<div dir="ltr">I like the relative simplicity of this method. It's also nice because it has a clear relationship to Bucklin/median methods. It seems as though it would do well against the chicken dilemma; though perhaps it would be even better if it used pure MPO as a tie breaker.<div>
<br></div><div>I have two questions, then. What would you call it? And, how would you count it in practice? Would you need to keep a full Condorcet matrix, or are there tricks which would allow you to do a hand-count without that?</div>
<div><br></div><div>As to naming, here are some ideas:</div><div><ul><li>Pairwise Opposition Bucklin</li><li>Instant Runoff Bucklin</li><li>Threshold Approval Minus Oppsition (TAMO)</li></ul></div></div><div class="gmail_extra">
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2013/10/26 Forest Simmons <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu" target="_blank">fsimmons@pcc.edu</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div><div><div>Here's an idea that is essentially a more seamless version of Chris Benham's IBIFA:<br><br>Each voter rates each candidate on a scale of zero to some maximum allowable rating..<br>
<br></div><div>Set the approval cutoff level at the highest level possible consistent with at least one candidate having at least as much approval as max pairwise opposition.<br></div><br></div>Elect the candidate with the biggest difference between approval and max pairwise opposition.<br>
<br></div>That's it.<br><br></div>It turns out that if no other approval cutoff yields a candidate with as much approval as MPO, then setting the cutoff between zero and the next higher level (thereby yielding "Implicit Approval") will work. In fact when approval is given by Implicit Approval, the candidate with the most approval is one candidate (but not necessarily the only one) that will have at least as much approval as MPO.<br>
<br></div>This method satisfies the FBC and the mono-add-top version of Participation, etc. It also solves the same problem of ordinary Approval and MAMPO that IBIFA was designed to solve, viz getting your Compromise out of the way when your Favorite has sufficient high level support.<br>
<br></div>What do you think?<br><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 7:10 PM, Chris Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div style="font-size:12pt;font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif"><div><div><div style="font-size:12pt;font-family:times new roman,new york,times,serif">
<div><span>Forest,</span></div><div><span></span> </div><div><span>Another FBC-complying method (that I'd forgotten about) that I also like a lot is</span></div><div><span>"ICT" (as Mike O. renamed it). It should only be used on 3-slot ratings ballots.</span></div>
<div><span></span> </div><div><span>It is just like Kevin V's ICA (Improved Condorcet//Approval) except if there
is</span></div><div><span>no "tied-at-the-top" rule pairwise beats-all candidate then instead of electing the</span></div><div><span>most approved (rated Top or Middle) candidate we elect the most Top-rated candidate.</span></div>
<div><span></span> </div><div><span><a href="http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica" target="_blank">http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica</a></span></div><div><span></span> </div><div><span>Unlike ICA, IBIFA, Shulze and other methods, it meets Mike O's "Chicken dilemma<br>
criterion".</span></div><div><span></span> </div><div><span>Chris</span></div><div><span></span> </div><div><span></span> </div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></div>
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