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<body class='hmmessage'><div dir='ltr'>To the 'Owner'<BR>From: Steve (Stephen Bosworth)<BR> <br>Please tell me exactly how I should submit contributions to the 'List'.<BR> <BR>Several days ago, I discovered that part of my dialogue with Richard Fobes was on the List. In response, I sent all the elements of my draft article to you believing this would also help other contributors to participate more efficiently. However, I then received an email from you informing me that these were too long (i.e. longer than your 200KB limit). I then sent you an email on your special form suggesting that I only the 52KB draft article, not the illustrative 2 flow charts and 3 tables.<BR> <BR>As I have not received a reply to that 'form email', I will now attach that draft article alone to my 1st reply to this email.<BR> <BR>In my next email, I will respond to Richards Fobes's comments below.<BR> <BR>I look forward to receiving your advice.<BR> <BR>Steve<BR>++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++<BR> <BR><div>> From: election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com<br>> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 124, Issue 28<br>> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>> Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 12:02:36 -0700<br>> <br>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>> election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>> <br>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit<br>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com<br>> <br>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to<br>> election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com<br>> <br>> You can reach the person managing the list at<br>> election-methods-owner@lists.electorama.com<br>> <br>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific<br>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."<br>> <br>> <br>> Today's Topics:<br>> <br>> 1. Re: Associational Proportional Representation (APR)<br>> (Richard Fobes)<br>> <br>> <br>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>> <br>> Message: 1<br>> Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 13:23:38 -0700<br>> From: Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org><br>> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>> Subject: Re: [EM] Associational Proportional Representation (APR)<br>> Message-ID: <54514CCA.9060701@VoteFair.org><br>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed<br>> <br>> On 10/27/2014 9:12 AM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>> > Hi Richard,<br>> > ...<br>> > I have attached PDF versions of all the attachments you wished not to<br>> > open because of anti-virus reason.<br>> ><br>> > I look forward to our continued dialogue.<br>> <br>> Steve, the following comments are based on reading the PDF file that <br>> describes your method. (Thank you for sending a PDF version.)<br>> <br>> Yes, you are correct in saying that improved primary elections would <br>> yield more-representative candidates for the general election.<br>> <br>> The simplest way to improve primary elections is to use approval voting. <br>> This means just changing the instructions to allow more than one <br>> candidate's name to be marked. (I don't support the use of approval <br>> voting in general elections, but I would be happy to see it used in U.S. <br>> primary elections.)<br>> <br>> Your suggested ballot is way too complicated! Also, the marked ballots <br>> would not be machine-readable. I can see ways to overcome these <br>> barriers, and still collect the information you want. (The <br>> cross-district votes can be handled like write-in options within a <br>> fill-in-the-oval 1-2-3 ballot; you don't need a separate section for <br>> "bullet" voting [for just one choice].)<br>> <br>> Yet the counting method you recommend has serious shortcomings.<br>> <br>> Your counting method definitely has the focus-on-the-current-top-choice <br>> "blinder" approach that I've already described.<br>> <br>> The reason you didn't understand my reference to "rounding" is that I <br>> chose an analogy that was not different enough from the topic. So, <br>> please ignore my "rounding" analogy.<br>> <br>> You offer a definition of a "wasted vote" and then claim that your <br>> method is the best way to eliminate wasted votes. This tactic -- of <br>> defining a term and then claiming your method maximizes or minimizes the <br>> defined term -- is often used in election-method discussions, yet it's <br>> pointless because advocates of competing methods simply do not accept <br>> the definition you offer, and instead offer a competing definition.<br>> <br>> Finally, yet most importantly, I'll point out a serious issue that you <br>> seem to have overlooked.<br>> <br>> After your counting method is used, the number of voters who support <br>> each winning candidate becomes public knowledge ? because it determines <br>> the "weighting" of each legislator's vote. This knowledge, combined <br>> with the ability to vote for legislators in other districts, makes it <br>> financially profitable for "consultants" and thugs to bribe voters to <br>> vote for the legislators whose "backers" provide the most money.<br>> <br>> Perhaps you think this kind of bribery is easy to detect and deter. <br>> It's not.<br>> <br>> For several years, while I was writing my creative-problem-solving book, <br>> I lived in a low-income part of a university town and learned a lot <br>> about what goes on in a neighborhood that gets lots of police attention. <br>> The police (and fire) events are just the tip of the iceberg. The <br>> selling of votes would easily become commonplace in places where people <br>> are desperate, vulnerable, illiterate, poor, abused (without exceeding <br>> the legal limit), etc.