<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra">On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 3:06 PM, Kathy Dopp <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:kathy.dopp@gmail.com" target="_blank">kathy.dopp@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div>Bejamin,<br><br>I think we fundamentally agree about most things except for one statement you made (I think you're seeing some disagreement where there is none), which is why I'll only respond to this.<br>
<br></div>You said "Since this isn't fixed, tell me what the benefit of Approval is in
the real world over Plurality? I want to be CLEAR about this, so please
let me: I am not asking how the what supporters of Approval voting
promise will happen, nor what Approval voting's creators intentions are -
I am ONLY asking about pragmatic and real-world RESULTS."<br><br></div>Me: E.g. If people see that the number of votes for Nader are virtually equal to those for Gore, and investigation (undistorted polling) shows that 9 out of ten of those voters preferred Nader first, and the "least favorite candidate" was more than 10% behind, then in the next election mathematically, only 5% of those voters have to switch to Nader for Nader to win and still beat the least favorite. </div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style>Yes, that is the best case scenario, and what we all hope would happen. What if the scenario I described happened instead? It's actually virtually guaranteed on the *way* to gettting to the scenario you painted.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>I.e. People are influenced by perceived public opinion and as well since your scenario was counterfactual, it may be less likely than cases that are possible where approval voting ends up making it possible for small parties to grow large and beat currently large parties.<br>
<br></div>You have no basis for claiming your counterfactual is more likely to occur than any other and yet you want to cut off clear opportunity for building support for smaller parties based on it? People, or at least some people may be able to figure out how and when to use approval voting to boost currently smaller parties. </div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I have yet to see any demonstration of any counterfactuality, so at this point I am not granting that claim. Unless I just plain don't understand what you mean when you say "counterfactual" - which is quite possible.</div>
<div><br></div><div style>In any case, among the things I seek in a voting system is a system where one doesn't have to choose between stopping your least preferred candidate and supporting your most preferred one. And so far as I can see, that will happen realistically in Approval voting when a minority group gets too optimistic.</div>
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