<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div style="RIGHT: auto">Robert,<BR></div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto">Can I take it that your "49: A>B A>C" means that 49 voters voted</div>
<div style="RIGHT: auto">A>B=C (meaning exactly the same thing as A>C=B)? I'll proceed<BR>on the assumption that your answer is yes.<BR><BR>So if <BR><BR>49: A>B A>C<BR>48: B>C>A<BR>03: C>A C>B<BR><BR>really means<BR><BR>49: A>B=C<BR>48: B>C>A<BR>03: C>A=B<BR style="RIGHT: auto"></div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto">you are aware here that there is no Condorcet winner and that Margins<BR>elects B, right?<BR><BR>B>C 48-3 (=45), C>A 51-49 (=2), A>B 49-48 (=1).<BR><BR>With only 3 candidates the Condorcet method algorithms you refer to<BR>are all the same as MinMax. <BR style="RIGHT: auto"><BR>You wrote:<BR>"again, i will repeat that probably, technically, Schulze is superior to <BR>Ranked-Pairs. but it doesn't matter with a Smith Set of 3 candidates or <BR>less. Condorcet cycles will be rare. cycles with more than 3 in the <BR>Smith set will be rare of the rare."<BR><BR>I agree.<BR><BR>" it's best to get Condorcet of *some* method enacted into law."<BR></div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto"> </div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto">I agree, if compliance with the Condorcet criterion is so important to you.<BR><BR>"the most realistic path to accomplishing that is *not* to advocate a method <BR>that cannot be explained to citizen-legislators."<BR><BR>Yes, but it also helps to advocate a method that opponents can't easily ridicule<BR>with bad examples.<BR><BR>I suggest Smith//Approval or Condorcet//Approval (interpreting ranking above<BR>equal-bottom as approval).<BR></div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto">In this example:<BR><BR>49: A<BR>48: B>C<BR>03: C<BR><BR>those methods elect C, while Margins elects B.<BR><BR>Chris Benham<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR></div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto">Robert Bistrow-Johnson wrote (8 Nov 2012):<BR></div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto"> </div>
<div style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent; FONT-STYLE: normal; FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; COLOR: rgb(0,0,0); FONT-SIZE: 16px; RIGHT: auto"><BR>well, i'm not the guy with upper-case letters. i didn't comment on this <BR>response to what i said, but looking it over right now, whether people <BR>vote on a Ranked-Choice ballot as if it were FPP or not, any candidates <BR>*not* ranked are tied for last place on that ballot. so<BR><BR>49: A<BR>48: B<BR>03: C<BR><BR>is really<BR>49: A>B A>C<BR>48: B>A B>C<BR>03: C>A C>B<BR><BR><BR>the difference with this:<BR><BR>49: A<BR>48: B>C<BR>03: C<BR><BR>is that C gets a helluva lot more support from B voters than the other <BR>scenario.<BR><BR>49: A>B A>C<BR>48: B>C>A<BR>03: C>A C>B<BR><BR>it's the same old complaint that Rob Ritchie (FairVote) and others make <BR>against Condorcet (justifying putting all their
support behind IRV): <BR>that (from their POV) Condorcet can elect wishy-washy candidates with <BR>little primary support. i (and Condorcet) would say that in the second <BR>case, C is the best candidate even if he/she got only 3 first-choice <BR>votes. might be a nice centrist, no-drama candidate in a polarized <BR>environment. in Burlington VT 2009, the 3rd-place finisher from the POV <BR>or FPP or IRV was the Condorcet winner and nearly everyone i talked with <BR>would have been much happier with this candidate than with whom actually <BR>won the IRV or with whom would have won FPP (who suffered a decisive <BR>defeat in a repeat run in March 2012). but the margins weren't so wide <BR>as with this example, candidate C got a lot more than 3% primary support <BR>votes.<BR><BR>again, i will repeat that probably, technically, Schulze is superior to <BR>Ranked-Pairs. but it doesn't matter with a Smith Set of 3 candidates or
<BR>l<VAR id=yui-ie-cursor></VAR>ess. Condorcet cycles will be rare. cycles with more than 3 in the <BR>Smith set will be rare of the rare. it's best to get Condorcet of <BR>*some* method enacted into law. the most realistic path to <BR>accomplishing that is *not* to advocate a method that cannot be <BR>explained to citizen-legislators. and i still think that margins is <BR>better than either winning votes (or the logical complement regarding <BR>the most losing votes). margins encompasses *both* winning votes and <BR>losing votes (the latter with a negative sign, of course).<BR><BR>-- <BR><BR>r b-j <A href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com">rbj at audioimagination.com</A><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR></div></div></body></html>