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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link="#0563C1" vlink="#954F72"><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>Hi guys, I’m still here, still pondering, but now I have another question. I’ve been thinking about score voting, approval voting, and plurality (FPTP) voting, and I have a concern.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>Say we have a situation where we have three candidates, say Gore, Nader, and Bush. Say we have a voter, Abe whose greatest concern is that Bush NOT win. His second priority is that Nader win over Gore – but this priority is a distant second. He *really* doesn’t want Bush to win. He would prefer Nader over Gore, but he *hates* Bush.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>Let’s also say that Abe is intelligent, and he is committed to using his vote to maximize his happiness – in other words, rather than vote sincerely and cause his preferences harm, he will always vote strategically where it is to his benefit to do so.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>If Score Voting was in place, and he were to vote sincerely, Abe probably would vote something like ‘Gore:75, Nader: 100, Bush: 0’. However, he’s no fool, and he knows that while it is theoretically possibly that Nader *might* win, Gore is his best chance to stopping Bush, and that withholding score from Gore might (if all Nader supporters did it) result in Gore not getting enough of a score, therefor Bush could win.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>So strategically speaking, Abe reasons that although he supports a less likely candidate more, he strategically should score the front-runner Gore at full strength, so long as keeping Bush out is the greatest need – and so long as Nader’s win is unlikely.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>So, as far as *I* can see, this converts Score Voting into Approval voting. The only people who would bother to vote sincerely are:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing style='margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>1)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span><![endif]>Those who truly prefer Gore highest and Bush lowest (or vice versa), because there’s no strategic downside.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing style='margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>2)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span><![endif]>People who would rather feel more “sincere” about their vote than feel good about the outcome of their vote.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing style='margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>3)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span><![endif]>People who aren’t intelligent to realize that by voting sincerely they may be helping elect their least preferred candidate.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>And say what you want about intelligence being a bar to entry, you can bet that the smart people behind ALL candidates will make sure that everyone gets the message, so we can largely ignore #3. Most people I imagine would be pragmatic enough to worry more about the end result and less about sincere vs. strategic, so we ignore #2. And #1 people are going to vote the same way anways, so they may as well use Approval voting.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>OK, so let’s throw out Score Voting and use Approval voting. Gore v Nader V Bush. Abe (who hates Bush but prefers Nader) gives an approval vote to Nader, his top-most preference, but knowing that withholding approval from Gore could elect Bush (and not wanting to play the spoiler) he also gives an approval vote to Gore. Since Gore in this example is far and away receiving much more support than Nader, Gore now beats Bush.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>Let’s call the party that put Nader on the ballot the Green party, and that they continue to field candidates in further elections that use the Approval voting system. Abe notices the following pattern: when the Green party fields a candidate that doesn’t even have a glimmer of hope winning the election (like the Gore/Nader/Bush one) that people that support the Green party candidate also approve the Democrat candidate as a bulwark against the Republican. And since in those elections the Green party never really had a hope of winning, the Green approval vote is ultimately irrelevant – those elections would have proceeded no differently than if the Green supporters had simply voted Democrat.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>But much worse yet, Abe notices that in *some* election, the Green party actually gets a chunk of people thinking that Green could actually win. And emboldened by their hopes, many Green supporters decide to go for it, approve of the Green candidate, but *not* the Democrat one. Result: in elections where more voters think more favorably towards Green’s chances, their least preferred choice (the Republican) tends to win more!<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>This are my two thoughts:<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing style='margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>a)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span><![endif]>Intelligent use of Score Voting becomes Approval Voting, and the harm in unwise use of Score voting means that Approval Voting is superior to (and simpler than) Score voting pragmatically.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing style='margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo2'><![if !supportLists]><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>b)<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> </span></span><![endif]>Approval Voting tends to result in irrelevant approval votes being given to weak candidates – which is pointless, or slightly stronger (but still losing) candidates can once again present a spoiler effect where a person’s least preferred choice is elected because they cast their approval only toward their most preferred choice, who was nowhere near supported enough to stop their least preferred choice.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>Am I substantially wrong about any of this? Ultimately, in real and practical terms, it seems that done intelligently, Score Voting devolves into Approval Voting, and Approval Voting devolves into Plurality Voting.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>How is this not so?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>If it *is* so, then as much as I abhor Plurality Voting, I must now likewise abhor Score and Approval Voting. But that shoves me back at the Bucklin, IRV, and other system that have one of my least favorite flaws – that ranking X higher than Y can cause Y to beat X. <span style='font-family:Wingdings'>L</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNoSpacing>It’s days like these that I feel that there *is* no way to elect people that is fair and right. <span style='font-family:Wingdings'>L</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='color:#1F497D;mso-ligatures:standard'>-Benn Grant<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='color:#1F497D;mso-ligatures:standard'>eFix Computer Consulting<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='color:#1F497D;mso-ligatures:standard'><a href="mailto:benn@4efix.com"><span style='color:#0563C1'>benn@4efix.com</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='color:#1F497D;mso-ligatures:standard'>603.283.6601<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></body></html>