<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">We seem to have similar understanding on how the CD should be defined. My problem was just that I couldn't see these features (multiple strategic groupins, that prefer C candidates above others, causing some cadidate outside C to win) fully reflected in the CD definition that you sent out earlier today.<div><br></div><div>Juho<br><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On 11.1.2014, at 20.38, Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 11:03 AM, Juho Laatu <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:juho4880@yahoo.co.uk" target="_blank">juho4880@yahoo.co.uk</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div>Some comments on the CD criterion itself.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I see CD as a situation where there is a group of voters (V) that has majority and whose members all prefer certain set of candidates (C) over all other candidates. With sincere votes one of the C candidates is guaranteed to win (it may be unclear which one of them). Some V voters can improve the expected outcome by voting some C candidates "lower". The Chicken Dilemma emerges when multiple members/subgroups of V (with different preferences within C) follow this strategy, and as a result some candidate outside C wins.</div>
<div> </div></div></blockquote><div> </div><div>Yes, that's the situation that CD is intended to test for.</div><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote">
<div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div> </div><div><br></div><div>This is not an exact definition yet, but you can see what I mean. Should we assume that in CD there are multiple strategic groups within V? </div></div></blockquote>
<div> </div><div>Yes. There might not always be, but there often will be. U.S. progressives are a terribly fractious group, with certain factions, which will remain un-named, angrily criticizing all progrssives who don't share their ideology.</div>
<div> </div><div>With a chicken-dilemma-vulnerable voting system, the chicken dilemma would devastate the progressives. The progressives would mutually self-destruct. ...unless they were real good at probabilistic partial-cooperation anti-defection strategy. Should we count on that? Better to just not have chicken dilemma, and thereby have the benefit of MMC and the Condorcet Criterion.</div>
<div> </div><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">
<div>Should we assume that one of the candidates outside C will win?</div><div> </div></div></blockquote><div> </div><div>Most definitely. </div><div> </div><div>Michael Ossipoff</div></div></div></div>
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