<br>> <br>> If my reactions seem to be excessively critical, and not supportive, <br>> consider that the best voting methods are the ones with the fewest <br>> flaws. There is no such thing as a voting method with no flaws!<br>> <br>> Regarding this issue, if you are not familiar with the table in the <br>> Wikipedia article titled "voting systems," then please become familiar <br>> with it, because it portrays the most common "fairness criteria" [my <br>> term] that I and others here refer to.<br>> <br>> In your article you claim that your method is better than plurality <br>> voting. I agree with that claim. But that's not saying much. Every <br>> method promoted here can make that claim.<br>> <br>> You claim that your method is not vulnerable to gerrymandering. I do <br>> not disagree with that claim. Yet I'll point out that there are a <br>> variety of ways to eliminate gerrymandering. In other words, your <br>> suggested approach is not the only way.<br>> <br>> I understand why you like the method you propose. It has some nice <br>> counting characteristics. Yet a voting method has to be workable, and <br>> that involves issues such as machine-readability, incorruptibility, <br>> ballot simplicity, invulnerability to strategic voting, etc.<br>> <br>> That's all I have time for now. If you have further questions, or you <br>> don't understand what I've said here, just ask.<br>> <br>> Most importantly, thank you for taking the time to learn about the many <br>> subtle issues that affect voting methods.<br>> <br>> Richard Fobes<br>> <br>> <br>> On 10/27/2014 9:12 AM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>> ><br>> > Hi Richard,<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > Thank you for your additional comments and observations below.I will<br>> > insert my responses into your text using *bold print*.<br>> ><br>> > I have attached PDF versions of all the attachment you wished not to<br>> > open because of anti-virus reason.<br>> ><br>> > I look forward to our continued dialogue.<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > Regards,<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > Steve<br>> ><br>> ><br>> >> Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 22:01:14 -0700<br>> >> From: ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org<br>> >> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>> >> Subject: Associational Proportional Representation (APR)<br>> >><br>> >> I'm responding (via Bcc) to Steve Bosworth's earlier reply to my<br>> >> responses, which he repeated in a direct message that is copied below.<br>> >> I no longer have a copy of the forum message, so please pardon the<br>> >> creation of a new thread about a conversation in progress. For context,<br>> >> see below.<br>> >><br>> >> Steve, I only had time to quickly look at your two flowcharts (which<br>> >> were in PDF format, in contrast to your ".doc" documents which I don't<br>> >> open for antivirus reasons), but ...<br>> > *S:Please see the new PDF attachments.*><br>> >> I saw that your Associational Proportional Representation (APR) method<br>> >> involves eliminating a candidate based on having the fewest number of<br>> >> votes (after possible transfers of votes).<br>> > *S:The first candidate eliminated could not have received any transfer<br>> > votes because all elected candidate keep all the votes they have<br>> > received.These determine the weighted vote each rep will have in the<br>> > assembly.*<br>> >> I favor methods that look deeper than each voter's currently top<br>> >> remaining choice. I don't like methods that only look at one voter's<br>> >> currently "top choice" at a time. Why? They have the same weaknesses<br>> >> as plurality voting and instant-runoff voting (IRV), which look at <br>> which<br>> >> candidate gets the most, or fewest (respectively) "votes."<br>> >> *S:In the context of APR, I do not understand why looking at each<br>> > elector?s ?top choice? as the first step in the count would be weakness.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > ***APR allows each elector to guarantee that his vote will be added to<br>> > the voting power of the rep in the assembly either that he had directly<br>> > ranked or that his first choice but eliminated candidate had ranked (a<br>> > special use of Asset Voting) ? every vote can be positive, no vote need<br>> > be wasted.Do you see any scientific basis for anyone to say that an APR<br>> > assembly would not be as representative as possible of all citizens?*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> >> Methods that involve the transfer of each voter's vote are open to<br>> >> strategic manipulations. You asked for more specifics. As a partial<br>> >> answer, the election results are vulnerable to strategies that control<br>> >> which candidates are nominated.Usually this manipulation involves<br>> >> campaign contributions (with the real source of funds for "spoiler"<br>> >> candidates being hidden).<br>> ><br>> > *S:Perhaps you will see that APR provides no incentive to vote<br>> > strategically, e.g. APR?s special ?primary? election would greatly<br>> > reduce or eliminate the ?manipulation? you have in mind.In this primary,<br>> > each citizen could choose the ?electoral association? through which,<br>> > several months later, he will record his rankings of as many general<br>> > election candidates in the country as he may wish. Each would try to<br>> > become such a voting member of the association believes is most likely<br>> > to field the most attractive candidates.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *This seems to remove any incentive to fund any ?spoiler candidates?.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> >> All voting methods fail some fairness criteria, so yours does too.<br>> >> Which ones? I don't know. That requires time-consuming analysis.