<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br clear="all"><div><div dir="ltr">dlw</div></div>
<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
Plurality voting and limited voting (and the Borda count if the voters<br>
are undisciplined) are about the only methods that _cannot_ handle 3 or<br>
(maybe) 4 popular choices along with any number of unpopular choices.<br></blockquote><div style><br>So you agree that IRV works w. relatively few popular candidates? </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
> So it seems disengaged from reality to let C, the number of candidates,<br>
> go to infinity... and if a lot of candidates are not going to get<br>
> elected then to disregard voter info/preference over them is of much<br>
> less consequence.<br>
<br>
Although the number of popular candidates is now small, that's because<br>
we use plurality voting. When we use better voting methods, the number<br>
of popular candidates will increase; of course not to infinity, but<br>
frequently beyond the 3 or 4 popular choices that IRV can handle with<br>
fairness.<br></blockquote><div style><br>dlw: This is a conjecture. One that I don't think makes economic sense when one considers all that is entailed with a competitive campaign for an important single-seat election. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Although it's a non-governmental example, take a look at the current<br>
VoteFair American Idol poll. The number of popular music genres is<br>
about 5, and there are about 7 singers who get more than a few<br>
first-choice votes.<br>
<br>
<a href="http://www.votefair.org/cgi-bin/votefairrank.cgi/votingid=idols" target="_blank">http://www.votefair.org/cgi-bin/votefairrank.cgi/votingid=idols</a><br>
<br>
IRV would correctly identify the most popular music genre (based on<br>
current results), but probably would not correctly identify the most<br>
popular singer.<br></blockquote><div style><br>Apples and Oranges. <br>There's no serious economic costs to competing in American Idol and so the number of competitive singers is not naturally hampered by that and the need for a large support base or expensive advertisements or connections for important endorsements. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Why would voters trust a voting method that stops getting fair results<br>
with so few popular candidates?<br></blockquote><div style><br>Because when one considers the potential candidates have for taking on ideas, there isn't a need for a large number of candidates to make the de facto center much more like the true center. <br>
<br>Only among theorists does one constrain candidates to fixed positions in policy-spaces.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Yes, IRV is easy to explain, but that advantage becomes unimportant as<br>
the number of popular candidates increases, which it will when better<br>
voting methods are adopted.<br></blockquote><div style><br>That may be your story, but when one adds realism with folks able to express voice thru other means besides voting then it becomes less important to amp up C much. The non-competitive candidates can still move the center. <br>
<br>And the opportunity cost of trying to settle on an alternative alternative to FPTP than IRV will become apparent.</div><div style>dlw</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 3<br>
Date: Mon, 27 May 2013 20:54:22 -0400<br>
From: Warren D Smith <<a href="mailto:warren.wds@gmail.com">warren.wds@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: electionscience <<a href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com">electionscience@googlegroups.com</a>>,<br>
election-methods <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Subject: [EM] NY state "fair elections" public funding bill (comments<br>
asap please?)<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CAAJP7Y2NMPdzBaYnW-Q_xwaQhhrkjgC=<a href="mailto:H5GyzxvM4QKrv1_giw@mail.gmail.com">H5GyzxvM4QKrv1_giw@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1<br>
<br>
<a href="http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?sh=printbill&bn=S04705&term=2013" target="_blank">http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?sh=printbill&bn=S04705&term=2013</a><br>
<br>
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