rating a sub-par candidate differently based on whether
there are any<br>
> better candidates in the race) that raises issues
with Arrow.<br>
><br>
> Kevin<br>
> ----<br>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a
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><br>
><br>
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