<div dir="ltr">In response to Warren Smith's Random example, <br><a href="http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html">http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html</a><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br>It chooses 7 candidates to reflect the number of candidates from the ballots in Australia, but it draws all seven candidates from the same distribution of voter utility preferences. This is what I've been arguing isn't realistic. <br>
<br>Realism matters and in real life, there is a mixed distribution of candidates with a non-insignificant portion of the "7" candidates tending to be non-competitive, serving the functions of bringing up ideas or the interests of some part of society. <br>
<br>So it is contrived to insist that the example is purely random and not contrived,</div><div class="gmail_extra" style>random isn't enuf, it reflects the underly distributional assumptions and the key assumption here is that there needs to be a mixed distribution with not all of the candidates having a priori equal odds of being the winning candidate. </div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><div><div dir="ltr">dlw</div></div>
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 9:11 AM, <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
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Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Re: Subject: Here's what a random IRV election looks like<br>
(Kathy Dopp)<br>
2. Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically<br>
substantially different from Plurality? (Benjamin Grant)<br>
3. Question about the Plurality Criterion (Benjamin Grant)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2013 15:54:04 -0400<br>
From: Kathy Dopp <<a href="mailto:kathy.dopp@gmail.com">kathy.dopp@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Subject: Here's what a random IRV election looks<br>
like<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CANqewJQRK7=ASt8rE6cB0VWzUDay0Y9NQnoc=<a href="mailto:1frHAT0BPU9Pg@mail.gmail.com">1frHAT0BPU9Pg@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"<br>
<br>
Warren,<br>
<br>
Great Job. Your presentation makes it very clear how fundamentally unfair<br>
the IRV counting method is to voters. Treat all voters equally - Not.<br>
<br>
I'll pass this link on to others.<br>
<br>
Kathy<br>
<br>
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2013 02:02:33 -0400<br>
> From: Warren D Smith <<a href="mailto:warren.wds@gmail.com">warren.wds@gmail.com</a>><br>
> To: electionscience <<a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a>>,<br>
> election-methods <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
> Subject: [EM] Here's what a random IRV election looks like<br>
> Message-ID:<br>
> <<br>
> <a href="mailto:CAAJP7Y3jjCLaka_YKDZpVqznHjAZ%2Bbt6ZVS39BpvOYzdDvWu0w@mail.gmail.com">CAAJP7Y3jjCLaka_YKDZpVqznHjAZ+bt6ZVS39BpvOYzdDvWu0w@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1<br>
><br>
> <a href="http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html" target="_blank">http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html</a><br>
><br>
><br>
> --<br>
><br>
--<br>
<br>
Kathy Dopp<br>
Town of Colonie, NY 12304<br>
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the<br>
discussion with true facts."<br>
<br>
Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections<br>
<a href="http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174" target="_blank">http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174</a><br>
<br>
View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:<br>
<a href="http://ssrn.com/author=1451051" target="_blank">http://ssrn.com/author=1451051</a><br>
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Message: 2<br>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2013 09:06:53 -0400<br>
From: "Benjamin Grant" <<a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com">benn@4efix.com</a>><br>
To: "'EM'" <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>>,<br>
<<a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a>><br>
Subject: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically<br>
substantially different from Plurality?<br>
Message-ID: <01a001ce70db$b3f68770$1be39650$@<a href="http://4efix.com" target="_blank">4efix.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"<br>
<br>
Hi guys, I'm still here, still pondering, but now I have another question.<br>
I've been thinking about score voting, approval voting, and plurality (FPTP)<br>
voting, and I have a concern.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Say we have a situation where we have three candidates, say Gore, Nader, and<br>
Bush. Say we have a voter, Abe whose greatest concern is that Bush NOT win.<br>
His second priority is that Nader win over Gore - but this priority is a<br>
distant second. He *really* doesn't want Bush to win. He would prefer Nader<br>
over Gore, but he *hates* Bush.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Let's also say that Abe is intelligent, and he is committed to using his<br>
vote to maximize his happiness - in other words, rather than vote sincerely<br>
and cause his preferences harm, he will always vote strategically where it<br>
is to his benefit to do so.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
If Score Voting was in place, and he were to vote sincerely, Abe probably<br>
would vote something like 'Gore:75, Nader: 100, Bush: 0'. However, he's no<br>
fool, and he knows that while it is theoretically possibly that Nader<br>
*might* win, Gore is his best chance to stopping Bush, and that withholding<br>
score from Gore might (if all Nader supporters did it) result in Gore not<br>
getting enough of a score, therefor Bush could win.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
So strategically speaking, Abe reasons that although he supports a less<br>
likely candidate more, he strategically should score the front-runner Gore<br>
at full strength, so long as keeping Bush out is the greatest need - and so<br>
long as Nader's win is unlikely.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
So, as far as *I* can see, this converts Score Voting into Approval voting.<br>
The only people who would bother to vote sincerely are:<br>
<br>
1) Those who truly prefer Gore highest and Bush lowest (or vice versa),<br>
