<html><head></head><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:12px"><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5872"><span id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5871">Hi Mike, I'm a little rusty (having proposed ICA over 10 years ago), but I feel confident that this wouldn't completely satisfy FBC, even for the approval-style voters. The effects of path tracing (in MAM or Schulze etc.) are too arbitrary/unknowable to offer the guarantee. The method seemingly needs to be very simple. I would certainly have been eager to devise something more complicated/sophisticated than ICA (but with similar properties), but I have not been able.</span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5870"><span><br></span></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5869"><span>Kevin</span></div><div class="qtdSeparateBR" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5875"><br><br></div><div class="yahoo_quoted" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5589" style="display: block;"> <div style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 12px;" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5588"> <div style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5587"> <div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5586"> <font size="2" face="Arial" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5876"> <hr size="1" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5877"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold;">De :</span></b> Michael Ossipoff <email9648742@gmail.com><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">À :</span></b> election-methods@electorama.com <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Envoyé le :</span></b> Jeudi 1 septembre 2016 20h05<br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Objet :</span></b> [EM] IC MAM?<br> </font> </div> <div class="y_msg_container" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5921"><br><div id="yiv6271464241"><div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5922">To me, this appears workable. Am I missing something?:</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5923">Do MAM, using Kevin's definition of "beat" (the one that his ICA method uses).</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5924">Advantage:</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5965">Ranking one's entire approval-set at top would give maximum protection to those candidates, & would always be optimal if your goal is to elect from your approval set.</div>
<div dir="ltr">People seem to want a rank<br>
method. ...& will want to rank in sincere order.</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5966">With MAM, as with any MMC complying method, if your approval-set (or at least part of it) has a majority preferring them to the other candidates, and your goal is to elect from your approval-set, then you can safely rank them sincerely.<br></div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5967">But otherwise, if you want to elect from your approval-set, then you'd better approval vote them, top-rank them all, & have that effectively-counted.</div>
<div dir="ltr">Hence the desirability of IC MAM.</div>
<div dir="ltr">I like the Bucklin version that doesn't allow equal-ranking or skipping in rankings, but allows the option of top ranking as many candidates as you want, and not using any other rank-position.</div>
<div dir="ltr">...if you opt to do that instead of voting a ranking.</div>
<div dir="ltr">With that method too, you'd better approval vote, if some of your approval set isn't preferred to all others by a majority.</div>
<div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1472819659808_5968">IC MAM brings to MAM what equal top ranking does in Bucklin.</div>
<div dir="ltr">Michael Ossipoff</div></div><br>----<br>Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list info<br><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></div></body></html>