<span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div>I'd said:<br><br><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Tricky isn’t the word for it. Try “unknown”, for most typical situations in Condorcet.<br>
</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">But
I told the expectation-maximizing strategy for a u/a election in which
Compromise is the only acceptable perceived to be able to beat Worse.
No, I’m not going to repeat it for you.<br><br>Juho says:<br><br></span></div></div></div></div></span><div><br></div><div>Since
you don't want to point out any such strategy<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I've only described it many times already, in replies to you. I'm not going to waste any more time repeating it for you. <br><br>Juho says:<br>
<br> I assume there is no such
single strategy that you want to recommend for all regular voters.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>To maximize expection with Condocet in a u/a election where Compromise is the only acceptable able to beat the unacceptables, rank Compromise alone in 1st place.<br>
<br>I don't know what you mean by "all regular voters". The above strategy is for voters who perceive the above-desecribed conditions.<br>If you want a general strategy for Condorcet, none is known.<br><br>Juho says:<br>
<br> Actually any working general strategy that regular voters or parties can
use will do, either for Approval or Condorcet, either <span style="color:rgb(31,73,125);font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:15px">expectation-maximizing
or other strategy that is expected to improve the outcome. But so far I
have thus not seen any (lots of u/a discussion though but no general
strategy for all situations).<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>No general strategy is known for Condordet. The general expectation-maximizing strategy of Approval is the better-than-expectation strategy.<br><br></span></div><div>
<span style="color:rgb(31,73,125);font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:15px">Juho says:<br><br></span></div><div><span style="color:rgb(31,73,125);font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:15px">I
got the two numeric examples though. Thanks for them. At least one of
them didn't however seem to work well enough, so I assume that the
theory and strategy behind those examples is not quite well thought yet.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>As usual you're vague. I have no idea what examples you're referring to. If you want to say that one of them isn't good enough, then you need to clearly specify it, and then tell what's wrong with it, and why you think so. <br>
<br></span></div><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">But
I fully admit that expectation-maximizing strategy isn’t known for
Condorcet in most typical situations. It isn’t that Condorcet doesn’t
need strategy. It’s just that you don’t know what the
expectation-maximizing strategy is. But don’t feel bad—no one else does
either.</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><br><br></div><div><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
In
theory there are cases where one could cheat the system. But in
practice sincerity is by far the best strategy that voters have in large
elections where voters make independent decisions. The challenge is to
find practical situations where regular voters, after hearing some poll
results (and possibly some poll based situation specific strategic
advices by the media), would have good reason to vote otherwise (in a
way that they can master an that is likely to improve the outcome).</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">I described one to you, and no, I’m not going to repeat it. I don’t have time to keep repeating things for you.</span></div>
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></span></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Sorry,
I don't recall, or maybe didn't identify the the general solution when I
read it. You might point that out to help my poor memory. :-)</div><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div><div><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]<br>
<br>No, sorry, I don't have time for that. I've repeated it enough already. I refer you to my previous replies. <br><br></span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">I’ve abundantly and sufficiently discussed that. It’s time to just agree to disagree.</span></div></div></div></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Ok.
My statement is pretty well covered above. My assumption is that you
wll stick to the claim that there are often working strategies in
Condorcet<span style="color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">…unknown
ones, yes. But I described a strategy for a particular situation,
showing that sometimes favorite-burial is optimal in Condorcet.</span></div></div></div></div></div></span></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>If
you describe a theoretical vulnerability or a practical strategy for
some specific situation, and the strategy is intended for regular people
or parties, then it can be made a general and usable strategy by adding
some criteria that tell the voters when that strategy should be
applied. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Fine. Then do so. Write a general strategy for Condorcet :-)<br><br><br>Juho says:<br><br>That would make the strategy a working strategy (although not
necessarily a strategy that would work often).<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Then it wouldn't be a general strategy, would it.<br><br></div><div><br></div><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">, and voters would be foolish toassume that they can generally vote sincerely.</div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Correct.</span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><br><br></div><div><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<br><br><br></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span><span style="font-size:11.5pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Two:
In Approval, if you like strategy, I’ve given simple instructions for
determining the way of voting that maximizes your expectation. I’ve
described it for u/a elections,</span></span></div></div><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">………..and for non-u/a elections.</span></div>
</div></div></div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"> </div></div></div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
I'd be interested in the one (or ones) that the regular voters are supposed to follow in real life Approvan elections.</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Any
one of them that they like, or any one of them that makes use of the
information, perception or feel possessed by the voter. Yes, in real
life Approval elections.</span></div></div></div></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"> </div></div>
<div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">That was not an answer. A concrete strategy please.</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">No,
actually that is an answer. I’ll repeat it again for you: Look at the
last part of my Approval article. If you feel that some part of the
