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<small><small>Hello Jameson Quinn,<br>
I used to be a science fiction reader. I'm too old for
the new generation. <br>
The organisation Democracy 2000 also told me that
audiences, they tried, found STV too difficult.<br>
In principle, tho, it's very simple. You just have to go
back to the invention of proportional representation in
1821, by Thomasd Wright Hill, with the school-boys
queueing behind their favorites for a committee, and
shifting away from the most popular, who don't need
surplus votes, and shifting from least popular candidates,
with no chance of making the quota. The quota can be
replaced by a chalk line for required length of queue for
election. And there is no need for any arithmetic at all.<br>
<br>
It's just the incident of the loaves and the fishes. I
believe transferable voting is the way to go. And have
invented improvements: Binomial STV. The preferential
computation is difficult, even more so, with my version.<br>
But I look at it this way. Democracy cannot be left at the
prehistoric gatherer society stage of social evolution,
while everything else is subject to division of labor and
ever more technical specialisation.<br>
And to tell you the truth, I find non-transferable voting
elections opaque.<br>
<br>
Yours sincerely,<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
</small></small></big></big></big><br>
<br>
On 27/08/2015 00:43, Jameson Quinn wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAO82iZwwaRQOWdrVj2CzoejSQwuEVWGN5KWqosOGXniX9B5FfA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Yes, I was the designer of this system, and I was
there at Worldcon to get it passed.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>What was needed was a proportional system based on approval
ballots. There are of course a number of options in this vein.
Within these limitations, this system was designed for:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Relative simplicity of explanation. I found that
explaining STV-like systems which are top-down and so require
keeping track of how "used up" a ballot is were too hard to
explain.</div>
<div>-Resistance to "bullet voting" strategy, since widespread
use of such strategy would weaken the non-slate voters against
slate voters.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It is like IRV in that it is a bottom-up elimination
system. However, it was in no way "based on" IRV, and in fact
it differs in one key regard: it looks at the whole of each
ballot from step one, instead of ignoring all but one of the
choices on each ballot at any given time.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I'd be happy to answer any further questions about it here.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Jameson</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">2015-08-24 13:22 GMT-04:00 <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:mrouse1@mrouse.com" target="_blank">mrouse1@mrouse.com</a>></span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">That would
be awesome -- there are too many emails over there to read
in one sitting! :)<br>
Mike
<div>
<div class="h5"><br>
<br>
On 2015-08-24 10:49, Andy Jennings wrote:<br>
</div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div class="h5">
Jameson Quinn, who's on this list, was working with
the Hugo awards to<br>
come up with this system.<br>
<br>
I believe he proposed simple systems first, but
several wrinkles came<br>
up which necessitated the complexity.<br>
<br>
I'll email him and see if I can get him to chime in
here.<br>
<br>
On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 8:29 AM, <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:mrouse1@mrouse.com" target="_blank">mrouse1@mrouse.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
As an addendum, they are calling this method “single
divisible<br>
vote with least popular elimination," which I
haven't heard of<br>
before.<br>
<br>
Mike<br>
<br>
On 2015-08-24 04:06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
On 08/24/2015 02:27 AM, Michael Rouse wrote:<br>
<br>
I'm not sure how many people here are fans of
science fiction, but<br>
there<br>
was a big brouhaha at this years awards (which I'll
ignore), and<br>
one of<br>
the results was the proposal of a new method of
choosing winners:<br>
<br>
*Short Title: E Pluribus Hugo (Out of the Many, a
Hugo)*<br>
Moved, to amend section 3.8 (Tallying of
Nominations), section 3.9<br>
(Notification and Acceptance), and section 3.11
(Tallying of Votes)<br>
as<br>
follows:<br>
<br>
[snip]<br>
<br>
So this is basically cumulative voting IRV? I
suppose it's better<br>
than<br>
ordinary IRV, but if they're using an Approval
ballot, why not just<br>
use<br>
Approval to begin with?<br>
<br>
Do they want a proportional representation method or
a majoritarian<br>
one?<br>
The reference to avoiding slates seem to suggest to
me that they<br>
want a<br>
proportional representation method, or at least
something that is<br>
closer<br>
to a PR method.<br>
<br>
As a positional elimination method, it could suffer
path<br>
dependence.<br>
Consider someone nominating (voting for) X, Y, and
Z. Say now that<br>
Y is<br>
very narrowly eliminated at some point, but if the
person had voted<br>
for<br>
X and Y alone, he would have given enough of his
vote to Y to have<br>
kept<br>
Y from being eliminated. So the claim that "[i]n
other words, you<br>
can<br>
safely nominate anything you feel is Hugo-worthy"
doesn't seem to<br>
be<br>
strictly true. You can safely nominate anything that
is relatively<br>
unpopular, but if it gets popular enough, it may
draw enough<br>
support<br>
away from the others you would also like to
nominate.<br>
<br>
If I were to construct a majoritarian ballot system
with Approval<br>
ballots, I would just use Approval. There's a
similar "drawing away<br>
from<br>
other popular candidates" problem (the chicken/Burr
thing), but<br>
Approval<br>
is much simpler and doesn't repeated iteration.<br>
<br>
For PR, the question is much harder. With computers,
you could use<br>
PAV,<br>
sequential PAV or birational voting. However, the
non-sequential<br>
ones<br>
require a lot of recounts and are probably not
feasible for manual<br>
elections. Sequential ones are simpler but the
proportionality<br>
might not<br>
be obvious.<br>
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<div class="h5">
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