<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On Jun 24, 2012, at 8:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite"><div>To Democracy Chronicles, EM, and Dave Ketchum:<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1; "> </span></div><div>On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Dave Ketchum <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:davek@clarityconnect.com" target="_blank">davek@clarityconnect.com</a>></span> wrote:<br> </div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"> <div><br></div><div>Quoting from today's Demoncracy Chronicles, 6/24/12:</div><div><blockquote type="cite"><p><span style="line-height:32px;font-family:"times new roman";font-size:14px">The basic idea is avoid the situation faced today, where many candidates that are well liked do not get votes because voters choose the most likely to win candidate instead of their favorite. <span style="color:rgb(20,79,174);line-height:normal;font-size:24px"> So<span style="line-height:32px;font-size:14px"><span style="line-height:normal;font-size:24px">urce: <a style="border-width:0px;margin:0px;padding:0px;color:rgb(32,91,135);text-decoration:none;outline-style:none" href="http://s.tt/1fy4W" target="_blank">Democracy Chronicles</a> (<a style="border-width:0px;margin:0px;padding:0px;color:rgb(32,91,135);text-decoration:none;outline-style:none" href="http://s.tt/1fy4W" target="_blank">http://s.tt/1fy4W</a>)<span class="Apple-style-span" style="color: rgb(0, 99, 18); -webkit-text-stroke-width: -1; "> </span></span></span></span></span></p> </blockquote></div></div></blockquote><div>Dave comments:<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: -1; "> </span></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"> <div style="word-wrap:break-word"><br><div>Reads like a typo - that these voters would vote for the one they think is most likely to be voted for by other voters.</div><div> </div></div></blockquote><div>I reply:</div><div> </div><div>The voters are certain that the winner will be either the Republican or the Democrat, and so they (nearly) all vote for the Republican or the Democrat. And so guess what?...The winner is therefore predictably always the Republican or the Democrat. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Assuming X is reported as likely to win, these voters would help this along by also voting for X, rather than voting for X or Y according to which they would prefer to have win.</div><div><br></div><div>Agreed that if X and Y are Rep and Dem, considering only among them as major candidates makes sense - but voting for the one reported as ahead fails as to being useful.<br><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote"> <div> </div><div>But thanks for your suggested wording-change, Dave.</div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"> <div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div> </div><div>Dave continues:<br></div></div></blockquote><div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"> <div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div>for Approval voters should:</div><div>. Start with their favorite.</div><div>. Add the best they see among possible winners - but not if this best likely will cause their favorite to lose.</div> <div> </div></div></blockquote><div>[endquote]</div><div> </div><div>Sounds about right. I like and agree with Dave's emphasis on avoiding helping an unliked compromise. You won't find any unliked compromises marked on my approval ballot. In Approval, one never approves an unacceptable candidate.</div> <div> </div><div>But I also refer Dave to the strategy suggestions in my Approval article at Democracy Chronicles, for voters who want to use strategy.</div><div> </div><div>But my best suggestion for voting in Approval is: Just approve (only) the candidates whom you like, trusts, &/or consider deserving of your support. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>If all you know is that you see X and Y as each deserving, you properly vote for both.</div><div><br></div><div>However, changing that to preferring X, and X and Y each being possible deserving winners, you need to consider:</div><div> If your vote will likely not affect which one wins, vote for both.</div><div> If voting for Y could cause Y to win over X, you think on this as part of deciding whether to also vote for Y.</div><div><br></div><div>It gets sticky. If considering only Y, then whether Y may be deserving is all you need as to voting. Add to this X being deserving, and you need to consider possibility of voting for both causing X to lose.<br><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote"> <div> </div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid" class="gmail_quote"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div>Mike Ossipoff</div></div></blockquote></div></blockquote></div><br><div>DWK</div></body></html>