<br>> >> Although your method is not instant-runoff voting, it is similar enough<br>> >> that I suspect it would fail many of the same fairness criteria <br>> that IRV<br>> >> fails.<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *S:Perhaps you will find that a careful reading of the attachments<br>> > alleys your suspicions in this regard.*<br>> >><br>> >> Of course you can correctly claim that there are no fairness criteria<br>> >> for proportional methods,<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *S:I see APR as satisfying the following ?fairness criteria? entirely:*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *1)**Each citizen has the same range of options both during the<br>> > ?primary? and the general election.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *2)**One of these is to guarantee that his vote will be added to the<br>> > ?weighted vote? of the rep he most trusts, or which his first choice but<br>> > eliminated candidate most trusts.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *3)**The voting power of each party in the assembly would be exactly<br>> > proportional to its support by electors because this power would result<br>> > from combining all the weighted votes of its members.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > yet I believe your method involves underlying<br>> >> algorithms that can be applied to a single-winner method, and that<br>> >> related single-winner method has to fail some fairness criteria.<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *S: I would very much appreciate you explaining this because it seems to<br>> > me that its counting method is clear -- contains no ?underlying<br>> > algorithm? that would not be fair.*<br>> >><br>> >> As for the method's proportional aspects, the use of sub-groups --<br>> >> called "associations" in this case -- introduces what can be thought of<br>> >> as similar to the mathematics of "rounding" numbers too early (instead<br>> >> of waiting until all the calculations are done, and then rounding).<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *S: Again, perhaps you will find that the ?associations? only help to<br>> > expand the number of attractive candidates from the points of view of<br>> > citizens voting in APR ?primary?.Also, APR never needs or wants to<br>> > ?round? it numbers.*<br>> >><br>> >> Expressed another way, both the Republican and Democratic parties <br>> in the<br>> >> U.S. are heavily controlled by the same relatively few people, and the<br>> >> result is that voters do not control either political party.<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *S: The fact that APR citizens will elect all the reps in a given party<br>> > would seem to mean that they also have a good chance of largely<br>> > ?controlling? each political party.*<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > I believe<br>> >> that in Canada each party nominates a candidate using voting at a<br>> >> convention, but admission to the convention requires paying a fee, so<br>> >> that too prevents a majority of voters from controlling any political<br>> > party.<br>> >><br>> >> Looking into the _distant_ future, voting methods will handle<br>> >> calculations deeply in ways that do not involve any extra layer of<br>> >> subgroups or rounding, and possibly without involving political <br>> parties.<br>> >> In the meantime we are stuck with subgroups such as the "electoral<br>> >> college" for U.S. Presidential elections, and parliaments/Congress/etc.<br>> >> that add an extra voting layer (compared to the future when voters<br>> >> eventually will directly vote on issues of concern). Why not begin now<br>> >> to get rid of the need for subgroups?<br>> ><br>> ><br>> > *S: Perhaps you will reconsider some of these hopes in the light of<br>> > Endnote 6 to the attached draft article.*<br>> >><br>> >> I am not saying that your voting method is bad. It might be quite good<br>> >> for some voting situations!<br>> >><br>> >> I'm just saying -- since you specifically asked me -- that my <br>> preference<br>> >> is to skip over slight improvements and jump ahead to advanced voting<br>> >> methods that look deeply into ballot preferences (beyond one current<br>> >> "top" choice at a time) and that avoid the need to segment voters into<br>> >> subgroups.<br>> >><br>> >> For further context I'll say that years ago a group of people within a<br>> >> local food co-op came up with a very carefully designed way of electing<br>> >> a group of "representatives" for the purpose of having them make<br>> >> decisions instead of letting all the members vote on important<br>> >> decisions. In spite of how well-designed and "fair" (neutral) the<br>> >> process was, neither the people who wanted the co-op to sell a few meat<br>> >> items nor the people who wanted absolutely no meat in the store were<br>> >> willing to let such a group make a decision about that issue. The point<br>> >> of this example is that each layer of decision-making -- even if it <br>> gets<br>> >> adjusted at every election based on the ballots -- does not truly<br>> >> provide proportional representation. As for what a truly proportional<br>> >> solution to that "meat" conflict would have been, I'm not sure. Selling<br>> >> fewer meat items than what a majority of voters wanted would still fail<br>> >> to represent the members who didn't want any meat sold. (It was not<br>> >> clear who was in the majority, and probably a middle third of the<br>> >> members would have been OK with certain meat choices but not other meat<br>> >> choices.)