<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px"><div>Y'all are still jumping into areas I didn't mention. <br></div><div><br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1440974007161_6869">Succinctly, all I'm saying is that you cannot derive my personal pairwise preferences from a ranked ballot. I'm not talking about the even more complicated question of counting votes.</div><div><br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1440974007161_8398">Given more than 2 "issues" I might rank A>B>C>D>E given 5 choices, but asked whether I prefer C or D might choose D based upon the only subset of the issues where they disagree. You can build up a pairwise matrix from my pairwise choices, but you cannot infer my pairwise preferences from something that isn't pairwise.</div><div><br></div><div dir="ltr" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1440974007161_9868">The list (and literature) is full of examples of why my ranked ballot may not match my pairwise preferences: maybe I put C>D because that would help A. But if A, B, C and E were NOT running I'd prefer D. <br></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">A decade or so ago I tried to point this out in the context of someone describing a "condorcet election" as being the same as a "round robin" tournament. It would be if the voters got to choose between each pair of alternatives (THAT would be a "round robin") but it is logically incorrect to infer from an ordered list that the voter's list would always be the same for all subsets of that list. <br></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">Personally, I'd like a voting method that gave me pairwise choices, like my opthalmologist's "better or worse?" tests when trying to figure out what eyeglass prescription to write. Just record my answers in a matrix and sum all voters' matrixes. Then you can count the result however you want but I'll know that my pairwise choices weren't made by you.<br></div><div><span></span></div> <br><div class="qtdSeparateBR"><br><br></div><div style="display: block;" class="yahoo_quoted"> <div style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div dir="ltr"> <font face="Arial" size="2"> On Sunday, August 30, 2015 3:07 PM, robert bristow-johnson <rbj@audioimagination.com> wrote:<br> </font> </div> <br><br> <div class="y_msg_container">On 8/29/15 9:24 PM, James Kislanko wrote:<br clear="none">> I cannot respond to what you describe, since it has no relevance to <br clear="none">> what I said, which is there is no ranked ballot that can reproduce my <br clear="none">> pairwise preferences if I use different criteria depending upon what <br clear="none">> the pairs are.<br clear="none">><br clear="none"><br clear="none">i can't really decode this, James.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">we all understand that with a population of voters, a Condorcet cycle <br clear="none">can possibly result (Rock>Scissors, Scissors>Paper, Paper>Rock) and then <br clear="none">you need to add something or have something more, in the tabulating <br clear="none">criteria, to determine a winner. (i actually think a cycle would be <br clear="none">rare in real governmental elections using a ranked ballot.) people on <br clear="none">this list can argue which is best. probably most agree that Schulze is <br clear="none">best, but i think that if the cycle contains only 3 candidates, that <br clear="none">Schulze and Ranked-Pairs (margins) and MinMax all pick the same winner. <br clear="none">Ranked-Pairs is a helluva lot easier to explain to skeptical legislators <br clear="none">and others i might try to convince to re-adopt the ranked ballot (but <br clear="none">this time *not* to go with IRV), so i have been sticking with that. <br clear="none">(and, as rare as a cycle might be, i think it would be even more rare <br clear="none">for a cycle to have more than 3 candidates in it, so the difference <br clear="none">between a Schulze and Ranked-Pairs might seem moot.)<br clear="none"><br clear="none">but just because the collective vote totals might result in a circular <br clear="none">preference, that doesn't mean that it's reasonable for a single voter <br clear="none">to. if a voter prefers Candidate Rock over Candidate Scissors and the <br clear="none">same voter prefers Scissors over Paper, i cannot grok how this same <br clear="none">voter could possibly prefer Paper over Rock. then a single, linear, <br clear="none">ranked ballot works fine in recording all of the contingency vote <br clear="none">preferences of that voter. the rest of the problem is taking all of <br clear="none">this collection of ranked ballots, and with the principle of "One Person <br clear="none">One Vote" determining what the collective preference of candidates is <br clear="none">and identifying the winner. outside of a cycle, i think that Condorcet <br clear="none">works pretty well because, as long as there *is* a Condorcet Winner, <br clear="none">that choice would prevail in any hypothetical one-on-one election and <br clear="none">not the reverse.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">people here since 2009 might remember when i joined the list and that i <br clear="none">lived in a municipality with a strong 3rd party (the Progressive Party <br clear="none">of Vermont), we had IRV for our mayoral election and, while a majority <br clear="none">of voters marked their ballots that they preferred Candidate A (for <br clear="none">Andy) over Candidate B (for Bob), nonetheless Candidate B was elected. <br clear="none">a year later IRV was repealed, although a wide majority of voters didn't <br clear="none">understand exactly what went wrong (and would dispute the problems), <br clear="none">enough folks knew *something* was wrong and IRV and it was repealed and <br clear="none">unfortunately along with it, the ranked-order ballot.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">so, please elaborate on exactly what you mean.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">r b-j<div class="yqt9246868567" id="yqtfd22625"><br clear="none"><br clear="none">> On Saturday, August 29, 2015 4:46 PM, robert bristow-johnson <br clear="none">> <<a shape="rect" ymailto="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>> wrote:<br clear="none">><br clear="none">><br clear="none">> On 8/29/15 6:17 PM, James Kislanko wrote:<br clear="none">> > This example is a perfect demonstration of what I tried to describe a<br clear="none">> > decade or so ago.There is no way to make a linear ordering of pairwise<br clear="none">> > preferences if the voter uses different criteria depending upon what<br clear="none">> > the pair is. I'd like my contribution to the pairwise matrix be based<br clear="none">> > upon a ballot that gave "A or B, neither?" for every combination of<br clear="none">> > choices.<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> while IRV ballots seem to prohibit marking two candidates equally<br clear="none">> (except for those unmarked, who are all tied for last place preference<br clear="none">> on that particular ballot), there's nothing in a Condorcet ranked-ballot<br clear="none">> to stop you from marking A and B equally, whether they be first or last.<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> how is<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> A = B = last place<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> any different an expression from "neither"?<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> ranked ballot, in which tied ranking is allowed, is the most sensible<br clear="none">> form of expressive preference voting. score voting requires too much<br clear="none">> "expression" from the voters and approval voting too little.<br clear="none"><br clear="none"><br clear="none"><br clear="none"><br clear="none">-- <br clear="none"><br clear="none">r b-j <a shape="rect" ymailto="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br clear="none"><br clear="none">"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br clear="none"><br clear="none"><br clear="none"><br clear="none">----<br clear="none">Election-Methods mailing list - see <a shape="rect" href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list info<br clear="none"></div><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></div></body></html>