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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Forest,<br>
<br>
Which method are you referring to in your example? It appears to
be simply MinMax (Losing Votes), and not anything<br>
that we've been discussing lately.<br>
<br>
The MMLV(erw)M method I've suggested elects A.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">The losing vote scores (for strongest
defeats) are D42>A35>B33>C32 </blockquote>
<br>
The Margins Sort algorithm flips D>A, then D>B, then D>C
and then is happy with the order A>B>C>D.<br>
<br>
River (and Ranked Pairs) locks A>B 2, B>C 1, (skips
C>A -3), locks A>D -7, B>D -9, C>D -10<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
On 5/1/2014 4:38 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAP29ondHpaF5tf+OFqLH7t0FBmP2O=U=Z+57aSwiiCXH8k8XYw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
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<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>Yes, your description of the method is
correct. However, as much as I like the
idea it seems to have a fatal flaw:<br>
<br>
</div>
21 ABCD<br>
</div>
19 BCAD<br>
</div>
18 CABD<br>
</div>
14 DABC<br>
</div>
14 DBCA<br>
</div>
14 DCAB<br>
<br>
</div>
The losing vote scores (for strongest defeats) are
D42>A35>B33>C32 .<br>
<br>
</div>
The Condorcet Loser D is elected.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
This example also shows failure of Clone Winner.<br>
<br>
</div>
By the way, I prefer Benham over Woodall for reasons similar
to yours: Benham is more "seamless;" you don't have to
compute the Smith set; in fact, you don't have to even mention
it in the method description, unless you cannot resist the
temptation to brag about it..<br>
<br>
</div>
Forest<br>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 6:29 PM,
Michael Ossipoff <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Forest--</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Oops! I forgot the A voters' transfer to C.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>
So Woodall does as well as Benham in that example. So
my example doesn't mean that Benham is better than
Woodall. ...But Benham is a lot easier to propose to
organizations that use or offer IRV.</div>
<div> </div>
<div> You mentioned Chris's other method. Is that the
one that does Condorcet, measuring defeat-strengh by
the defeater's Score minus the defeated's
score...where a candidate's Score is her pairwse
support in her strongest defeat?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>That method elects C when B is middle CW, and the
most favorite, and A is least favorite, and A voters +
C voters outnumer B voters, and the A voters bury B?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Specific numeical instance of that example:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>2: A>C>B (burying B)</div>
<div>4. B>A>C</div>
<div>3: C>B>A</div>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Michael Ossipoff</div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
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