<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div> You mentioned Chris's other method. Is that the one that
does Condorcet, measuring defeat-strengh by the defeater's
Score minus the defeated's score...where a candidate's Score
is her pairwse support in her strongest defeat?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>That method elects C when B is middle CW, and the most
favorite, and A is least favorite, and A voters + C voters
outnumer B voters, and the A voters bury B?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Specific numeical instance of that example:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>2: A>C>B (burying B)</div>
<div>4. B>A>C</div>
<div>3: C>B>A</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I have this as indecisive between B and C.<br>
<br>
B>A>C>B. MinMax Losing Votes scores: B4 > C3 >
A2. Margins Sort is indecisive as to which pair to flip: B>C
or C>A?<br>
<br>
B>A (4-2 = 2), A>C (2-3 = -1), C>B (3-4 = -1).<br>
<br>
I haven't put much thought on how best to break such ties, but I'm
inclined to say it should be in favour of the candidate with the
higher score.<br>
Here that is B, the sincere CW.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
On 4/30/2014 10:59 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOKDY5CZxZBTYuCLQq344mOA7wKqYYQYTN2+RqjffuPrhWs=WQ@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Forest--</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Oops! I forgot the A voters' transfer to C.</div>
<div> </div>
<div>So Woodall does as well as Benham in that example. So my
example doesn't mean that Benham is better than Woodall.
...But Benham is a lot easier to propose to organizations that
use or offer IRV.</div>
<div> </div>
<div> You mentioned Chris's other method. Is that the one that
does Condorcet, measuring defeat-strengh by the defeater's
Score minus the defeated's score...where a candidate's Score
is her pairwse support in her strongest defeat?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>That method elects C when B is middle CW, and the most
favorite, and A is least favorite, and A voters + C voters
outnumer B voters, and the A voters bury B?</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Specific numeical instance of that example:</div>
<div> </div>
<div>2: A>C>B (burying B)</div>
<div>4. B>A>C</div>
<div>3: C>B>A</div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Michael Ossipoff</div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</body>
</html>