strategy suggestions there are insufficiently “concrete”, then tell me
what it is that you need more details about. Ask a specific question.</span></div></div></div></div></div></span></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Ok, but which Approval article?<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>The one that I posted to EM. The one that is at Democracy Chronicles.<br>
<br></div><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><br><br></div><div><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div></div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="color:rgb(31,73,125)">You said:</span></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
</div></div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">You
mentioned also sincere approval of "approvable" canddates as a strategy
that could be recommended to the voters. Do you think Approval can
handle well situations where some voters or voter groups are strategic
while some are sincere?</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
</div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div>
</div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
</div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">It’s
easy to show strategizers taking advantage of sincere suckers in Range
or Majority Judgment. Maybe you’re saying that you fear that if you
approve the candidates you like, then the supporters of one of them will
take advantage of you by approving the candidates that they perceive as
acceptable, above-mean, or better-than-expectation. Sorry, but I don’t
see it. If you think that there’s a problem there, then you need to
explain what and why.</span></div></div></div></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"> </div></div><div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Simple example:</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
2: A>B>>C</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">1: B>>A>C</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
</div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">If
the first group of voters approves sincerely A and B, B will win. Ins't
this a good enough reason for the first group to vote strategically and
place the approval cutoff between the two potential winners? That is,
if they want to win and not just elect the most approved candidate.</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">If
you’ve approved some candidates whom you like, and one of them wins,
then I guess that I’m not quite understanding what your problem is.</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">If, on the other hand, you prefer to vote strategically, then of course you should do so.</span></div></div></div></div></div></span></blockquote>
<div>Juho says:<br><br></div></div><div>The
problem is that we usually talk about competitive political elections
where all the players want to win.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>You need to clarify, with yourself, what you mean, what you want. Do you mean that you only want your favorite to win? Then, in Approval, approve hir only. <br>
<br>If you want to maximize your expection, I've told Approval strategy for that purpose. <br><br>Juho says:<br><br>Few lines above you assumed that
people would use their burying possibilities to the maximum. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Available evidence indicates that many voters would do whatever it takes to maximally help Democrat against Republican.<br><br>Juho says:<br>
<br>I don't
understand why in this case voters would be indifferent with respect to
the outcome of the election. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>If you're asking about favorite-burial need in Approval, there is none. Those same voters wouldn't favorite-bury in Approval because it is transparently obvious that there can be no reason to do so.<br>
<br>But if you're questioning the assumption that people wouldn't strategize in Approval, I merely suggest voting for all whom you like. If you want to, you can strategize. Suit yourself.<br><br>Juho says:<br><br>
Maybe you recommend Approval as a good
method for non-competitive elections.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>...and for competitive elections. <br><br><br></div><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><br><br></div><div><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">As
for the defection problem, we’ve discussed it before, and the fact that
Approval has ways of dealing with it, and the fact that Condorcet fully
has that problem too.</span></div></div></div></div></div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"> </div></div>
<div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">Disagreed. I don't know how Approval can handle it.<span style="color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">I posted some solutions some months ago. I’ll find that posting and re-post it.</span></div>
</div></div></div></div></span></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Thanks.</div><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><span style="border-collapse:separate;font-family:Helvetica;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;line-height:normal;text-align:-webkit-auto;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;font-size:medium"><div lang="EN-US">
<div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">But
my suggestions included Forest’s solution in which the A voters give to
B only enough approvals such that if C’s favoriteness-percentage is as
estimated, then the larger of {A,B} will win. In Approval that would be
done probabilistically. The A voters tell the B voters that they should
do the same, if they don’t want C to win, and if the A faction might be
bigger than the B faction. No, not perfect, due to imperfect predictive
information, but still helpful.</span></div></div></div></div></div></span></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Without exactly knowing
what the strategy is, I note that in practical elections there may be
some problems with making the voters vote in line with the strategy.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>The strategy is as described above. Any difficulty in following it would be likewise encountered when it is needed in Condorcet.<br>
<br></div><br><div>One
more thing in my mind. Regular voters may be interested only in the
outcome of this election and never mind if their opponents get angry. <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Fine, with Tit-For-Tat in use, the B voters will keep defecting, and so will the A voters. But the B voters will know that as soon as the co-operate, so will the A voters.<br>
<br>Anyway, Forest's suggested solution has its effect in the current election. The non-secretness of a faction's voting intentions is also relevent to the current election.<br></div><div class="im"><blockquote type="cite">
<div lang="EN-US"><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span><br><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
This claim was just a reflection of your idea that Approval could "maximize expectation".<span style="color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Nonsense.
We haven’t been speaking of some methods that maximize expectation.