because there's no strategic downside.<br>
<br>
2) People who would rather feel more "sincere" about their vote than<br>
feel good about the outcome of their vote.<br>
<br>
3) People who aren't intelligent to realize that by voting sincerely<br>
they may be helping elect their least preferred candidate.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
And say what you want about intelligence being a bar to entry, you can bet<br>
that the smart people behind ALL candidates will make sure that everyone<br>
gets the message, so we can largely ignore #3. Most people I imagine would<br>
be pragmatic enough to worry more about the end result and less about<br>
sincere vs. strategic, so we ignore #2. And #1 people are going to vote the<br>
same way anways, so they may as well use Approval voting.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
OK, so let's throw out Score Voting and use Approval voting. Gore v Nader V<br>
Bush. Abe (who hates Bush but prefers Nader) gives an approval vote to<br>
Nader, his top-most preference, but knowing that withholding approval from<br>
Gore could elect Bush (and not wanting to play the spoiler) he also gives an<br>
approval vote to Gore. Since Gore in this example is far and away receiving<br>
much more support than Nader, Gore now beats Bush.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Let's call the party that put Nader on the ballot the Green party, and that<br>
they continue to field candidates in further elections that use the Approval<br>
voting system. Abe notices the following pattern: when the Green party<br>
fields a candidate that doesn't even have a glimmer of hope winning the<br>
election (like the Gore/Nader/Bush one) that people that support the Green<br>
party candidate also approve the Democrat candidate as a bulwark against the<br>
Republican. And since in those elections the Green party never really had a<br>
hope of winning, the Green approval vote is ultimately irrelevant - those<br>
elections would have proceeded no differently than if the Green supporters<br>
had simply voted Democrat.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
But much worse yet, Abe notices that in *some* election, the Green party<br>
actually gets a chunk of people thinking that Green could actually win. And<br>
emboldened by their hopes, many Green supporters decide to go for it,<br>
approve of the Green candidate, but *not* the Democrat one. Result: in<br>
elections where more voters think more favorably towards Green's chances,<br>
their least preferred choice (the Republican) tends to win more!<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
This are my two thoughts:<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
a) Intelligent use of Score Voting becomes Approval Voting, and the<br>
harm in unwise use of Score voting means that Approval Voting is superior to<br>
(and simpler than) Score voting pragmatically.<br>
<br>
b) Approval Voting tends to result in irrelevant approval votes being<br>
given to weak candidates - which is pointless, or slightly stronger (but<br>
still losing) candidates can once again present a spoiler effect where a<br>
person's least preferred choice is elected because they cast their approval<br>
only toward their most preferred choice, who was nowhere near supported<br>
enough to stop their least preferred choice.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Am I substantially wrong about any of this? Ultimately, in real and<br>
practical terms, it seems that done intelligently, Score Voting devolves<br>
into Approval Voting, and Approval Voting devolves into Plurality Voting.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
How is this not so?<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
If it *is* so, then as much as I abhor Plurality Voting, I must now likewise<br>
abhor Score and Approval Voting. But that shoves me back at the Bucklin,<br>
IRV, and other system that have one of my least favorite flaws - that<br>
ranking X higher than Y can cause Y to beat X. :(<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
It's days like these that I feel that there *is* no way to elect people that<br>
is fair and right. :(<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-Benn Grant<br>
<br>
eFix Computer Consulting<br>
<br>
<mailto:<a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com">benn@4efix.com</a>> <a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com">benn@4efix.com</a><br>
<br>
<a href="tel:603.283.6601" value="+16032836601">603.283.6601</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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Message: 3<br>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2013 10:10:36 -0400<br>
From: "Benjamin Grant" <<a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com">benn@4efix.com</a>><br>
To: "'EM'" <<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>>,<br>
<<a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a>><br>
Subject: [EM] Question about the Plurality Criterion<br>
Message-ID: <01af01ce70e4$9a68fff0$cf3affd0$@<a href="http://4efix.com" target="_blank">4efix.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"<br>
<br>
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: "If there are<br>
two candidates X and Y so that X has more first place votes than Y has any<br>
place votes, then Y shouldn't win".<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Which I think means that if X has, for example, 100 votes, then B would have<br>
to appear on less than 100 ballots and still *win* for this criterion to be<br>
failed, yes?<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
I cannot imagine a (halfway desirable) voting system that would fail the<br>
Plurality Criterion - can anyone tell me the simplest one that would? Apart<br>
from a lame one like "least votes win", I mean?<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-Benn Grant<br>
<br>
eFix Computer Consulting<br>
<br>
<mailto:<a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com">benn@4efix.com</a>> <a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com">benn@4efix.com</a><br>
<br>
<a href="tel:603.283.6601" value="+16032836601">603.283.6601</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 108, Issue 62<br>
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</blockquote></div><br></div></div>