<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2014-08-22 15:44 GMT-04:00 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank" onclick="window.open('https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=cm&tf=1&to=km_elmet@t-online.de&cc=&bcc=&su=&body=','_blank');return false;">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>></span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=""><div>On 08/22/2014 01:05 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:</div></div><div class="">
Here I am surprised that Condorcet was considered more easy to understand than IRV. IRV advocates often say that the "remove the loser from the ballots and run again until someone gets a majority" is a very simple phrasing, and it certainly seems simpler than explaining Minmax. Did you explain the actual Minmax method or just Condorcet (the candidate that would beat every other candidate one-on-one wins)?<br>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>My explanation was just for Condorcet, though it did mention the word "minimax" in parentheses.</div><div class=""><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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If you did explain Minmax itself, I am indeed surprised. I'm not going to complain, though! If the results are representative, that would be a serious counter to the "IRV is so easy" argument. The method itself is harder to understand according to your numbers, and if the advocates try to shift the goal to "as easy as 1-2-3", well, then Condorcet is just as easy because the front-end is the same.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>I've actually contacted Fair Vote to get a new explanation for IRV. They've agreed to give me one, and I'll rerun a few sessions of the experiment with their wording, so that I can be accused of biasing the experiment with an intentionally poorly-written explanation.</div>
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However, that may also show that the Turkers aren't good at evaluating fairness. They consider Borda among the best, but we know about its extreme teaming incentive. OTOH, they also consider IRV in the Plurality class. I could understand either judgement, but both at the same time is quite unexpected.</div>
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<div><br></div><div>Yes, you can certainly criticize their judgment here. Still, their perception is a fact we have to deal with.</div><div class=""><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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I think these numbers are certainly interesting. To me, they clearly<br>
bolster the case for joining forces behind approval activism, and for<br>
eschewing IRV as an activist strategy; even for the majority of us who<br>
see some other system as ultimately better than approval.<br>
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Right. Approval is a simple fix on Plurality, gives the best bang for the buck, and is easily understood. I think the greatest risk to Approval is a scenario where it is implemented, the chicken dilemma makes it dangerously unstable, and after having gone the wrong way a few times due to voters mis-anticipating each other, it is repealed in a similar way to how Burlington repealed IRV.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>I'd agree that that's probably the biggest risk (besides "nobody pays any attention and it never happens"). How big is it? This experiment can help us see.<br></div>
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<br></div><div>Note that this experiment is 100% in a chicken dilemma situation, with an unrealistically tiny number of voters, so insofar as the pathologies are avoided and/or accepted by the voters in the experiment, they'd be even less likely to be an issue in real life.</div>
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Maybe your strategy data will provide information on how realistic that scenario is.<br>
</blockquote></div></div><br></div><div class="gmail_extra">It will certainly help us understand this question. I'll post about that as soon as I'm confident in my analysis.</div><div class="gmail_extra"><br></div>
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Cheers,</div><div class="gmail_extra">Jameson</div></div>
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