<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:abd@lomaxdesign.com" target="_blank">abd@lomaxdesign.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
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I've argued that the combination of aspects of the US political system in our constitution, namely the import of winner-take-all presidential/senatorial/<u></u>gubernatorial elections(obviously hard to change), + habits built up among many US voters( used to 2-party dominated system, inequalities in the quality/quantity of eduation) + bounded rationality of voters make it wise to assume the continued two-party domination of the US political system.<br>
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While it may be *reasonable* to assume continued domination, in some areas, it is not *wise*.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Wisdom entails consideration of real world precedents, such as how positive election reforms have tended to be <a href="https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&ie=UTF-8#output=search&sclient=psy-ab&q=elite-mass%20interactions&oq=&gs_l=&pbx=1&fp=e16824eab702e431&ion=1&bav=on.2,or.r_cp.r_qf.&bvm=bv.48572450,d.aWc&biw=1366&bih=603" target="_blank">elite-mass interactions</a>.</div>
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Essentially, one of the possible positive functions of voting system reform would be encouragement of a healthy multiparty system, even if there continue to be two major parties *in most elections.*<br></blockquote><div>
<br></div><div>IRV+ American forms of PR will do exactly that. The presences of 2 major parties *in most elections* is the essence of a 2-party dominated system. It will be a healthy system because the 2 major parties will be more meritocratic and their duopoly will be easier to contest.</div>
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We *already have* places in the U.S., with elections, where there are three major parties.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Depends on how you define major parties, but yes regional diversity + cross-regional subsidies have been a major source of potential threats to duopoly in US political history. </div>
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I have argued more recently that in addition that economic factors involved with running for an important single-winner election tend to reduce the number of competitive candidates and in combination with the likely continued 2-party domination reduce the feedback loop from a change in election rule to increased numbers of competitive candidates in single-winner elections.<br>
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IRV is being promoted for nearly all elections, regardless of conditions. We know that advanced voting systems will encourage additional candidates to run, that's obvious and it shouldn't be questioned. Yes, there are natural limits in those "important single-winner elections," i.e,. elections on a large scale. We do not clearly know how rapidly a minor party might grow if not for the first-order spoiler effect, which IRV does resolve.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: It's called keeping things simple in marketing to people with opp. costs to learning about politics, much less electoral analytics. Yes, the number of candidates will grow and get more respect from people, obviously minor parties might grow and then get coopted? The issue is how often it'd lead to the scenarios where it'd be nice to have more rankings or approval votes or what-not. I'm willing to wait and see, let folks get habituated to IRV before delving into experiments with other single-winner election rules in the USA.</div>
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Howver, given that minor parties still often maintain ballot presence, given how much of an obstacle currently exists for such parties, due to Plurality voting, given that IRV would not increase the obstacle, it would relieve it and open the door, David's argument seems facile. Once minor parties can get, in public elections, validation for true support and thus increased ballot position, we can expect *as a reasonable possibility* that, in places, the minor party will rise to parity.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: It's one thing to make it easier for folks to get on the ballot but to rise to parity is another question. More likely there'd be some mergers to ward off Burlington-like scenarios. </div>
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And that is precisely where IRV breaks down, badly, as it did break down in Burlington. IRV is a *terrible* single-winner method when there are three viable candidates or more. So why set this up? Why not use a *simpler* method that also addresses the spoiler effect?<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: With one more election and voter-learning, Burlington would've worked out just fine. It's true that IRV does coerce supporters of a major party that refuses to realign itself towards the true center to vote strategically. With one more election, presuming a comeback in popularity was not acheived by the Progressive party, the Republicans would've either shifted to be more like the Dems or they'd have lost their moderates to the Dems so that GOP would've sunk into the minor/third party status they deserve in Burlington and maybe started to push for American forms of PR. </div>
