<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:verdana, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:18pt"><div>Ben Grant wrote:</div><div> </div><div>" - Approval Voting tends to result in irrelevant approval votes being given to weak candidates – which is pointless, or slightly stronger (but still losing) candidates can once again present a spoiler effect where a person’s<br>least preferred choice is elected because they cast their approval only toward their most preferred choice, who was nowhere near supported enough to stop their least preferred choice.<br><br>Am I substantially wrong about any of this? Ultimately, in real and practical terms, it seems that done intelligently, Score Voting devolves into Approval Voting, and Approval Voting devolves into Plurality Voting."</div><div> </div><div>The idea is that some voters dislike feeling strategically pressured to vote their sincere favourites below equal-top. With voters
never needing to vote their sincere favourites below equal-top, previous elections become a much better indicator of which candidates are really "weak".</div><div> </div><div>So I don't see compliance with the Favorite Betrayal Criterion as "pointless".</div><div> </div><div>Chris Benham</div></div></body></html>