We’ve been speaking of expectation-maximizing strategies.</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div>
<div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif"><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">It’s been established and agreed on EM that the strategies that I’ve described do indeed maximize expectation in Approval.</span></div>
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><div class="im"><div><br></div></div><div>"agreed
on EM" :-)<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Correct. And many special cases of, implementations of, the better-than-expectation strategy have been well-known for a long time in the broader voting system discussion.<br><br>
Juho says:<br> <br>Are there multiple such strategies?<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>As I've already repeated for you many time, there is one expectation-maximizing strategy for Approval: Vote for the candidates who are better than expectation. That strategy can be implemented directly, or via various implementations that are special cases of it. <br>
<br>This time, pay attention, because I'm not going to repeat that for you again.<br><br><br>Juho says:<br><br> Does that mean that each
voter can pick his favourite, and they work well in sync that way?<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Yes to both questions. Pick whichever implementation you like or have the information or intuitive feel for. Remember that they're just special cases of the same strategy.<br>
<br></div><div class="im"><div><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div lang="EN-US"><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
Maybe better to focus on concrerte practcal strategic vulnerabilities (unless there is something more in this).</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">So focus on it then, instead of just making a vague reference to it.</span></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>
What
should I provide? I'm willing to be more concrete if you tell me what
you want.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>In general, what you should provide is the specifics of what you mean. You never do that, and no doubt you never will. That's why talking to you is a waste of time.<br><br>In particular, in this instance, you speak of focusing on concrete practical strategic vulnerabilities. I suggested that you specify and focus on one. <br>
<br>Juho says:<br><br>I'd like you to point out concrete and practical strategies
for real life elections for both or either of the methods.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I've written this sentence many times for you: I've pointed out a practical expectation-maximizing strategy for certain conditions in Condorcet elections. I've pointed out that no general strategy is known for Condorcet.<br>
<br>I've suggested concrete and practical strategies for real life elections with Approval. I've told you where to find them. I won't repeat it for you again. I refer you to my previous replies, and to my Approval article. The one that I posted to EM fairly recently. The one that is at Democracy Chronicles.<br>
<br><br></div><br><div class="im"><blockquote type="cite"><div lang="EN-US"><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
And in addition you say that any (your listed) strategy is ok. Why so? Is there no good working strategy that all could use?</div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">[endquote]</span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">Yes
there is. The better-than-expectation strategy. As I’ve said here many
times, all of the Approval expectation-maximizing strategies for
Approval are special cases of better-than-expectation.</span></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>I don't have a full description of that strategy yet.<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I've repeated it for you many times, and told you where to find it. I've helped you all I can. You're wasting my time.<br>
<br></div><br><div class="im"><br><blockquote type="cite"><div lang="EN-US"><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)">The
direct implementation of better-than-expectation could just consist of
approving the candidates who are better than (or maybe exactly as good
as) the result-merit that you expect from the election.</span></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div>Juho says:<br><br></div></div><div>Is
this the definition of the better-than-expectation strategy for regular
voters? <br><br>[endquote]<br><br>It's for any voter, regular or otherwise, who wants to vote strategically in Approval.<br><br>Juho says:<br><br>Does "or maybe" mean random selection or selection based on
what the voter feels like that day?<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>I said "(or maybe exactly as good as)" because approving a candidate who is exactly as good as your expectation doesn't affect your expectatation. It doesn't matter whether or not you approve a candidate who is exactly as good as your expectation. You can flip a coin, or yes, go by how you feel that day.<br>
<br>Juho says:<br><br>Does "result-merit that you expect"
mean the value of the (single) guessed winner or maybe the weighted
average of potential winners?<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Answer to both questions: Yes, if that's what you feel that you know, or have a perception or feel about.<br><br>People are not going to determine their expectation in the election by multiplying the win probability of each candidate by hir utility, and summing the products. But you can do that if you want to.<br>
<br><br>But you know how good a result you expect from the election.<br><br><br>Juho says:<br><br>Does the expectation refer to the sincere
opinions or does it include the expected strategic voting too (much more
complicated and cyclic)?<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>...if you want it to. <br><br>Do as complicated and elaborate an analysis as you want to, to try to calculate your expectation. It isn't for me to tell you if or how to calculate your expectation, if you want to calculate it. That's your business.<br>
<br>But, as I said above, you know how good a result you expect from the election.<br><br>Or, if you really don't, then just use the 0-info Approval strategy of approving the above-mean candidates.<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br>
<br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div lang="EN-US"><div><div><div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"></span></div><div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-left:0in;margin-bottom:0.0001pt;font-size:12pt;font-family:'Times New Roman',serif">
<span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;color:rgb(31,73,125)"> </span></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>