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<big><big>Hello Prof. Myers</big></big>,<br>
<br>
<big><big>Just reading your message, I would guess these Condorcet
polls are proportionately weighted.<br>
It can make a big difference, even over-turn a whole theoretical
edifice.<br>
I once </big></big><big><big>(in a book called Beyond Numeracy)</big></big><big><big>
came across a contrived election example, using five different
voting systems, all disagreeing with each other. (I have seen
its like, even on the most prestigious of web-sites.) I don't
blame it for being contrived. But it was obvious that the
different out-comes were the inevitable result of using more or
less rudimentary counting procedures, including First Past The
Post, Supplementary Vote and Instant Run-off Voting/Alternative
Vote.<br>
Then I checked whether a fourth system of Condorcet pairings of
candidates were weighted.</big></big><big><big> And they
weren't. </big></big><big><big> (I had learned weighting from
statistics. I didn't know it was already a recognised election
method, by Kemeny, I believe.)<br>
<br>
I did the arithmetic. Lo and behold! Weighted Condorcet now
agreed with the fifth method, Borda method, on the most popuar
candidate. These were the two methods that made best use of the
preferential information. My old statistics lecturer said the
best statistical test is the one that makes the most use of the
information. Here was a demonstration of that truth for election
methods.<br>
Yet the whole purpose of that text example had been to prove the
opposite, contending that there is no best election method, as
demonstrated by the criteria of social choice theory.<br>
<br>
I have discussed these matters in my second of two e-books on
election reform and research, whose links I just posted on this
e-mail forum.<br>
<br>
From Richard Lung.<br>
</big></big><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 07/11/2015 22:06, Andrew Myers wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:AFDC5DCD-0BAA-434B-9F1B-EE8C44F92B5A@cs.cornell.edu"
type="cite">
<div class="markdown">
<p dir="auto">We recently crossed some thresholds over at
civs.cs.cornell.edu:</p>
<ul>
<li>more than 10,000 Condorcet polls run</li>
<li>more than 200,000 total votes cast</li>
</ul>
<p dir="auto">CIVS is regularly used by organizations whose
names you might recognize to make decisions with real-world
impact. Here are a few of them:</p>
<p dir="auto">Ubuntu<br>
OpenStack<br>
Linux Foundation<br>
SUNY Fredonia<br>
Iowa State University<br>
University of Mary Washington</p>
<p dir="auto">The source code for CIVS can now be found on
GitHub: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/andrewcmyers/civs">https://github.com/andrewcmyers/civs</a>.
Contributions are generally welcome.</p>
<p dir="auto">Regards,</p>
<p dir="auto">Andrew Myers<br>
Professor, Department of Computer Science<br>
Cornell University<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru">http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru</a></p>
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