<div dir="ltr">Omnibus response:<div><br></div><div>Toby: "Which voting systems?"</div><div><br></div><div>At present: plurality, IRV, borda, ranked pairs, range, MAV (a graded median/Bucklin system), approval. The code is <a href="https://github.com/The-Center-for-Election-Science/vse-sim">on github</a> (in Python 3), so anyone is free to add systems.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Steve: "Coordinated strategic?"</div><div><br></div><div>That's what I'm calling cliquishness. Even if I set it to a pretty high number, like 70%, there will still be plenty of scenarios where the strategy on both sides is balanced.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2014-02-24 15:30 GMT-05:00 Kevin Venzke <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank" onclick="window.open('https://mail.google.com/mail/?view=cm&tf=1&to=stepjak@yahoo.fr&cc=&bcc=&su=&body=','_blank');return false;">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>></span>:<br>
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<span>Hi Toby,</span></div><div style="font-style:normal;font-size:16px;background-color:transparent;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif"><span><br></span></div><div style="font-style:normal;font-size:16px;background-color:transparent;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif">
<span>In my own simulations (in which voting blocs learn how the method works through repeated polls, until ultimately one poll becomes the election result) the consistent difference between WV and margins was favorite betrayal (i.e. WV sees compression incentive where margins sees compromise incentive). IIRC the two usually scored pretty similarly with regard to sincere CW
election rate and "utility maximizer" election rate.</span></div><div style="font-style:normal;font-size:16px;background-color:transparent;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif">
<span><br></span></div><div style="font-style:normal;font-size:16px;background-color:transparent;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif"><span>Actually, I found most methods pretty hard to differentiate wrt social utility. Given the vast range of possible underlying voter utilities, I think the actual voter utilities are very hard to perceive, even if the (strategic) votes aren't very distorted from the truth.</span></div>
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<span>Jameson, does your strategy #3 "fully strategic" mean Warren-style "use favorite betrayal and burial no matter what"? Or is it more of an approval-style "everybody gets an A or an F" thing, under the methods that allow it at least?</span></div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>In strictly ranked Condorcet, it means FB and burial. In non-strict ranking, I think it should be just FB (for margins) or just turkey-raising (for WV), that is, compression-to-ties on one side, and inversion on the other. But I'm open to suggestions on that count.</div>
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<span>Does your polling system do a round of Range voting, or something like that?<br></span></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>A round of honest votes, using the same system. In some scenarios, those honest results are then subjected to a media bias which disfavors arbitrary "non-major" candidates according to one of two soft scales.</div>
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<span>My concern would of course be the possibility of supposing behavior that doesn't happen to make sense in a specific scenario. I see that you have some conditions to try to avoid this. But naturally if "strategic" voters strategize poorly (either too much or too little, or not in the right way) or "unevenly" poorly (among the various methods and scenarios) this could bias a method's final score (either positively or negatively!).</span></div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Right. My goal is to find some set of models (each of which is a probability measure over scenarios) that I can call "realistic", and explore relative system quality under such models. So I'm not aiming for ideal strategy, except insofar as there are significant numbers of real-world voters who strategize ideally. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div></div></div></div>