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Bucklin would do it with ease, it is extremely easy to understand, no surprises, and it has what I'd call "historical momentum."<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>not recently. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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FairVote has attempted to confuse that history, it's one of their more objectionable activities. Bucklin worked. It did not do everything that was claimed for it, that's all. It did not magically generate majorities in party primaries, but there is *no* claim that it caused harm. Bucklin is *better* than IRV as to finding majorities, in a nonpartisan election context (and a party primary is a nonpartisan election), because it can uncover support for a candidate, underneath support for the favorite. Bucklin votes only add, and there are no eliminations. It's "instant runoff Approval."<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Bucklin voting sounds like a great rule to push for nonpartisan elections, like primaries. Let's hope that FairVote will concede that. </div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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My next arg was that if the average number of competitive candidates wouldn't be likely to grow too much with the adoption of a, Condorcet-like or Approval-like or IRV-like election rule that it would lower the value-added from Condorcet-like or Approval-like rules relative to a variant of IRV.<br>
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*Any method* that eliminates the first-order spoiler effect will encourage *many* more candidacies. I don't see that I understood, however, what David was saying here. Too many variable or negative conditions to parse readily.</blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>competitive candidates it the key term. In terms of the models that Warren Smith likes to use to evaluate election rules, candidates come from a mixed distribution with competitive candidates having an a priori decent chance at election and non-competitive candidates having a very small chance, even with a "good" rule. My point is that the economics of running for serious single-winner elections and voter quirks in real life make it easier for the number of non-competitive candidates to increase while the number of competitive candidates would increase less, regardless of the election rule used. </div>
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I then have argued that if the short-run probability of widespread implementation of an IRV-like rule in our current US system with all of the previous conditional factors plus the first-mover marketing advantage of IRV-like system out weighs the short-run probabilities of other alternatives to FPP then it doesn't per se matter if there is some value-added from such alternatives relative to IRV.<br>
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This is a circular argument. The "marketing advantage" of IRV is useless if the method will be rejected. </blockquote><div><br></div><div>There is no good reason to insist it will be rejected. The tactics used during Burlington can be subverted if we all defend IRV-like election rules as very useful ways to help the USA's beleaguered democracy so long as they're combined with American forms of Proportional Representation. </div>
<div><br></div><div> Burlington was arguably a fluke, hardly enough evidence to settle the matter... </div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
More people know about IRV, yes, and most of them don't know about the problems, but ... these do come out in campaigns for implementation. We have to notice, now, how many jurisdictions have tried IRV and have later rejected it. Maybe it's time for a fresh approach.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>You need more evidence. Why not wait and see and support the best known alternative to fptp or top two primary whereever there is a push for election reform? IRV will likely remain in the lead and we must do no harm against it. For IRV's widespread adoption and internalization will make it easier for other election reforms down the road. </div>
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This is what I'd predict: at great expense, a jurisdiction implements IRV. As a result, a minor party grows in strength until it challenges a major party. Then there is a spectacular failure, where voters realize that they'd have gotten a better result by not voting. They realize that the promise that they could now vote sincerely was a *lie.* They realize that the promise of finding majorities was *highly deceptive.*<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: Nonsense. The tendencies that FairVote uses in its marketing aren't stated as tendencies but folks will see why that's a useful marketing pitch. Only moderate supporters of major parties that refuse to realign to the dynamic center will be coerced to vote strategically. That's no where near as bad as forcing outsiders to vote strategically. </div>
<div><br></div><div>And the majority thing is pretty robust if not perfect. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
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And so they dump IRV, and, good chance, they go back to what was in place before. At least, with Plurality, people understand the effect of their vote. And it's cheap and easy to count. And so all that implementation work, and the prior campaign, were not only *wasted*, but harm was done to the voting reform movement.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: If we stand together we can prevent that from happening. IRV ain't complicated, especially with some simplifications. There's no good reason to pile on it and repeat the talking points used against IRV during the campaign. </div>
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Really, David, FairVote should stop the deceptive advertising and focus on what is real and what is true reform. FairVote lost their original purpose in their "momentum." By suggesting we all sign up for that parade you are suggesting that we validate deception. Not likely, David. We, and the entire planet, are moving in a very different direction.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Last I've read from this list, you're not really going the same direction together, you're biggest aggreement is on the badness of IRV and how Burlington settled that...</div>
