<div dir="ltr">On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 1:28 PM, Kathy Dopp <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:kathy.dopp@gmail.com" target="_blank">kathy.dopp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Please forward to the appropriate list for me. Thank you.<br>
<br><div><div class="gmail_extra">From: <a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com" target="_blank">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a><br><div dir="ltr">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
[mailto:<a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com" target="_blank">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a>] On Behalf Of Benjamin Grant<br>
Sent: Monday, June 24, 2013 11:40 AM<br>
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger <<a href="mailto:unger@cs.columbia.edu" target="_blank">unger@cs.columbia.edu</a><br>
<mailto:<a href="mailto:unger@cs.columbia.edu" target="_blank">unger@cs.columbia.edu</a>> > wrote:<br>
<br>
If you cast votes (approve or give high scores to)<br>
only for parties that might win the current election, then we will be<br>
stuck forever with the existing 2-party scam.<br></blockquote><div> <br></div><div>Yes. But the point of approval or score voting is voters do not have to do that in order to keep their least favorite from winning.<br></div>
</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I understand that is it's goal, but I seem to have pointed out that it still does that. Aparently, not well, though.<br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div dir="ltr"><div> And under Score/Approval/Plurality voting systems, there would be three</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
phases a party might go through:<br>
<br>
<br>
A) unpopular enough not to be a spoiler<br>
<br>
B) popular enough to be a spoiler, but not popular enough to win<br>
<br>
C) popular enough to win often (>25% of the time, for example.)<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Those options apply to plurality and IRV, not to approval or score voting where a voter's 2nd choice vote cannot cause his least favorite to win. <br>
</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Except when it does? I know that the party line is that "Approval and Score Voting cannot cause your least favorite to winner", but that's untrue if Nader being Abe's (our voter's) preference over Gore causes him to give less than 100 to Gore - that *can* cause Bush to win. The only way to be sure that he has done everything to prevent Bush from winning (if that is his highest priority in a Nader/Gore/Bush election) is to make sure to score the person most likely to beat Bush as high as possible. Therefore he *must* strategically score Gore a 100, Therefore Score/Range voting devolves into Approval voting.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>So let's examine Approval voting, since that is what we are left with. If we do an Approval voting system with Gore/Nader/Bush, assuming that Abe's first priority is to stop Bush and his next priority (a distant second, considering how opposed he is to Bush) is to support Nader over Gore.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Well, now he cannot do that. He can support Nader *and* Gore, be he cannot support Nader *over* Gore without risking a greater chance of a Bush victory. And in our example (as in real life) Gore has much more support than Nader.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>This means that If he Approval votes for BOTH of them, it is unlikely that his vote for Nader will accomplish anything.</div><div style>If he votes for ONLY Nader, he has a better chance for Nader to beat Gore, but a much worse chance for stopping a Bush victory.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>And, this is the poison pill: Let's say that election after election people see that more and more people are voting for Nader,although he is not winning. Thinking optimistically (as some people like to) that this might be the year that Nader could take it all, they put all their money on Nader - they vote Nader, but *not* Gore. The result? Gore's numbers drop, Nader's numbers rise a little, but Bush still get's the most!</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>This seems almost worse than plurality, in a way, because at least with plurality we all knew and admitted that we need to vote against the spoiler effect, but Approval voting may actually suffer from it just as much while not as obviously - meaning people may vote against there interests more by not seeing that.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Make sense?</div><div style> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div dir="ltr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
On your way to C, you are going to have a LOT of B, and you may never make<br>
it to C, especially if people get burned voting for the emerging party by<br>
getting their least preferred candidate.<br>
<br></blockquote><div>Speaking re. plurality or IRV still. <br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Huh?</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div dir="ltr"><div></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
The only way to build a strong new party in reality, as far as I can see, is<br>
to have a voting system that does not penalize you into getting your least<br>
favored choice by voting for your most favored one.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes. Agreed. <br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Good.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div dir="ltr"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Second of all, it seems to me that the less divergence there is between<br>
strategic and sincere voting, the more beneficial qualities the voting<br>
system has, such as:<br>
<br>
-we can worry less about the spoiler effect, which promotes more than just 2<br>
parties<br>
<br>
-we can worry less that people are accidentally voting against their<br>
interests<br>
<br>
-we can have fewer debates about whether people have an obligation to vote<br>
strategically or sincerely<br><br>
This would seem to be a good thing.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ideally, but practically we may have to continue to vote for all candidates other than our least favorates. <br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>
<div><br></div><div style>Again, huh? "we may have to continue to vote for all candidates other than our least favorates"? When we we NOT vote for candidates other than our least favorites? You seem to be suggesting that I want voters to vote for their least favorite candidates?</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div dir="ltr">
<div></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
* Intelligent use of Score Voting becomes Approval Voting, and the<br>
harm in unwise use of Score voting means that Approval Voting is superior to<br>
(and simpler than) Score voting pragmatically.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree.<br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>OK, so at least we agree that Score Voting is little more than a stop on the way to Approval voting.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div dir="ltr">
<div> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
* Approval Voting tends to result in irrelevant approval votes being<br>
given to weak candidates - which is pointless, or slightly stronger (but<br>
still losing) candidates can once again present a spoiler effect where a<br>
person's least preferred choice is elected because they cast their approval<br>
only toward their most preferred choice, who was nowhere near supported<br>
enough to stop their least preferred choice.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>First, why should anyone care if some votes turn out to be "irrelevant" according to your definition? Second, if someone uses approval voting like plurality byvoting for their true favorite without also voting for their most likely favorite candidate to win, then they are accepting that they might spoil the chances of their other favorite(s). Neither of these arguments is a logically coherent reason for favoring plurality over approval voting.<br>
</div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Well the above example illustrates that. Plus, some of us may find that a system in which people must accept that voting sincerely is not in their best interest is not as good a system as one in which that is less likely. And the only point I was making is for the 3rd party supporter (when there are two stronger parties), there is no practical difference between Approval and Plurality - either way, if he votes smart, he helps Gore beat Bush, and Nader doesn't win. If he votes less smart, he can even regrettably (from his point of view) help Bush beat Gore by only Approving Nader.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>So the fact that he is penalized by support Nader *over* Gore by getting his last choice Bush is something that I thought Approval (and by extension, Range/Score) were supposed to fix.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Since this isn't fixed, tell me what the benefit of Approval is in the real world over Plurality? I want to be CLEAR about this, so please let me: I am not asking how the what supporters of Approval voting promise will happen, nor what Approval voting's creators intentions are - I am ONLY asking about pragmatic and real-world RESULTS.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>It is easy I think to see that with the Gore/Nader/Bush example, a Nader supporter has to choose between stopping Bush and voting his true preference. It seems to me that whatever the criterion is named that covers that, that's an important one to embrace.</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Expressing your true preference should never cause your least favored outcome to happen - and here it sure seems to.</div><div><br></div><div style>-Benn</div></div></div></div>