<br>> >><br>> >> Ultimately voters don't care about the process. That's why so few<br>> >> citizens "do the math" to discover why they are not represented by the<br>> >> people "they" elect. This same dilemma applies to all the voting<br>> >> methods discussed here. Here we are not only "doing the math," but we<br>> >> are developing "the math" relating to voting methods. Let's eliminate<br>> >> extra layers and stop using "start-at-the-top" blinders as we look at<br>> >> each ballot.<br>> >><br>> >> Thank you for your interest in my opinion. I hope this helps, either to<br>> >> refine your ideas or to refine ways to "sell" whatever method you like<br>> >> best. (All of us here are learning how to "sell" our favorite <br>> method(s).)<br>> >><br>> >> BTW, thank you for creating the flowcharts. They do help clarify your<br>> >> method. (Alas, graphics on websites seem to be the only way to make<br>> >> flowcharts easy to view, so they are not suitable here in this forum.)<br>> >><br>> >> Richard Fobes<br>> >><br>> >><br>> >> On 10/22/2014 6:54 AM, steve bosworth wrote:<br>> >> > Hi Richard,<br>> >> ><br>> >> > Sorry for the late reply. I've been travelling.<br>> >> > Thank you for your several criticisms, comments and suggestions.<br>> >> ><br>> >> > I've *injected my responses within the text of your email bellow, <br>> using<br>> >> > bold print*.<br>> >> ><br>> >> > I hope you will see that some of the problems you mentioned are <br>> solved<br>> >> > within the full explanation of my proposed system (Associatonal<br>> >> > Proportional Representation (*APR*)) that I have fully described <br>> in the<br>> >> > attached article with its illustrative 2 flow charts and 3 tables.<br>> >> ><br>> >> > In the light of the more complete information provided, I very <br>> much hope<br>> >> > you will be able to find the time to respond to the additional<br>> > explanations.<br>> >> ><br>> >> > Thank you,<br>> >> > Steve<br>> >> ><br>> >> > > Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2014 09:10:10 -0700<br>> >> > > From: ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org<br>> >> > > To: stevebosworth@hotmail.com<br>> >> > > Subject: Re: (2) "Severity" of failing<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > Steve Bosworth ~<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > Thank you for your interest in my opinion.<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > Getting to the point of your question, your election method <br>> combines<br>> >> > > single-winner voting concepts<br>> >> > *S: No, in effect, APR**is entirely a multi-winner system, e.g. <br>> to elect<br>> >> > the 435 members of the US House of Representatives or the UK House of<br>> >> > Commons. *<br>> >> > with proportional representation concepts,<br>> >> > *S: APR's giving different 'weighted votes' to each rep depending <br>> on how<br>> >> > many citizens had ranked them would provide complete individual<br>> >> > representative and party proportionality.*<br>> >> > > which means that the well-known fairness criteria do not apply.<br>> >> ><br>> >> > *S: I know of no such criteria which APR would not satisfy.*<br>> >> > > Your idea sounds intriguing. Yet it would encounter time-related<br>> >> > > issues,<br>> >> > *S: Please explain.*<br>> >> > especially strategy issues,<br>> >> > *S: Please explain.*<br>> >> > if it were converted into an actual<br>> >> > > election method -- that involves ballots.<br>> >> > *S: Perhaps you will see that these issues have been solved by the<br>> >> > detailed presentation of the 'actual method' and the paper <br>> 'ballots' to<br>> >> > be used by APR, and explained by the attachments.*<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > The single-winner aspects basically match instant-runoff voting,<br>> > so the<br>> >> > > same fairness-criteria failures would apply.<br>> >> > *S: No, because it is not an IRV system.*<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > As for the proportional part, your method would tend to elect a few<br>> >> > > celebrity representatives who are supported by "the media"<br>> >> > *S: Given APR's 'electoral associations' as selected by citizens <br>> months<br>> >> > before the general election through APR's special 'primary election',<br>> >> > the relative influence of 'celebrity' and the 'media' might be much<br>> >> > reduced. In any case, the article stipulates that any very <br>> popular rep<br>> >> > who receives more than 10% of all the votes in the country would be<br>> >> > required to publish exactly how he will pass on all of his 'extra <br>> votes'<br>> >> > to his trusted fellow reps.*<br>> >> > and the<br>> >> > > other representatives would tend to be "fringe" types who are<br>> > supported<br>> >> > > by fewer voters. Note that this is a tendency, and would be <br>> reduced to<br>> >> > > the extent that it's noticed, which means that most voters <br>> would not<br>> >> > > notice this tendency.<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > Alas, my time is limited, so I can't offer more feedback at <br>> this time.<br>> >> > *S: Thank you again for your time.*<br>> >> > > I hope this is helpful.<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > If you want more opinions, I suggest that you present the idea <br>> on the<br>> >> > > Election Methods forum.<br>> >> > *S: I keep trying to find out how to do this but have so far <br>> failed. Can<br>> >> > you please explain how one contributes to this forum?*<br>> >> > ><br>> >> > > Richard Fobes<br>> <br>> <br>> <br>> ------------------------------<br>> <br>> Subject: Digest Footer<br>> <br>> _______________________________________________<br>> Election-Methods mailing list<br>> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com<br>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com<br>> <br>> <br>> ------------------------------<br>> <br>> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 124, Issue 28<br>> *************************************************<br></div> </div></body>
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