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So I take offense at having my views characterized as "religious" or anti-reason when I made clear the diffs between me and Herr Kristofer were epistemic, simply not easy to reconcile from evidence readily available.<br>
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We could be less polite if you wish.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Yes, you could, but it is an empirical fact that the ability to persuade someone is positively related with how that person thinks of you as a person. I've been taking the unpopular position that the US doesn't need much of an upgrade from IRV to get serious election reform so long as it's coupled with American forms of PR. I've tried to bring in lots of aspects from real world elections that aren't easy to model in rational choice theory models but that together tend to bolster my arg that there's not as much value-added from "better" alternatives to IRV or that IRV can be improved on easily and that ending a tendency to a 2-party dominated system in the US doesn't need to be and shouldn't be the goal of immediate election reform in the US. <br>
<br>This doesn't invalidate your work or expertise, it just suggests that focusing on primaries and other locations for experimentations with your ideas is a better venue and that you should reconsider repeating the idea that Burlington deep-sixed IRV or even stand up to use of that meme in the near future by folks who might not be trying to do the right thing but rather holding back electoral reform thru the old work-horse of divide and conquer. </div>
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dlw:I've argued.... I have argued ....<br><br>My next arg ....<div><br></div><div>I then have argued ....</div></div></blockquote><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br></div><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">JamesonQuinn: This is a long chain of reasoning. Each link may seem solid to you, but even if you are 80% right at each of four steps, by the end of the chain you're only 40% right. Yet you'd never realize that if you refuse to discuss any alternate lines of logic until people have discredited at least one of the links in your chain.</span></div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><font face="arial, sans-serif"><br></font></div><div class="gmail_extra"><font face="arial, sans-serif">dlw: They're not wholly independent and the system as a whole doesn't fail if some of the args fail, and I think the consitutionality args that bolster the import of winner-take-all elections with economically important consequences, thereby leading rent-seeking/keeping actions in elections, are pretty damn solid. <br>
</font><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"> </div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">The way I see it, I lay my cards down. Your rational choice models involve lots of tacit assumptions that I've tried to draw attention to and I've responded when you've pointed to possible "fixes", like the study that introduced uncertainty/noise in voter-utility/rankings in a homogenous fashion and not unsurprisingly found that the rules that used the most "information" did the best. I don't see myself as being anti-reason or faith-based when I try to poke holes in the assumptions that these fixes make. <br>
<br>And since my position here is essentially an apologist for the status quo of election reform in the USA, which is a healthy thing to have on a list-serve trying to change the goals of election reform in the USA(and elsewhere), I don't feel like I'm doing the wrong thing by building up a system that justifies a prejudice against more ambitious alternatives than tweaks to IRV or the use of American forms of PR to presumably accelerate the healing of democracy in the USA. </div>
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<div><br></div><div>As such, I disregard....</div></div></blockquote><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">JQ:That's anti-evidence armor. Relatively discounting a line of evidence is one thing; disregarding it another. </div>
<div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">dlw: It's not evidence when it's built out of straw, or hypotheticals with a tenuous link to reality. </div>
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<div dir="ltr"> </div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">The sort of experiment that would prove me wrong is the widespread adoption of Condorcet-like or Approval-like rule for important single-winner elections in the USA,</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div></div><div style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px">JQ:How convenient, that the only thing that could prove you wrong is something unlikely to happen soon. If you want to take a scientific outlook, you have to think harder about how to get new, relevant data.</div>
<div class="" style="font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:13px"><div id=":4k7" class="" tabindex="0"><img class="" src="https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/images/cleardot.gif" style=""></div></div>dlw:Let's try and not use the word science in vain. The thought-experiments done here are not "bad", they're just not convincing because of how much of real life gets thrown out in the process of making various simplifying assumptions. <br>
<br>So I see myself as insisting that the data be relevant and new and resolve to help devise an experiment that is IMO likely to happen in the near future: the widespread adoption of IRV+Am. forms of PR. In that vein, I've tried to get you all to turn away from how you appeal to Burlington and talk smack of IRV by my various arguments and by asking for you to trust that there'd be more scope for further experimentation after the implementation of the experiment I see as highly likely to heal what's been at root enabling the poisoning of my country's democracy in recent decades, with considerable negative spill-over into the rest of the world.</div>
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